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INTRODUCTION 
What was meant by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause?1  Did it incorporate the U.S. Bill of Rights against the states 
or did it do something else?  In retrospect, the Clause has seemed to have 
the poignancy of a path not taken—a trail abandoned in the Slaughter-
House Cases and later lamented by academics, litigants, and even some 
judges.2  Although wistful thoughts about the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause may seem to lend legitimacy to incorporation, the Clause actually 
led in another direction.  Long-forgotten evidence clearly shows that the 
Clause was an attempt to resolve a national dispute about the Comity 
 
*  Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  For a wide range of help-
ful comments, I am grateful to many learned colleagues, including Randy Barnett, Michael Kent Curtis, 
Michael Dorf, Kurt Lash, James Lindgren, John McGinnis, Eduardo Peñalver, James Pfander, and the 
participants at the Cornell Law School faculty workshop and the Northwestern University School of 
Law Constitutional Law Colloquium. 
1  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
2  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 66, 74 (1873) (upholding law restricting slaughter-
ing to a city corporation and rejecting argument that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected indi-
viduals from their own states).  Among the judges who look back regretfully at the path not taken is 
Justice Thomas, whose concurrence in McDonald v. City of Chicago argues that the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause incorporated the Bill of Rights.  130 S. Ct. 3020, 3059–60 (2010) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
incorporates the Second Amendment against the states).  For the incorporation of incorporationist falla-
cies in Justice Thomas’s opinion, see infra note 305 and accompanying text. 
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Clause rights of free blacks.3  In this context, the phrase “the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States” was a label for Comity Clause 
rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment used this phrase to make clear that 
free blacks were entitled to such rights.  
The incorporation thesis runs into problems already on the face of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.  The Bill of Rights guarantees rights gen-
erally, without distinguishing citizens from other persons.  In contrast, the 
Fourteenth Amendment sharply juxtaposes the privileges or immunities of 
“citizens” with the due process and equal protection rights owed to “any 
person.”  It therefore is not easy to understand how the Amendment’s guar-
antee of the privileges or immunities of citizens can be understood to refer 
to the rights of persons protected by the Bill of Rights.4  
What then was the Privileges or Immunities Clause doing when it 
guaranteed that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall ab-
ridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”?  The 
answer lies in the nineteenth-century dispute about whether free blacks had 
the benefit of the Comity Clause.  This clause assured that “[t]he Citizens of 
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in 
 
3  According to the Comity Clause, “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
4  See Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 334, 342 (2005) (“No satisfactory inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . can elide the distinction between citizens and per-
sons . . . .”); Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 
78 n.16 (1963) (“[T]he provisions of the Bill of Rights are not rights of citizens only but are enjoyed by 
non-citizens as well.”). 
Recognizing that the focus on citizens seems incompatible with incorporation, Professor Akhil Amar 
defends incorporation by proposing that noncitizens were not necessarily protected by the Bill of Rights: 
“Surely the fact that Americans may often extend many benefits of our Bill [of Rights] to, say, resident 
aliens—for reasons of prudence, principle, or both—does not alter the basic fact that these rights are pa-
radigmatically rights of and for Americans citizens.”  AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 170 (1998).  A scholar attentive to the text, however, might recognize 
that the Constitution in 1789 and 1791, and the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, carefully distinguished 
between citizens and persons.  As Representative Bingham himself observed, “[t]he alien is not a citi-
zen,” and this was why “[y]our Constitution says ‘no person,’ not ‘no citizen,’ ‘shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property,’ without due process of law.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1866).  
Rather than focus on citizens, the Bill of Rights generally protects all persons enjoying the protection of 
the law, including all citizens, all lawfully visiting aliens in amity, most unlawfully present aliens in am-
ity, and even some enemy aliens.  See Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 
1977–78 (2009).  It therefore is troubling to read that “Americans may often extend many benefits of our 
Bill [of Rights] to . . . resident aliens”—as if the application of the Bill of Rights beyond citizens were 
merely discretionary.  In order to incorporate the Bill of Rights, Amar’s analysis profoundly curtails its 
application. 
Incidentally, the textual obstacle to incorporation cannot be explained away as an accident of draft-
ing, for the men who proposed the Amendment clearly were attentive to the distinction between the 
rights of persons and the privileges and immunities of citizens.  For details, see infra text accompanying 
notes 238–43, 252, 259–60. 
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the several States.”5  Many states, however, especially in the South, denied 
Comity Clause rights to free blacks—the justification being that only citi-
zens of the United States were entitled to the benefit of the Comity Clause 
and that free blacks were not U.S. citizens.  Opponents of slavery responded 
in kind, arguing that free blacks were U.S. citizens and so were entitled to 
the privileges and immunities secured by the Comity Clause.  Thus, each 
side interpreted this clause to exclude or include free blacks on the basis of 
whether or not they were federal citizens.  In these circumstances, oppo-
nents of slavery defended the Comity Clause rights of free blacks in terms 
of “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”  After 
the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment echoed this antislavery interpre-
tation of the Comity Clause and secured it in the Constitution.6 
The phrase employed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause thus has a history—indeed, a genealogy—that clearly 
reveals its historical meaning.  It will be seen that allusions to privileges 
and immunities could occur in different contexts with different meanings.7  
But only one combination of context, text, and meaning led directly to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, thereby revealing a historical genealogy that leaves 
the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause unmistakable.  Al-
though this history has been largely forgotten, it was once a central element 
in the struggle against slavery and a foundation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  And it had nothing to do with incorporation. 
1. The Missing Evidence.—The incorporation thesis has seemed 
plausible because scholars have tended to focus either on too narrow a slice 
of evidence (which excludes what is essential) or on too broad a range of 
evidence (which conflates different contexts).  In fact, although the relevant 
evidence comes from a wide array of sources, it arose in a specific context, 
in which “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” 
had a very specific meaning.  
Many scholars concentrate on too narrow a slice of evidence: the text 
of the Amendment and the debates about it in 1866 and 1868.  Hoping for 
enlightenment from the drafting and ratification debates, these scholars sift 
through the speeches of congressmen and others, searching for passages 
 
5  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
6  This Article uses the term “antislavery” more for its convenience than its clarity.  The privileges 
and immunities debate explored here concerned the rights of free blacks rather than of slaves, and this 
question often split Northerners, even those who shared a distaste for slavery.  See, e.g., Crandall v. 
State, 10 Conn. 339, 348 (1834), discussed in the text infra accompanying notes 104–07.  But increas-
ingly, opposition to interstate discrimination against free blacks became a core question for antislavery 
Americans.  Slavery became an all-or-nothing battle, and in this context, although there remained some 
opponents of slavery who did not favor privileges and immunities for free blacks, the privileges and 
immunities of free blacks became prominent as a central point of dispute in the broader quarrel. 
7  See infra Part IV.A. 
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that might, perhaps, have alluded to incorporation.8  Even most of the scho-
lars who have questioned incorporation (such as Charles Fairman) have 
worked from the same evidence, picking through the debates for hints of 
what the drafters or ratifiers might have thought.9  When those earlier 
Americans, however, discussed the Privileges or Immunities Clause, they 
 
8  William Nelson observes: “Nearly all the scholarship dealing with the adoption of the amendment 
which is addressed to lawyers is based on a single set of source materials: the debates of Congress . . . .”  
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL 
DOCTRINE 5 (1988) (footnote omitted).  Nonetheless, he believes that “[i]t is even more important to ask 
new questions than to examine more sources.”  Id. at 6. 
There is much learned scholarship finding incorporation in the debates, including MICHAEL KENT 
CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 92–130 
(1986) [hereinafter CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE]; JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870, at 258 (1978); AMAR, supra note 4, at 163–80; Akhil R. Amar, 
The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1218–33 (1992); Richard L. 
Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1295 
(2009); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE 
L.J. 57, 58–63 (1993); Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The 
Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2000) [hereinafter Cur-
tis, Historical Linguistics]; Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and 
Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996) [hereinafter Curtis, Resurrecting]; Michael Kent Curtis, The 
Klan, the Congress, and the Court: Congressional Enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments & the State Action Syllogism, a Brief Historical Overview, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1381, 
1406 (2009) [hereinafter Curtis, The Klan]; Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in 
the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 910–17 (1986); Kurt T. Lash, The 
Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1109 (1994). 
9  See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The 
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) [hereinafter Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment].  Even 
Fairman, however, conceded some partial incorporation.  Charles Fairman, What Makes a Great Jus-
tice? Mr. Justice Bradley and the Supreme Court, 1870–1892, 30 B.U. L. REV. 49, 77 (1950) (“Con-
gress, no doubt, . . . meant to establish some substantial rights even though the State might not itself 
have established them for its own citizens.”).   
Some scholars are mildly skeptical.  See, e.g., EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, 
AND CONGRESS, 1863–1869, at 117 (1990) [hereinafter MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS] (observing that incorpo-
ration has not been “proven beyond a reasonable doubt”); Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Con-
cepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 305, 337 (1988); George C. Thomas III, The Riddle 
of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor Wildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1627, 1657 (2007) 
(concluding that the Clause is a riddle). 
Others are more forcefully critical of incorporation.  See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY 
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 134–56 (1977); RAOUL 
BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888, at 342–51 (1985); 
Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down That 
Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1564, 1571–92 (1996); Stephen B. Presser, Some Alarming 
Aspects of the Legacies of Judicial Review and of John Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1495, 1497 
(2002). 
In addition, there are scholars who argue that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was understood to 
establish equality, even among a state’s own citizens.  See NELSON, supra note 8, at 115–18; John Harri-
son, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1388 (1992). 
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felt little need to explain a phrase that was widely understood.  As a result, 
the scholars who narrowly rely on the debates from the 1860s have rarely 
found much clarity, let alone much agreement.  They reach conflicting con-
clusions about incorporation, and many simply view the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause as a puzzle or mystery.10 
Other scholars look to a wider range of evidence and, on this basis, 
confidently conclude that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated 
the Bill of Rights, but their confidence rests on their assumption that privi-
leges and immunities were understood in the same way in different con-
texts.  For example, Michael Kent Curtis quotes abolitionists who argued in 
terms of “privileges and immunities” to defend their freedom of speech and 
the press in Southern states.11  It will be seen, however, that these arguments 
for the rights of abolitionists, however, typically did not go beyond ordinary 
Comity Clause claims, and to the extent the arguments touched on some-
thing like incorporation, they were made in a different context and thus had 
a different meaning from the arguments that led to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Similarly, Akhil Amar quotes the 
abolitionist Joel Tiffany, who argued against slavery on the ground that all 
Americans enjoyed the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens against 
both the federal and the state governments.12  Again, however, it will be-
come apparent that such arguments for privileges and immunities had a dif-
ferent context and meaning from the claims that led to the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.  Another incorporationist scholar, Kurt Lash, recog-
nizes that “privileges and immunities” could be discussed in different con-
texts, but he then cuts across contexts by assuming that the phrase 
“privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” was a “legal 
 
10  Many commentators have thought the Clause puzzling.  According to the Beards, the entire first 
article of the Amendment was “mysterious” and “cabalistic.”  2 CHARLES & MARY BEARD, THE RISE OF 
AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 111–14 (Macmillan 1930) (1927).  Seizing upon such assumptions to impute 
meaning where none was clearly discernable, Justice Jackson argued that “the difficulty of the task does 
not excuse us from giving these general and abstract words whatever of specific content and concrete-
ness they will bear as we mark out their application, case by case.”  Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 
160, 183 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also NELSON, supra note 8, at 3–5 (noting “conflicting 
interpretations” and arguing that the uncertain meaning leaves judges free to develop incorporation).  
Gerald Gunther writes: “In no part of the congressional debates on the Amendment is there greater evi-
dence of vagueness and inconsistencies than in the discussions of ‘privileges and immunities.’”  
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 417 (11th ed. 1985).  Perhaps most famously, Robert Bork 
analogized the Clause to an inkblot or Rorschach test.  ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: 
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 166 (1990). 
11  MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 266–68 (2000) [hereinafter CURTIS, DARLING 
PRIVILEGE]; CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 8, at 26–56; Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill 
of Rights and the States: An Overview from One Perspective, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 20–25 
(2009).  
12  AMAR, supra note 4, at 262–63.  Incidentally, the nineteenth-century Americans who made 
claims for slaves and abolitionists in terms of privileges and immunities did not always distinguish be-
tween the privileges and immunities of state citizens and those of citizens of the United States.  
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term of art.”13  To be precise, he notes that, in treaties ceding territories to 
the United States, the federal government generally guaranteed federal 
rights to the inhabitants of these territories, assuring them that they would 
enjoy “the privileges, rights and immunities of citizens of the United 
States.”14  On this basis, Lash assumes that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
words “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” also gen-
erally referred to federal rights—apparently not recognizing that the 
Amendment actually differed from the cession treaties, using a different 
phrase to deal with a different problem in a different context.15  
In contrast to the existing scholarship, the approach taken in this Arti-
cle is neither so narrow nor so broad.  On the one hand, the Article exam-
ines a much wider range of evidence than the debates from the late 1860s, 
and it thereby recognizes that those debates discussed an idea that was al-
ready widely familiar.  On the other hand, rather than assume that all pre-
1868 discussions of privileges and immunities matter for understanding the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, it focuses on the 
line of discussion that led directly to the adoption of this clause.  The privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States were discussed in dif-
ferent contexts, in different ways, and with different meanings, and it is 
therefore essential to focus on the genealogy and meaning of the specific 
ideas that actually led to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.16 
The privileges and immunities controversy that matters for understand-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment can be observed in a line of evidence that 
has hitherto been largely ignored.  Fortunately, Paul Finkelman has ele-
gantly explored some of the pre-Civil War history of privileges and immu-
nities, and this Article relies on his work.17  But no scholar has traced the 
central genealogy of ideas that matter here—an evolution of ideas, from at 
least 1821 to 1866, that concerned the mobility of free blacks and that often 
was framed in terms of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States.18  
 
13  Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and Immu-
nities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241, 1244, 1287 (2010).  For further details, see in-
fra text accompanying notes 154–56.   
14  Lash, supra note 13, at 1285.  
15  Id. at 1285–87.  Similarly, Amar observes that the “rights, and privileges and immunities” of citi-
zens of the United States could mean the rights held under federal law.  AMAR, supra note 4, at 170.   
16  For some of the different contexts, phrases, and meanings, see infra Part IV.A. 
17  Paul Finkelman shows how mobility threatened slavery and how the resulting tensions soon 
overwhelmed the fragile structure of the Comity Clause.  PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: 
SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 9 (1981).  Also relevant, for the shift toward federal citizenship, is 
the work of Robert Kaczorowski, although his work assumes that this shift and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment entailed incorporation.  Kaczorowski, supra note 8, at 910, 913. 
18  The conclusion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause echoed the Comity Clause is not unfa-
miliar, but it rests mostly on the relatively thin foundation of the 1866 congressional debates.  For ex-
ample, Fairman alludes to the possibility of a Comity Clause reading, but apparently hesitates to 
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Indeed, the scholarship on the Fourteenth Amendment scarcely even 
recognizes the events and statements that provoked, popularized, and gave 
legal expression to the ideas that ended up in the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.  Although the first Missouri Compromise, in 1820, appears in much 
scholarship on the Fourteenth Amendment, the second Missouri Compro-
mise, in 1821, is scarcely mentioned.  Although Corfield v. Coryell gets 
discussed in anodyne and even celebratory fashion, its context in the second 
Missouri Compromise, and its racist implications for excluding blacks from 
privileges and immunities, are simply ignored.19  Although Dred Scott v. 
Sandford in 1857 is recognized as important, the scholarship tends to dwell 
on the implications of the case for the first Missouri Compromise, thus dis-
tracting attention from what Justice Curtis, in his dissent, said about the 
second.20  Furthermore, although the vague words of white legislators are 
parsed as if they were the Rosetta Stone of constitutional law, the public 
                                                                                                                           
embrace it.  Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 9, at 56.  The current scholarly attitude toward 
this position is almost one of incredulity: 
Scholars do not generally seem to have thought much about this issue, perhaps because it is so un-
likely that a state would think of discriminatorily denying any Bill of Rights guarantees to out-of-
state visitors.  Think about it.  Could it really be imagined that a state, under Article IV, could 
properly deny such travelers freedom of speech, or trial by jury, while maintaining such rights for 
its own citizens? 
Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and Commentary on the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1867–1873, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 153, 195 (2009).  
In contrast, Michael Kent Curtis takes the Comity Clause interpretation of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause seriously, and his response to it is therefore particularly detailed and interesting.  See Curtis, 
Resurrecting, supra note 8, at 44–67.  His arguments against the Comity Clause interpretation, however, 
are misplaced.   
The first argument is that “Republicans were deeply concerned about denials of free speech” and 
that under “the equality argument,” a state “could deny basic rights if it denied them to all residents of 
the state also.”  Id. at 46–47.  It is true that abolitionists and then Republicans were concerned about 
freedom of speech in Southern states, and it is true that Southern states could for some purposes wiggle 
out of guarantees of equality.  But just because Republicans worried about free speech does not mean 
that they generally doubted the efficacy of equality guarantees or that they addressed this danger in the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause or, indeed, in any other constitutional guarantee.  Although the free 
speech rights of abolitionists mattered, the rights of free blacks seemed far more central, and what free 
blacks needed was equality—equal protection within their own states and cross-jurisdictional equality 
when they went to other states.   
Curtis’s second argument is that the word “abridge” in the Privileges or Immunities Clause alluded 
to any diminishment of the relevant rights, not merely to discrimination.  Id. at 47.  In the abstract, this 
sounds significant, but it is, in fact, irrelevant to the argument here.  The Comity Clause addressed inter-
state discrimination, and this Article argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause barred states from 
diminishing or “abridging” Comity Clause rights.   
Third, Curtis denies that the Privileges or Immunities Clause merely gave effect to a narrow reading 
of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.  Id. at 50.  This, however, is another irrelevant point, for this Article does 
not place the Privileges or Immunities Clause on the Civil Rights Act, but instead argues that the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause echoed another 1866 statute: Representative Shellabarger’s Privileges and 
Immunities Bill.  See infra Parts V.B–C, VI.A. 
19  Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). 
20  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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statements of blacks about the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States have been omitted from the scholarship, thus treating the 
blacks like invisible men.  Even more astonishing is the neglect of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Bill of 1866.  Although the Bill recited the key phras-
ing that would appear three weeks later in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Bill’s significance has gone entirely 
unrecognized.21  Indeed, it would appear that scholars of the Amendment 
have never even read the Bill.  Finally, although two national movements in 
the 1870s proposed constitutional amendments incorporating the First 
Amendment, the implications for the Fourteenth Amendment are ignored.  
Overall, the scholarship thus offers a strange contrast: it scours debates, ca-
sual comments, and even private letters from 1866 and later to show the in-
tent of the framers and ratifiers of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but 
it fails to explore the most important public records relating to the Clause.22 
This largely public evidence removes the uncertainty about “the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States” and challenges the 
confident claims about incorporation.  The phrase used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment was the label for a position that opponents of slavery had de-
veloped over the course of the prior half century—a position that concerned 
not incorporation, but the privileges and immunities to which citizens of the 
states were entitled under the Comity Clause.  The Privileges or Immunities 
Clause was thus an almost literal restatement of a familiar antislavery posi-
tion, and once this is understood, the mystery of the Clause comes to an 
end.   
2. The Underlying Legal and Sociological Problems.—The historical 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause 
may initially seem strangely redundant and poorly expressed.  Why would 
the Fourteenth Amendment reassert the privileges and immunities already 
assured to state citizens by the Comity Clause?  And why would it do so in 
terms of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States?   
This sense of redundancy and misexpression is reinforced by the view 
that the Slaughter-House Cases rendered the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause meaningless.  These cases, according to Justice Field’s dissent, re-
duced the Clause to “a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished noth-
 
21  A Bill to Declare and Protect All the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States in 
the Several States, H.R. 437, 39th Cong. (1866).  See infra Part V.B. 
22  A recent article summarizes the frustrations of seeking the framers’ personal intent: “Unfortu-
nately for historians attempting to learn more concerning the drafters’ intent, no record of the Commit-
tee’s debates exists, and ‘extensive investigation of private correspondence by a legion of historians has 
unearthed only the most fragmentary evidence on the issue.’”  Douglas G. Smith, A Lockean Analysis of 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1095, 1136 (2002) (quoting 
MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 81). 
For the contrast between the intent of framers and the intent, sense, or meaning of their legislative 
act, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 49–52, 57, 295–96 (2008). 
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ing.”23  Even Charles Fairman writes that, as a result, the Clause has “per-
form[ed] virtually no duty as an operative part of the Constitution.”24  This 
assumption has become ever more widespread, leading some scholars to 
pronounce that “everyone agrees the Court incorrectly interpreted the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause.”25  From this point of view, there is a “schol-
arly consensus” in favor of incorporation and against the Slaughter-House 
Cases.26   
 
23  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting). 
24  Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 9, at 139.  
25  Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 627 (1994) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY, 195 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court “set aside” the “original meaning” of the Clause).   
26  See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CONTEXT 292 (2008); Richard 
L. Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of Rights Against the States: The History and the Future, 18 J. CONTEMP. 
L. ISSUES 77, 151 (2009) (quoting Barnett).  
Rather than criticize Slaughter-House, a recent article concludes that “[a] careful examination re-
veals nothing in Slaughter-House that is inconsistent with incorporation.”  Gerard N. Magliocca, Why 
Did the Incorporation of the Bill of Rights Fail in the Late Nineteenth Century?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 102, 
105 (2009).  See, however, infra note 304, for the words of Justice Miller.   
In support of its conclusion about Slaughter-House, that article argues that “[t]he anti-incorporation 
reading did not emerge until . . . three decades after Slaughter-House.”  Magliocca, supra, at 105.  This 
argument, however, relies on very narrow evidence: the opinions of judges in the federal courts.  Out-
side the courts, those who sought incorporation of First Amendment rights assumed that they needed an 
additional amendment.  See infra Part VII.  Moreover, newspaper and periodical literature shows that 
contemporaries understood Slaughter-House to have rejected incorporation.  For example, a newspaper 
article noted that the opinion of the Court “was substantially a definition of State and National citizen-
ship, with a separation of the rights which distinctively belong to each.”  Another View of State Rights, 
N.Y. DAILY TRIB., May 5, 1873, at 4.  Incidentally, when incorporation was more widely demanded, 
such observations about Slaughter-House became widespread.  For example, when speaking of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a professor at the University of Virginia said that the Supreme Court in Slaugh-
ter-House, “instead of intimating for a moment that the rights and privileges secured under this amend-
ment were those specified in the first eight amendments, specif[ied] others which, according to 
circumstances, may be regarded as the immunities and privileges intended.”  JAMES H. GILMORE, 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND NOTES OF A COURSE 
OF LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 313 (1891).  Similarly, Andrew McLaugh-
lin noted that Slaughter-House rejected the proposition that the “‘privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the United States’ . . . include the restrictions in the first eight amendments.”  Andrew McLaughlin, 
Mississippi and the Negro Question, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1892, at 828, 835.  For this point, at 
much greater length, with a citation to Slaughter-House, see J.I. CLARK HARE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 539 (1889). 
One criticism of Justice Miller’s opinion in Slaughter-House is that whenever he quoted the Comity 
Clause, he rewrote it to allude to “citizens of the several states” rather than, as in the Constitution, “citi-
zens in the several states.”  LOUIS LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?: A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME 
COURT’S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 194–95 (1975); Richard L. Aynes, Unintended Conse-
quences of the Fourteenth Amendment and What They Tell Us About Its Incorporation, 39 AKRON L. 
REV. 289, 299 (2006).  Rather than deceptive misquotation, however, this probably was an attempt to 
clarify the meaning of the Clause after so many decades of reinterpretation and rewriting.  For the re-
writing, see infra text accompanying notes 181–83. 
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Yet the oddity of a redundant or meaningless amendment is largely a 
product of modern sensibilities.  It arises, at the very least, from the as-
sumption that the central question is incorporation and that anything else is 
lesser fare.  It arises even more emphatically from a failure of imagina-
tion—a failure to recognize that, in 1866, the purpose of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause was not to give blacks new rights, but to secure them in 
rights that, in theory, they already possessed.  Comity Clause rights were al-
ready guaranteed, but this is not to say they were already enjoyed.  Only by 
understanding this can one begin to recognize the nineteenth-century legal 
problem.   
Put another way, the legal problem was not centrally about what was 
protected but about who was protected.  When scholars assume that the Pri-
vileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the Bill of Rights, they are apt to 
think that the essential question is to determine what rights were considered 
privileges or immunities.  And certainly among whites the question of what 
was protected had great salience.  When free blacks, however, increasingly 
were excluded from Southern states, and thus were denied the privileges 
and immunities of local citizens, the question shifted.  Both for blacks and 
for those who despised them, the primary issue now was not what was pro-
tected, but who was protected, and once one recognizes this, the seriousness 
of the Comity Clause question becomes inescapable. 
As if the legal difficulty were not enough, it ultimately arose from a 
sociological problem. When the question was merely one of white mobility, 
the Comity Clause solved it by guaranteeing visiting citizens the privileges 
and immunities of local citizens.  But when free blacks in the nineteenth 
century increasingly crossed state lines, the Comity Clause’s solution col-
lapsed under the weight of local prejudice.  The Clause would further im-
plode when slaveholders who traveled north with their slaves were told by 
Northern courts that they could not keep their property.27  The point here, 
however, is that the interstate movement of free blacks had already begun to 
fracture the Comity Clause and that, in defense of this mobility, antislavery 
Americans came to interpret the Clause in terms of the privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States.28  Under the Comity Clause, free 
blacks traveling south could claim the local rights enjoyed by whites, and 
 
27  See FINKELMAN, supra note 17, at 9–13 (showing how comity broke down when, beginning in 
the 1830s, Southern slaveholders in Northern states were denied their right of property in their slaves).  
Although Finkelman focuses mostly on the claims of slaveowners and their slaves rather than those of 
free blacks, his argument generally supports the point here about the claims of free blacks.  Incidentally, 
Finkelman notes that courts had difficulty maintaining the distinctions among transients, visitors, so-
journers, and residents.  Id. at 9.  In this spirit, this Article casually speaks of travelers, visitors, and oth-
er mobile Americans without drawing distinctions among such persons.   
28  The attention to the Comity Clause claims by slaveowners has unfortunately distracted attention 
from the significance of such claims by, or on behalf of, free blacks.  See, e.g., id. at 280–81 (focusing 
on claims by slaveowners and only briefly discussing claims by free blacks); Lash, supra note 8, at 
1146–49 (regarding claims by slaveowners).   
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this was intolerable to Southerners.29  Put sociologically, the mobility and 
freedom of a modernizing society collided with a peculiarly stationary and 
restrictive local institution.  When faced with this sort of contradiction, the 
Comity Clause, a mere paper solution, could not be very effective.30  Mod-
ernization, in other words, had stimulated a struggle between local prejudice 
and federal rights of mobility, and the depth of this problem suggests why 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause had to reas-
sert what the Comity Clause had already guaranteed. 
It thus makes sense that the Privileges or Immunities Clause concerned 
Comity Clause rights rather than incorporation.  Blacks had little need for 
assurances of any particular substantive federal rights, let alone incorpora-
tion.  But they had a great need for federal guarantees of voting, due proc-
ess, and especially equality—both local equality and cross-jurisdictional 
equality.  It therefore should be no surprise that advocates for blacks, in-
cluding advocates for the Fourteenth Amendment, focused on these ques-
tions rather than on incorporation. 
Nor should it be a surprise that, although the Comity Clause guaran-
teed the privileges and immunities of state citizens, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment restored this guarantee in terms of the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States.  Southerners had avoided the Comity Clause’s 
guarantee of interstate mobility and equality by denying that blacks could 
be citizens of the United States.  In response, Northerners defended Comity 
Clause rights as the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States.  In effect, Southerners had turned the phrases “privileges and immu-
nities” and “citizens of the United States” into terms of evasion.  These 
were therefore the terms on which Northerners self-consciously took their 
constitutional stand.  
3. A Pair of Conceptual Distinctions.—Conceptually, the evidence 
examined here points to distinctions that are incompatible with an incorpo-
rationist reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  The incorporation 
theory rests on the sweeping assumption that the privileges and immunities 
of citizens of the United States were the rights enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights—or perhaps, even more broadly, all rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution.  The evidence, however, leads to more refined distinctions. 
First, like the preexisting Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment 
carefully distinguished between the rights of persons and the privileges and 
immunities of citizens.  The leading advocates of the Amendment, more-
over, emphasized this distinction.31  Of course, from the perspective of in-
 
29  Slaveowners who took their property north did not ordinarily have to worry about citizenship is-
sues when making Comity Clause claims, and their slaves did not usually rest their claims on the Comity 
Clause.  Free blacks, however, depended on the Clause to protect them from states that sought to ex-
clude or enslave them. 
30  For hints of this point, see FINKELMAN, supra note 17, at 9–13. 
31  See id. 
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corporation, the distinction seems incongruous, and it therefore usually gets 
left by the wayside.  It is, however, essential, for it reveals how the Four-
teenth Amendment, in guaranteeing the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States, referred not to all rights that the Constitution secured 
to persons, but only to the privileges and immunities it assured to citizens.  
Second, rather than grant rights abstractly, the U.S. Constitution pro-
tected rights by limiting government, and in so doing, it distinguished be-
tween limits on the federal government and limits on the states.  Thus, 
whereas only the states could abridge the limits in Article I, Section 10, and 
Article IV, Section 2, only the federal government could abridge the limits 
in Article I, Section 9, and in the first eight amendments.  As a result, al-
though a state could abridge a right that consisted of a limitation on the 
states, it was difficult to conclude that it could abridge a right that consisted 
of a limit on the federal government.  The Supreme Court addressed this 
question—one “of great importance, but not of much difficulty”—in Bar-
ron v. Baltimore, holding that “the fifth amendment must be understood as 
restraining the power of the general government, not as applicable to the 
states.”32  The incorporation theory supposes that the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause overrode this distinction.  By contrast, this Article shows that 
when the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from abridging the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States, it alluded to the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens that the Constitution secured against the 
states, not those guaranteed against the federal government.  In the abstract, 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States included all 
rights secured to citizens, including not only Comity Clause rights but also 
the right to hold federal legislative and presidential office.33  But of these 
rights, only the Comity Clause rights were limits on the states, and therefore 
only these were the sort of privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens that a 
state could abridge.  The drafter of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
Representative John Bingham, nicely summarized this point.  After quoting 
Barron and similar sources, he asked: “Why . . . should not the ‘injunctions 
and prohibitions,’ addressed by the people in the Constitution to the States 
and the Legislatures of States, be enforced by the people through the pro-
posed amendment?”34   
The evidence thus draws attention to some revealing conceptual points.  
The incorporation theory assumes that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
concerned the Bill of Rights or, more generally, the rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution.  The Clause and its history, however, suggest further distinc-
tions, which require one to focus on the privileges and immunities of citi-
 
32  32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). 
33  For the restriction of legislative and presidential office to citizens of the United States, see U.S. 
CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; art. II, § 1. 
34  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866) (statement of Rep. John Bingham on Feb. 28, 
1866). 
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zens and, in particular, on those that limited the states and so could be 
abridged by the states.  These distinctions are important, for they show how 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause was written, and still can be read, with-
out reference to incorporation. 
4. Overview of the Argument.—This Article lays out the argument 
chronologically, in seven stages.  Part I examines the privileges and immu-
nities problem in an era in which it was mostly a question about whites—
showing how the Comity Clause solved the problem of mobility in a federal 
system by guaranteeing to the citizens of each state the privileges and im-
munities of the citizens of the other states.  Part II shows how this solution 
collapsed under the stresses of slavery, especially when Missouri attempted 
to evade the Comity Clause by excluding free blacks.  It further shows how 
the congressional solution in the second Missouri Compromise refocused 
the debate in a way that led antislavery Americans to argue that free blacks 
enjoyed Comity Clause rights as citizens of the United States.  Part III ob-
serves that Justice Curtis, in his 1857 dissenting opinion in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, gave great prominence to the antislavery position.  Part IV ex-
plains that already before the Civil War, Americans not only defended the 
Comity Clause rights of free blacks on the ground that they were citizens of 
the United States but also began to describe Comity Clause rights as “the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”  Tellingly, the 
American who did this most prominently was Representative John Bing-
ham, who would later draft the Fourteenth Amendment.  Part V shows that 
Congress, in early 1866, considered a bill that would have protected Comity 
Clause rights on the ground that they were “the privileges and immunities 
of citizens of the United States.”  Part VI shows that, after the bill failed to 
pass because of constitutional objections, Congress instead adopted the 
bill’s language in the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Article thus traces the 
long-forgotten genealogy of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and it the-
reby shows that this clause was designed to settle the dispute over the Com-
ity Clause rights of free blacks. 
Last but not least, the Article adds an epilogue, Part VII, on two na-
tional movements that demanded a sort of incorporation.  In the years im-
mediately following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, these 
movements sought a separation of church and state, and because they as-
sumed that the Constitution had not yet incorporated the Bill of Rights, they 
campaigned for amendments to apply the First Amendment to the states.  
Evidently, Americans were perfectly capable of an open and vigorous de-
bate about incorporation.  Yet rather than do this in 1866 and 1868, in re-
sponse to racial problems, they did it in the next decade, in response to 
concerns about religion.   
In sum, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause 
did not concern the rights of persons in general under the Constitution.  In-
stead, it guaranteed the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
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States, which were understood to be the privileges and immunities that be-
longed to such citizens under the Comity Clause. 
I. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES UNDER THE COMITY CLAUSE 
The traditional privileges and immunities problem in international law 
was how to assure travelers from one jurisdiction of local rights when in 
another jurisdiction.  Already in Europe, the solution lay in guarantees of 
“privileges and immunities.”  In America, the Comity Clause offered an 
unusually generous version of this protection, for the Clause generally se-
cured each state citizen in the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
other states.  This protected at least white Americans in cross-jurisdictional 
rights.  Among whites, therefore, the most salient Comity Clause question 
concerned not who was protected, but exactly what was protected. 
A. The Privileges and Immunities Problem 
The underlying problem arose from mobility.  A citizen of one state 
who traveled in or through another state had reason to fear that the other 
state might deny him rights there.  Although this was already a standard 
problem in Europe, it became especially significant in America, where indi-
viduals were relatively mobile, and where they traveled among states that 
were united in a federal system.  In these circumstances, it was particularly 
important to assure citizens from any one state of local rights in other states.  
The Comity Clause of the U.S. Constitution therefore adopted a very com-
prehensive guarantee of privileges and immunities. 
The phrase “privileges and immunities” could be used for many pur-
poses.  Seeking to understand this locution, scholars have explored the 
meaning of the separate words “privileges” and “immunities” and the com-
bined words “privileges and immunities.”35  But of particular interest here, 
the phrase “privileges and immunities” was the conventional phrase with 
which European treaties assured that the subjects or citizens of one nation 
would enjoy local rights in another.36   
In guaranteeing privileges and immunities, European treaties specified 
two variables: first, who had a right to the guaranteed privileges and immu-
 
35  These studies of the meaning of the words tend to argue that the words “privileges” and “immuni-
ties” were understood to include freedom of speech and the press and the other sorts of rights that are 
enumerated in the U.S. Bill of Rights.  See, e.g., Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note 8, at 1146–48; 
Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 8, at 20; Curtis, The Klan, supra note 8, at 1406; Lash, supra note 8, at 
1146–49.  The studies also show that the words “rights,” “liberties,” “privileges,” and “immunities” 
were often used “interchangeably.”  CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 8, at 64–65.  Al-
though such evidence is interesting, it is of doubtful relevance.  What matters here is not the generic 
meaning of the words, but the meaning of a particular phrase in a particular context and how the phrase 
came to be adopted in a particular amendment. 
36  The treaties could also employ variants of the phrase, such as “privileges, rights and immunities.”  
See, e.g., infra note 154. 
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nities, and, second, what privileges and immunities were guaranteed.  There 
was no predetermined answer to either question, for both depended on ne-
gotiations and ultimately on the wording of the treaty or other document in 
which the privileges and immunities were secured.  With regard to who was 
protected, treaty clauses could focus on a nation’s merchants, its natural 
subjects, or its subjects when in another nation.  As for what privileges and 
immunities were protected, one solution was to enumerate them.  A more 
practicable approach was to tie them to the same privileges and immunities 
granted to the peoples of other nations—this being a most-favored-nation 
provision.37  Going even further, some nations reciprocally guaranteed each 
other’s subjects the privileges and immunities of local subjects.38   
This was the approach taken by American constitutional documents.  
The Articles of Confederation formed a sort of contract or treaty among 
confederated states.  Under such an arrangement, which was more national 
than international, there was particularly good reason to assure visiting citi-
zens of local rights and, moreover, to measure such rights by whatever the 
local state gave its own citizens: 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among 
the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of 
these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; 
and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from 
any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and com-
merce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabi-
tants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far 
as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other 
State of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, du-
ties or restriction shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United 
States, or either of them.39  
Conceptually, this was an elegant solution to the questions of who enjoyed 
local rights and what rights were included.  The phrasing, however, was 
cumbersome. 
 
37  For example, a treaty provided: “[T]he English merchants and other subjects of the King of Great 
Britain shall enjoy the same, and as great privileges and immunities, as to their being imprisoned, ar-
rested, or any other way molested in their persons, houses, books of accounts, merchandizes and goods, 
within the extent of the states of the most renowned King of Portugal, as have been, or shall be for the 
future granted to any Prince or people in alliance with the King of Portugal.”  Articles of Peace and 
Commerce, Gr. Brit.-Port., art. XV, Jan. 29, 1642, in 2 A COLLECTION OF TREATIES BETWEEN GREAT 
BRITAIN AND OTHER POWERS 257–58, 265 (George Chalmers ed., 1790). 
38  In their August 25, 1761 treaty, France and Spain reportedly guaranteed that “their natural born 
subjects are to enjoy all rights, privileges and immunities, &c. in both kingdoms.”  JOHN ALMON, AN 
IMPARTIAL HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR 332 (1763). 
39  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 76 
Desiring simplicity, the framers of the Constitution retained only the 
basic concept employed by the Articles of Confederation.40  They merely 
stated in their Comity Clause that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be enti-
tled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”41   
The rest of what had appeared in the equivalent clause of the Articles 
of Confederation probably seemed redundant.  It will be seen that if a state 
denied some rights to paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice, such 
rights were probably not among the privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the state, for they were not among the privileges and immunities enjoyed by 
citizens as such.  The framers of the Constitution, therefore, did not need to 
exclude “paupers, vagabonds and fugitives” from access to the “Privileges 
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”42  Similarly, it was unnec-
essary to specify that the promised privileges and immunities were those of 
“free” citizens in the several states, for citizens were understood to be free, 
and therefore what a state did not give its slave population was irrelevant to 
what it owed the citizens of other states.  As for rights of ingress and re-
gress, commercial privileges, and freedom from unequal restrictions, these 
were apt to be considered among the privileges and immunities of the citi-
zens of a state.  Eventually, during the contest over slavery, some states 
would deny the right of ingress to black citizens of other states, thus nearly 
bringing the entire constitutional edifice to the ground.  But at least among 
whites, such details about what was guaranteed, although occasionally a 
source of difference, were not a source of danger.  
B. Three Conceptions of What Was Protected 
When Comity Clause disputes arose from the claims of white Ameri-
cans, the most salient question was what was protected.  The conflicting vi-
sions of what was protected are not the main focus of this inquiry, for in the 
nineteenth century, amid the struggle over slavery, the more central ques-
tion would become who was protected.  This would therefore be the focus 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Nonethe-
less, the question of what became central in the debates about who, and it is 
therefore important to understand that there were at least three different 
conceptions of what was protected.43   
 
40  In a central drafting document from the 1787 Convention, the Committee of Detail explained that 
it was desirable “[t]o use simple and precise language, and general propositions, according to the exam-
ple of the constitutions of the several states.”  Edmund Randolph, Draft Sketch of Constitution, in 
SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 183 (James 
H. Hutson ed., 1987). 
41  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
42  Id. 
43  Of course, even among whites, there were some doubts as to who could claim the privileges and 
immunities of the citizens of a state.  Such questions arose, for example, when Massachusetts in 1785 
contemplated a statute denying the privileges and immunities of its citizens to Tories who had fled to 
join the British but later returned to other states and then, after the war, came back to Massachusetts.  
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These different approaches had to reconcile an underlying tension be-
tween national and local interests.  On the one hand, from the national per-
spective, a visitor needed and deserved a broad range of local rights.  On the 
other hand, from the state point of view, he could not justifiably expect 
every sort of local right enjoyed by every sort of local citizen.  For example, 
imagine that a New Yorker spent a week in Ohio, including the day when 
that state held its elections; moreover, imagine that he happened to spend all 
his money before the end of the week.  This improvident New Yorker sure-
ly did not have a right to poor relief from Ohio, let alone a right of suffrage 
in Ohio’s elections, for this would jeopardize the interests of the state and 
its citizens.  It was thus apparent that although a visitor enjoyed the rights of 
local citizens, he could not be understood to have all of their rights.44   
This tension gave rise to the three basic conceptions of what rights 
were protected by the Comity Clause.  Each conception had its draw-
backs—and the first two posed particularly significant difficulties—but all 
three approaches to what was protected need to be understood in prepara-
tion for understanding the question of who was protected. 
1. Delaying Access.—One solution was to delay access to some 
rights.  From this perspective, the privileges and immunities of citizens 
could be defined very broadly—even so broadly as to include any right that 
                                                                                                                           
Many legislators doubted the constitutionality of this measure under the Articles of Confederation, and 
when the question was put to the justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, they gave an ad-
visory opinion: 
[T]hat all Persons, who are or shall be naturalized, by any State in the Union, from any Class or 
denomination of Aliens, are by the Confederation, Considered as Intitled to all the priviledges, 
and immunities of free Cityzens in the several States; and of Course in this Commonwealth when-
ever they shall come to reside within the same. 
Opinion of Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court on an Article of the Confederation (June 22, 1785) 
(docketed Oct. 19, 1785), MSA, Senate Documents, Rejected Bills, 1785, No. 344, Box 11.  For further 
details, see HAMBURGER, supra note 22, at 597–600.   
In another eighteenth-century decision, Bayard v. Singleton, the North Carolina judges seem to have 
come close to assuming that the Comity Clause not merely gave visitors the rights of citizens, but re-
quired that they be deemed citizens for some purposes.  A North Carolina statute (which protected pur-
chasers of confiscated Tory lands) barred the plaintiffs from enjoying a jury trial, and the judges held 
that the enactment violated the North Carolina Constitution.  The plaintiffs, however, were from New 
York, and the judges therefore had to consider the privileges and immunities question.  According to a 
newspaper, they held that “[t]hese plaintiffs being citizens of one of the United States, are citizens of 
this State, by the confederation of all the States; which is to be taken as a part of the law of the land, un-
repealable by any act of the General Assembly.”  Bayard v. Singleton (N.C. Super. Ct. 1787), as re-
ported in Correspondence (Newbern, June 7), VA. INDEP. CHRON. (July 4, 1787).  Although this may 
have been only a compressed account of what the judges said, the judges themselves may have used the 
reported phrasing.  Certainly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court said in 1827: “The privileges and im-
munities secured to the people of each State in every other State, can be applied only in case of removal 
from one State into another.  By such removal they become citizens of the adopted State without natu-
ralization . . . .”  Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 91 (1827). 
44  Kurt Lash has noted that the Comity Clause could not have protected a visitor in all local rights, 
although on the assumption that there was rough agreement on the solution of limiting rights.  See Lash, 
supra note 13.  In fact, this was but one of at least three different solutions. 
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a state conferred on any of its citizens in any circumstances.  So expansive a 
definition was plausible, however, because it was combined with a restric-
tion on when a visitor could enjoy such rights.  As explained by Senator 
John Burrill of Rhode Island, “Citizens of one State were entitled to the 
rights of citizens of all the States; yet the different States exercised the 
power of prescribing certain probationary rules to those coming from an-
other State, to entitle them to all the privileges.”45  Or, as put by the justices 
of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the Comity Clause “is necessarily 
limited and qualified, for it cannot be pretended that a citizen of Rhode Is-
land coming into this State to live, is ipso facto entitled to the full privileges 
of a citizen, if any term of residence is prescribed as preliminary to the ex-
ercise of political or municipal rights.”46  
This sort of waiting period for access seemed particularly important for 
the right of suffrage.  Senator Burrill broadly understood the privileges and 
immunities of citizens to include suffrage, and he made this practicable by 
suggesting that a state could require visitors to have stayed for a probation-
ary period before being allowed to vote:  
If a citizen of Massachusetts removes to another State, he cannot vote as soon 
as he enters it—a certain residence is required of him—and the people of Mis-
souri were competent by law to impose a residence of one or more years on a 
citizen going there, to entitle him to all the privileges of citizens of the State.47   
Such an approach avoided the difficulty of deciding what rights were not 
guaranteed by shifting the question to the probationary rules delaying ac-
cess to them.   
Yet there were problems in opening up the definition of the protected 
privileges and immunities and then cutting back on access—risks that are 
well illustrated by the assumption of Senator Burrill and others that suffrage 
was among the guaranteed privileges and immunities.  Many American men 
in the 1820s—notably, in Virginia—were demanding that they be allowed 
equal suffrage, regardless of property qualifications.  Not surprisingly, 
therefore, suffrage could seem to be among the privileges and immunities 
of citizenship.  But so broad a definition of the privileges and immunities of 
 
45  37 ANNALS OF CONG. 47 (1820) (statement of Sen. Burrill). 
46  Abbot, 23 Mass. at 91–93.  Immediately prior to the statement quoted above in the text, the jus-
tices said: 
The privileges and immunities secured to the people of each State in every other State, can be ap-
plied only in case of removal from one State into another.  By such removal they become citizens 
of the adopted State without naturalization, and have a right to sue and be sued as citizens; and yet 
this privilege is qualified and not absolute, for they cannot enjoy the right of suffrage or of eligibil-
ity to office, without such term of residence as shall be prescribed by the constitution and laws of 
the State into which they shall remove.  They shall have the privileges and immunities of citizens, 
that is, they shall not be deemed aliens, but may take and hold real estate, and may, according to 
the laws of such State, eventually enjoy the full rights of citizenship without the necessity of being 
naturalized.   
Id. at 91–92. 
47  37 ANNALS OF CONG. 47 (1820). 
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citizenship was poorly thought out.  It suggested that visiting citizens of 
other states acquired voting rights in a state not because they eventually be-
came its citizens, but rather because they were visitors who satisfied the 
probationary rules.  It thereby also implied that a mere visitor who lingered 
in a state long enough to satisfy the probationary period, but without intent 
to become a resident or citizen, could acquire the right to vote.  Yet it was 
improbable that the Comity Clause could be understood to require states to 
give suffrage to visitors who had no intent to become citizens or permanent 
residents.  Another approach might therefore seem necessary. 
2. Limiting the Definition to Fundamental Rights.—A second solu-
tion was not to delay access to the protected privileges and immunities, but 
to limit their definition.  Whereas the first approach could assume that the 
protected privileges and immunities included any of the rights that might be 
available in any circumstances to any of a state’s citizens, the second ap-
proach confined the guaranteed privileges and immunities to such rights as 
were “fundamental.”  For example, in Corfield v. Coryell, Justice Bushrod 
Washington asked, “what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in 
the several states?”48  He answered that he felt “no hesitation in confining 
these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their na-
ture, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free govern-
ments.”49   
Justice Washington, however, soon found himself in trouble, for even 
while restricting the definition of the protected privileges and immunities, 
he took too broad a view of them.  When he listed “these fundamental prin-
ciples” that belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, he began 
with an array of rights that usually were open to all citizens, and because it 
made sense that these would be shared with visitors, he initially encoun-
tered no difficulty.50  He ended, however, with “the elective franchise.”51  
This seemed to him fundamental, but it was odd to say that a state had to 
share this right with all visitors.  Perhaps, therefore, Justice Washington 
should have paused before famously commenting that the enumeration was 
“more tedious than difficult.”52  In reality, suffrage in a state was not ordi-
narily enjoyed by the women, minors, and blacks who were its citizens, let 
 
48  6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). 
49  Id. 
50  Id. at 551–52. 
51  Id. at 552. 
52  Id. at 551.  According to a 1797 case on the Comity Clause, “It seems agreed . . . by the counsel 
on both sides, that . . . it does not mean the right of election, the right of holding offices, the right of be-
ing elected.”  Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797).  By the early nineteenth century, 
however, equal suffrage had come to seem so important that judges such as Bushrod Washington came 
to assume it was too fundamental to be omitted.  Incidentally, the court in Campbell also noted that “[i]t 
seems agreed, from the manner of expounding, or defining the words immunities and privileges, by the 
counsel on both sides, that a particular and limited operation is to be given to these words, and not a full 
and comprehensive one.”  Id. 
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alone by mere visitors who were not citizens.  Accordingly, like Senator 
Burrill, Justice Washington found himself stumbling over suffrage.  He 
therefore hastened to explain that he meant “the elective franchise, as regu-
lated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to 
be exercised.”53   
Evidently, although Bushrod Washington began by narrowing the defi-
nition of the protected privileges and immunities to those that were “fun-
damental,” this was sufficiently broad that he still ended up with an 
awkwardly expansive a view of privileges and immunities.  Therefore, de-
spite his best intentions, he ultimately found himself in the same position as 
Senator Burrill, who had to delay access.  At least, however, Washington 
started on a different conceptual path—one that narrowed the definition of 
the protected rights. 
The difficulty with both approaches was the Comity Clause itself, 
which bluntly stated that “[t]he Citizens of each State” were “entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States”—thus leaving 
little room for restriction, either by delayed access or by limited definition.54  
At least one of the two approaches seemed necessary to make the Comity 
Clause practicable.  Yet each, from its own angle, cut into what the Comity 
Clause apparently guaranteed.  
On the one hand, the delayed access was problematic because the 
Comity Clause secured visitors from the very moment they entered a state.  
It was therefore unclear how the protected privileges and immunities could 
be truncated by “probationary rules” or other barriers to access.  Nor was it 
clear how any such waiting period could apply to only some of the guaran-
teed privileges and immunities.  A waiting period could not apply to most 
of the privileges and immunities, and if it applied only to some privileges 
and immunities, such as suffrage, did this mean that there were two layers 
of protected rights—some secured absolutely and others only contin-
gently?55 
 
53  Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. 
54  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
55  The incongruity of this position becomes especially clear when one realizes that the rights it ren-
dered contingent were those that seemed particularly important or fundamental.  As early as 1785 (in 
defense of a visiting Frenchman, the Chevalier de Longchamps), an anonymous writer argued: “The cit-
izens are members of the civil society; and, according to our constitution, a year’s residence is necessary 
to qualify one for the important privileges.  The inhabitants and subjects, as distinguished from citizens, 
are strangers who are permitted to settle and stay in the country.”  A Citizen, For the Chronicle of Free-
dom, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phila.), Feb. 5, 1785, at 2.  Along similar lines, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court in the 1820s cautioned that not all rights were immediately available under the Comity Clause: 
“[T]his privilege is qualified and not absolute,” for there had to be qualifications on the exercise of “po-
litical or municipal rights.”  Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 91–92 (1827).  Thus, visitors “can-
not enjoy the right of suffrage or of eligibility to office, without such term of residence as shall be 
prescribed by the constitution and laws of the State into which they shall remove.”  Id. at 92–93 (holding 
that a feme covert, who had been expelled by her husband, and who came to Massachusetts and main-
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On the other hand, the limited definition of the protected privileges and 
immunities was awkward, for the Comity Clause guaranteed “all” privi-
leges and immunities of citizens.  It was therefore unclear how such rights 
could be confined to those that were “fundamental.”  Indeed, the very in-
flexibility of such a formulation was incompatible with the diversity and 
flexibility of state laws.  It will be recalled that Bushrod Washington felt 
“no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immu-
nities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the 
citizens of all free governments.”56  But this would have turned the Clause 
into a strangely rigid and narrow straitjacket—rigid because it would re-
quire each state to provide the same, inelastic range of liberty, and narrow 
because it would guarantee only what was fundamental, thus leaving visi-
tors without equality in other local rights.   
In fact, if anything was fundamental in American government, it was 
that different states protected different rights under their laws and that each 
needed the flexibility, by legislation or constitutional amendment, to adjust 
such rights.  On this assumption, the Comity Clause ensured equality for 
out-of-state citizens, without limiting the freedom of each state to make its 
own choices about the rights it protected.  The fundamental rights approach 
to the Comity Clause was therefore singularly inapt, for it limited both the 
equality and the freedom and thus would have defeated much of what the 
Comity Clause accomplished. 
3. Protecting the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens as Such.—In 
light of what has been seen of the two approaches considered thus far, it is 
hardly surprising that there was a third, which did not encounter so many 
difficulties.  At least an initial hint about this third approach is essential, for 
it eventually acquired prominence in the leading dissent in the Dred Scott 
case, when Americans had turned from disputes about what was protected 
to controversies about who was protected. 
In this third approach, the Comity Clause secured visitors in the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens as such—that is, in the privileges and im-
munities that local individuals enjoyed as citizens.  For example, in 
Connecticut, the rights to own property and to sue and be sued were among 
the rights generally enjoyed by citizens, and these rights therefore had to be 
available under the Comity Clause to citizens of other states.  In contrast, 
the right to receive poor relief and to vote belonged to only some citizens.  
Because these rights did not belong to citizens as a whole, but only, respec-
                                                                                                                           
tained herself as a single woman, while her husband married and cohabitated with another woman and 
remained a citizen and resident of another state, was entitled to sue as a feme sole).  
Such views were caustically summarized in an opinion given during the Civil War by Attorney Gen-
eral Bates.  Writing about privileges and immunities, he observed that some writers loosely “suggest, 
without affirming, that there may be different grades of citizenship, of higher and lower degree, in point 
of legal virtue and efficacy.”  Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 388 (1862).   
56  Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551. 
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tively, to poor citizens and adult male citizens, they did not have to be 
available to citizens of other states.  Of course, all citizens had the potential 
to be eligible for poor relief, but when considered merely as citizens—not 
the subset of citizens who met the additional qualifications required for 
poor relief—they could not be said to have a right to such relief, let alone 
suffrage.  These were not privileges and immunities of citizens of Con-
necticut.57 
From this perspective, a state could adopt whatever degree of freedom 
and equality, or constraint and discrimination, it wished for its own citizens.  
But a state could discriminate against visitors only if it also discriminated 
against some of its own citizens.  If it allowed rights to its citizens merely 
on the basis of their citizenship, it had to allow such rights to visitors. 
4. General Rights Rather than Particular Rights.—Incidentally, each 
of the three visions of what was protected was open to further refinement.  
One additional consideration was the old distinction between general rights 
and particular rights.  In the context of this traditional distinction, the pro-
tected privileges and immunities included only general rights. 
The common law had long differentiated particular and general rights.  
The former were the rights of particular persons in particular matters.  The 
latter were the shared rights of natural subjects or the people as a whole—in 
other words, aspects of the freedom or liberty enjoyed by such subjects in 
general.58  In concrete terms, the difference was that between the right to a 
piece of property and the more abstract right of owning property.  Although 
the Comity Clause did not speak of “subjects,” but instead focused on “citi-
zens,” it could be understood to echo the traditional notion of the general 
rights of subjects, the effect being to exclude particular rights.59   
 
57  On the other hand, the Connecticut laws that sought to exclude paupers and vagabonds from other 
states were in tension with the Comity Clause.  For this point, see REPORT OF THE ARGUMENTS OF 
COUNSEL, IN THE CASE OF PRUDENCE CRANDALL, PLFF. IN ERROR, VS. STATE OF CONNECTICUT, 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS, AT THEIR SESSION AT BROOKLYN, JULY TERM, 1834, at 13–
14 (Bos., Garrison & Knapp 1834) [hereinafter PRUDENCE CRANDALL].  
Just how carefully this third understanding of the Comity Clause sorts out different rights can be ob-
served in the right to contract, including the right to enforce a contract.  Unlike the right to vote, which 
did not belong to minors, the right to enter into contracts belonged to all persons and hence all citizens, 
and it thus apparently had to be available to visitors.  At first glance, one might think that the Comity 
Clause fails to distinguish the right to contract from the right to vote because a minor or other legally 
incompetent person could not make a contract for himself any more than he could vote.  Yet even per-
sons legally incompetent to contract for themselves could do so through a guardian or by subsequent ra-
tification.  The right to contract thus belonged to citizens as a whole, even if some of them could not 
exercise the right by themselves.  Contracting was therefore among the “privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several states.” 
58  For example, in an early seventeenth-century English case, the Court of Common Pleas distin-
guished between “particular privileges” and the more “general liberties of the people.”  Norris v. Staps, 
(1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 357 (C.P.) 358; Hob. 210, 211. 
59  The question as to whether “citizens” included all natural subjects need not be pursued further 
here, but note that this perspective was concisely summarized in later litigation: “The term, citizen, is, 
105:61  (2011) Privileges or Immunities 
 83 
Justice Washington seems to have understood this point in Corfield v. 
Coryell.  He denied the claim of visitors to gather oysters in New Jersey on 
the ground that the gathering of oysters was not a general right but a par-
ticular property right that happened to be held in common.  As he summa-
rized, it was “the common property of the citizens of such state,” as if they 
were “tenants in common.”60  Accordingly:  
[W]e cannot accede to the proposition which was insisted on by the counsel, 
that, under this provision of the constitution, the citizens of the several states 
are permitted to participate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the cit-
izens of any other particular state, merely upon the ground that they are en-
joyed by those citizens.61   
Although Washington had spoken boldly of fundamental rights, this nar-
rower distinction between particular and general rights appears to have been 
the basis of his holding—oyster-gathering being a particular right, a right in 
particular property, even if ownership was widely diffused.  
There will be occasion to return to these three basic understandings of 
the Comity Clause, particularly the second and third approaches.  For now, 
however, it is enough to observe that the privileges and immunities problem 
was one of assuring cross-jurisdictional rights to a mobile population, and 
that in disputes involving whites, the question tended to focus on what was 
protected.  In contrast, when blacks sought privileges and immunities under 
the Comity Clause, the question would become who was protected. 
II. THE SECOND MISSOURI COMPROMISE 
In 1821, in Missouri, racial prejudice broke down the Comity Clause’s 
solution to the problem of mobility in a federal system.62  Increasing black 
mobility and Southern intransigence were already prompting a shift in the 
focus of privileges and immunities disputes from what to who.  Events in 
Missouri, however, rapidly accelerated this process, prompting a debate that 
would lead ever more Americans to understand the Comity Clause in terms 
of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.  
                                                                                                                           
under a republican government, what the term subject is under a monarchy: it embraces high and low—
rich and poor—male and female—white and colored—a general term which includes the whole republi-
can family—all who are free and live under the same government, and owe to it permanent allegiance—
subject to its duties—entitled to its privileges.”  PRUDENCE CRANDALL, supra note 57, at 25.  The same 
sort of issue arose in questions about citizenship for purposes of jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution. 
60  Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. 
61  Id. 
62  The leading work on the collapse of comity is FINKELMAN, supra note 17, at 9, but this focuses 
mostly on unfree persons taken to free states.  In contrast, it was the mobility of free blacks that first ele-
vated the question to a national crisis and that mattered for the development of ideas about the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States. 
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A. Race and the Collapse of the Comity Clause 
In 1820, Missouri asked to be admitted to the Union with a constitution 
that would have required its legislature to bar free blacks from entering the 
state.  Missouri’s attempt to exclude free blacks focused national attention 
on the question of who could enjoy the privileges and immunities guaran-
teed by the Comity Clause, and Missouri thereby provoked responses, in 
Congress and then outside, that would evolve into what would become part 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is a story that was utterly familiar in the 
nineteenth century, but it has been almost entirely forgotten, thus leaving 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause bereft of its 
history. 
Missouri was located relatively far to the north, and antislavery North-
erners were loath to concede a place for slavery there, let alone in the rest of 
the Louisiana Territory.  On the other side, Southerners demanded admis-
sion for Missouri as a slave state and would soon also demand this for other 
parts of the Louisiana Territory.  Much bitter debate ensued, until Congress, 
early in 1820, agreed to admit Missouri as a slave state but otherwise pro-
hibited slavery in the Louisiana Territory above the latitude of 36 degrees, 
30 minutes north.63  This settlement reified the line between north and south 
but at least put off the danger of civil war. 
It was not this first Missouri Compromise, however, but the second, in 
1821, that matters here.  After the adoption of the first compromise, when 
Missouri sought admission to the Union, the territory in 1820 submitted a 
constitution that generally protected slavery.  Moreover, the proposed con-
stitution stated that it shall be the “duty” of the General Assembly “as soon 
as may be, to pass such laws as may be necessary . . . [t]o prevent free ne-
groes and mulattoes from coming to and settling in this State, under any 
pretext whatsoever.”64  Although Missouri’s general provisions preserving 
slavery did not obviously violate the U.S. Constitution, the requirement that 
the legislature exclude “free negroes and mulattoes” seemed to many Nor-
therners to invite a breach of the Comity Clause.  Indeed, by requiring that 
the legislature keep such persons from entering Missouri “under any pretext 
whatsoever,” the Missouri Constitution seemed directly to demand that the 
legislature ignore the U.S. Constitution.65   
The drafters of the Missouri Constitution were not unsophisticated.  
They therefore avoided a simple rejection of the U.S. Constitution.  They 
understood that under the Comity Clause, Missouri could not deny the pri-
vileges and immunities of its citizens to free citizens of other states when 
they came to Missouri.  Therefore, rather than directly require the state to 
deny the privileges and immunities of its citizens to free blacks from other 
 
63  Missouri Enabling Act, ch. 22, §§ 1, 8, 3 Stat. 545, 548 (1820). 
64  MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 26. 
65  See ROBERT PIERCE FORBES, THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE AND ITS AFTERMATH 110 (2007). 
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states, the drafters merely sought to bar entry to free blacks and used the 
state’s constitution to require the legislature to do this.  In other words, their 
constitution attempted to avoid the privileges and immunities problem by 
keeping visiting blacks from coming within the scope of Missouri’s duties 
to the citizens of other states.  After the Articles of Confederation had re-
cited its Comity Clause, it had carefully added that “the people of each State 
shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State.”66  The U.S. 
Constitution, however, had dropped these words, and Missouri therefore 
had at least a plausible claim that the Constitution allowed it to prohibit 
“free ingress and regress.” 
Many Northerners, however, had little doubt that Missouri’s Constitu-
tion, by requiring its legislature to bar free blacks, violated the Comity 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  For example, Senator Burrill thought that 
the offending clause of the Missouri Constitution was “entirely repugnant to 
the Constitution of the United States.”67  He explained that “[i]t prohibits a 
very large class of persons from entering the State at all,” and that “[e]ven if 
[they were] soldiers of the United States, people of this proscribed class 
cannot enter Missouri without violating the constitution of the State.”68  
Burrill’s focus on black men in the federal military was very apt, for unlike 
other members of their race, they might have not merely a right but a duty 
to travel to Missouri.  The Missouri Constitution, however, reduced their 
duty to yet another “pretext” for entering the state.  As Burrill explained, 
“[i]t was well known . . . that we have colored soldiers and sailors, and 
good ones, too, but under no pretext, whether of duty or any other motive, 
can they enter Missouri.”69  Burrill “did not suppose if people of this de-
scription, in the service of the country, should enter the State, it would be 
attempted by the State authorities to exclude them; but it was suffici-
ent . . . to show the unconstitutionality of the clause.”70 
The question thus centered on the right of ingress.  Missouri could 
have made the question more complicated by arguing that free blacks were 
not, or perhaps even could not be, citizens of the other states, for it was 
 
66  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1.  In its entirety, it read:  
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the dif-
ferent States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fu-
gitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in 
the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any 
other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same 
duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such re-
strictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to 
any other State, of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or re-
striction shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them.   
Id. 
67  37 ANNALS OF CONG. 47 (1820). 
68  Id. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. 
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widely understood that “[g]reat difficulty seemed to arise in deciding the 
question, as to what constituted citizens in the different States.”71  The Mis-
souri Constitution, however, did not rest on this question.  In the alternative, 
Missouri could have made some use of what Burrill called “the power of 
prescribing certain probationary rules to those coming from another 
State”—that is, delays on access to privileges and immunities—but this too 
was “was a question” that Missouri “did not touch.”72  On the contrary, the 
people of Missouri “avoided it altogether” by declaring “that a certain class 
shall not come into their State at all, even though they may be citizens of 
other States, enjoying all the privileges of such.”73  Thus, although it would 
soon be much debated as to whether free negroes and mulattoes were citi-
zens of their own states, the immediate question in 1821 was one of entry: 
“[H]ad the people of Missouri the Constitutional right to prohibit from en-
tering that State a large class of persons who were[, for example,] citizens 
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts?”74   
B. The 1821 Congressional Resolution  
Congress responded to Missouri’s assault on the Comity Clause by de-
claring that the Clause’s assurance of privileges and immunities was a right 
under the U.S. Constitution.  Although Congress did not yet insist that the 
guaranteed privileges and immunities were the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States, it was taking what would later seem to be the 
first step in that direction.  
Northerners began by proposing that Missouri be denied admission to 
the Union until it cured the defect in its constitution.  Senator Burrill, for 
example, insisted that “[a]s Congress ‘might admit new States’ into the Un-
ion, it was clear to his mind that Congress must determine the conditions on 
which they should come in.”75  This was a firm moral stand, but it de-
scended into glib self-deception when Burrill added that “[i]f the constitu-
tion were not accepted . . . it would be easy to obviate any difficulty by 
passing an additional act authorizing the people of Missouri to form another 
convention and revise their constitution.”76  Southerners would view any re-
jection of the Missouri Constitution as an affront, and therefore, while 
Northerners demanded repudiation of the Missouri Constitution, Southern-
 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. at 48. 
75  Id. at 49. 
76  Id.  The views of Northern congressmen reflected popular Northern opinion.  For example, the 
Vermont legislature submitted resolutions to Congress complaining that the Missouri Constitution “con-
tains provisions to prevent freemen of the United States from emigrating to and settling in Missouri, on 
account of their origin, color and features” and that this was “repugnant to the Constitution of the United 
States.”  Id. at 80 (resolutions of the Vermont legislature on November 15, 1820). 
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ers made passionate threats that such an action would split the nation.  The 
problem came close to unraveling the first Missouri Compromise, and Con-
gress therefore had to consider how to reject the offending clause of the 
Missouri Constitution without rejecting Missouri.  
A solution became possible because Southerners and Northerners took 
positions on slightly different issues.  Southerners insisted that Missouri be 
admitted without delay and without any assertion that the Missouri exclu-
sion clause violated the U.S. Constitution.  But they were willing to leave 
room for a difference of opinion, as long as it was stated abstractly as a mat-
ter of constitutional interpretation.  On this basis, Northerners retreated 
from a direct condemnation of the Missouri Constitution and took solace in 
an assertion of interpretative principle.77  The result was that Congress ac-
cepted Missouri with its proposed constitution, but with the caveat that the 
clause excluding free blacks should not be construed to bar citizens of the 
states from any of the privileges and immunities guaranteed to them by the 
U.S. Constitution.  
In the spring of 1821, after profound fears of sectional discord, this be-
came the second Missouri Compromise:  
That Missouri shall be admitted into this Union on an equal footing with the 
original States, in all respects whatever, upon the fundamental condition, that 
the fourth clause of the twenty-sixth section of the third article of the constitu-
tion submitted on the part of said State to Congress, shall never be construed to 
authorize the passage of any law, and that no law shall be passed in conformity 
thereto, by which any citizen, of either of the States in this Union, shall be ex-
cluded from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and immunities to which 
such citizen is entitled under the Constitution of the United States: Provided, 
That the Legislature of said State, by a solemn public act, shall declare the as-
sent of the said State to the said fundamental condition, and shall transmit to 
the President of the United States, on or before the fourth Monday in Novem-
ber next, an authentic copy of the said act; upon the receipt whereof, the Presi-
dent, by proclamation, shall announce the fact; whereupon, and without any 
 
77  Southerners felt they got the better of the Northern states.  Later, during the debates on what be-
came the Kansas–Nebraska Act, Senator Badger of North Carolina recalled how Missouri became a 
state:  
Then how was the State got in at last?  By a marvellous contrivance . . . .  I really think it is one of 
the most remarkable species of humbuggery that ever was palmed off on any legislative body, 
composed of people who had attained the age of maturity—I do not say those who had come to the 
age of twenty-one, but those who had passed fourteen, if any such ever acted as legislators. 
SPEECH OF THE HON. GEORGE E. BADGER, OF NORTH CAROLINA, IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 
FEBRUARY 16, 1854, ON THE NEBRASKA BILL 7 (Sentinel Office 1854).  After quoting the second Mis-
souri Compromise, Badger explained: “In other words, Missouri was admitted upon the ‘fundamental 
condition’ that the State should agree that her constitution was not paramount to the Constitution of the 
United States.  That is the whole of it.”  Id.  This was, he admitted, “absolute nonsense, but I suppose it 
was the best that could be done.”  Id.  And when a fellow senator asked, “Did not Mr. Clay draw up that 
provision?”  Badger answered: “I recollect hearing Mr. Clay once . . . say, in substance, that he laughed 
in his sleeve at the idea that people were so easily satisfied.”  Id. at 8.  
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further proceeding on the part of Congress, the admission of the said State into 
the Union shall be considered as complete.78 
In June, the legislature of Missouri adopted a statute that met this condi-
tion—although with a bristling protest that “the congress of the United 
States have no constitutional power to annex any condition to the admission 
of this state into the federal union.”79  Neither side was really content, but 
by the end of the summer President James Monroe proclaimed that “the 
admission of the said State of Missouri into this Union is declared to be 
complete.”80  
The congressional resolution may seem in retrospect to have been 
merely a weak restatement of what was already guaranteed by the Comity 
Clause.  It may also seem in retrospect to have been tautological, for it ac-
complished nothing conceptually, other than to recognize that the privileges 
and immunities owed by a state to the citizens of other states were privi-
leges and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution.  This, however, was 
the justification for Congress’s enforcement of the Comity Clause against 
Missouri.  It therefore was of some significance to say that the privileges 
and immunities protected by the Clause were not merely horizontal claims 
among states but also vertical claims under the Constitution. 
C. The Shifting Controversy: 
Were Free Blacks Citizens of the United States? 
Although the second Missouri Compromise was significant for what it 
said, it was even more significant because it forcefully refocused the debate 
about privileges and immunities on the question of federal citizenship.  In 
prior disputes about the Comity Clause, it had been possible to put aside the 
question of whether free blacks were citizens of the United States.  After the 
adoption of the second Missouri Compromise, however, this question about 
federal citizenship increasingly became inescapable, thus prompting anti-
slavery Americans to take up the position that would eventually become the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
After the second Missouri Compromise, many states (including Mis-
souri) still attempted to evade their duty under the Comity Clause by bar-
ring entry to free blacks.81  The difference was that these states now needed 
to explain why such measures were not unconstitutional.  Most Southerners 
had previously been content to deny blacks the privileges and immunities of 
 
78  Res. of Mar. 2, 1821, 3 Stat. 645.  For Clay’s proposal of the resolution for the joint committee, 
see 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 1228 (1821). 
79  Act of June 26, 1821, 1825 Mo. Laws 68, 69. 
80  37 ANNALS OF CONG. 1786 (1821). 
81  For some of the attempts by states to bar entry by free blacks, see EARL M. MALTZ, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 37 (2003).  For Missouri’s evasion of 
the condition of its statehood in 1825 and its outright violation of it in 1847, see WILLIAM M. WIECEK, 
THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760–1848, at 124 (1977).  
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local citizenship on grounds other than citizenship.82  Congress had made 
clear, however, that the exclusion of citizens of other states was a violation 
of the Comity Clause.  Southerners therefore had to explain why free blacks 
did not have a right to the privileges and immunities guaranteed by that 
Clause.  They could have argued that free blacks were not citizens of their 
states, but if state citizenship was a state question, Southerners could not 
make this argument against the blacks from states that gave them citizen-
ship.   
The dispute thus almost inevitably shifted to a debate about who was a 
citizen of the United States.  Unable to rely on arguments about the state ci-
tizenship of blacks, Southerners had to take the rather aggressive position 
that Comity Clause rights belonged only to citizens of the United States and 
that free blacks did not enjoy such citizenship.  Northerners responded that 
free blacks were U.S. citizens and that they therefore had a right to the pri-
vileges and immunities protected by the Clause.  The second Missouri 
Compromise thus triggered the development of the position that would 
eventually be vindicated in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Southerners were not unreasonable in thinking that the Comity Clause 
established a sort of general citizenship, but they were on weaker ground 
when they suggested that only federal citizens had the benefit of the Clause.  
Whatever general citizenship the Clause implied, it did so by giving assur-
ances of privileges and immunities to state citizens.  Northerners, however, 
accepted the supposition that Comity Clause rights belonged only to federal 
citizens and fought, instead, on the question of whether free blacks could be 
citizens of the United States.  
From the Southern perspective, free blacks were not U.S. citizens be-
cause they had not been members of the political community that had 
formed the Constitution.  In fact, blacks in some states began to participate 
in public life during the late eighteenth century.  But nineteenth-century 
Southerners could support their view by pointing to the 1790 federal Natu-
ralization Act (and subsequent versions of it), in which the Congress of the 
United States declared that “any alien, being a free white person . . . may be 
admitted to become a citizen thereof,” upon meeting enumerated require-
ments.83  On this sort of evidence, Southerners argued that even free blacks 
who were citizens of their states had not been members of the polity that 
adopted the U.S. Constitution.  Free blacks therefore were not citizens of 
the United States and so were not entitled to the privileges and immunities 
or other rights guaranteed to citizens by the U.S. Constitution.   
 
82  As a recent commentator on the Missouri Compromise observed, “Perhaps surprisingly, few leg-
islators, even in the South, had formally disputed the citizenship of free blacks.”  FORBES, supra note 65, 
at 110.  Although Charles Pinckney of South Carolina claimed in the House that he had written the 
Comity Clause and that he had never imagined that there could be a black citizen, free blacks clearly 
were citizens in a number of states, and in some of them (including two Southern states, Tennessee and 
North Carolina) free blacks had a right to vote—a right that was not always denied.  Id. at 111, 113. 
83  An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790).  
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Already in November 1821, Attorney General William Wirt enunciated 
the Southern position in an opinion on the right of free blacks to command 
coastal or ocean-going vessels.84  The mobility of free blacks was particu-
larly apt to rub against local prejudice when free blacks commanded vessels 
entering Southern ports.  Such blacks displayed not only black freedom but 
also black authority.  Accordingly, some Southern states, notably South 
Carolina and Louisiana, responded to the second Missouri Compromise by 
adopting statutes aimed at limiting the presence of black seamen who en-
tered their ports.85  The problem, however, also turned on a federal statute 
that limited the command of vessels in foreign and coastal trade to citizens 
of the United States.  Therefore, on behalf of the collector of customs at 
Norfolk, Virginia, the Secretary of the Treasury asked Attorney General 
Wirt, “Whether free persons of color are, in Virginia, citizens of the United 
States, within the intent and meaning of the acts regulating foreign and 
coasting trade, so as to be qualified to command vessels?”86 
Although the question was one of statutory interpretation, Wirt, a Vir-
ginia slaveowner, did not miss the constitutional implications.  He began by 
presuming that the phrase “citizen of the United States” had the same mean-
ing in the Constitution as in federal statutes.87  On this premise, he relied on 
the Comity Clause, which he apparently understood to have created a 
shared, federal citizenship for citizens of the states, at least when they trav-
eled to other states.  He concluded from this that “no person is included in 
the description of citizen of the United States who has not the full rights of 
a citizen in the State of his residence.”88 
Starting at the state level, Wirt noted that a free black born and residing 
in Virginia possessed “none of the high characteristic privileges of a citizen 
of the State,” meaning political rights.89  Accordingly, if he were to have 
Comity Clause rights, “then, on his removal into another State, he acquires 
all the immunities and privileges of a citizen of that other State, although he 
possessed none of them in the State of his nativity,” which could not have 
been in the “contemplation” of those who adopted the Constitution.90  Mov-
ing to the federal level, Wirt examined the Constitution’s qualifications for 
legislative and presidential office.  “Free negroes and mulattoes can satisfy 
the requisitions of age and residence as well as the white man,” and if such 
things were “sufficient to make him a ‘citizen of the United States’ in the 
sense of the constitution, then free negroes and mulattoes are eligible to 
 
84  Rights of Free Virginia Negroes, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 506 (1821). 
85  2 JOHN CODMAN HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 97, 100, 
109, 161 (Little, Brown & Co. 1862) (describing statutes adopted by South Carolina, Georgia, and Lou-
isiana).  
86  Rights of Free Virginia Negroes, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. at 506. 
87  Id. at 507. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
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those high offices, and may command the purse and sword of the nation.”91  
On both state and federal grounds, therefore, it seemed obvious to Wirt that 
only those “who enjoyed the full and equal privileges of white citizens in 
the State of their residence” could be citizens of the United States.92  This 
was merely statutory interpretation, but it was also an early backhanded 
declaration of what would become the conventional Southern position on 
the Comity Clause.  Tellingly, it was echoed in even stronger terms by a 
later Attorney General, Roger B. Taney, who in 1832 wrote an opinion on 
the rights of black seamen, concluding that free blacks were not included in 
the term “citizens” as used in the U.S. Constitution.93 
The shift in the Southern position—toward restricting Comity Clause 
rights to citizens of the United States—can be further observed in Ken-
tucky.  Even before the adoption of the second Missouri Compromise, the 
state’s supreme court was familiar with “the argument, that free persons of 
color are not parties to the political compact,” and the court responded in 
shades of gray: “This we can not admit, to the extent contended for.  They 
are certainly, in some measure, parties,” for “[a]lthough they have not every 
benefit or privilege which the constitution secures, yet they have many se-
cured by it.”94  After the second Compromise, however, the court had to ad-
dress the Comity Clause in terms of federal citizenship, and this now 
seemed a matter of black and white.  
The occasion was an 1822 case, Amy v. Smith, in which an enslaved 
black woman sought her freedom.95  Although a Kentucky statute barred ac-
tions by slaves, she claimed that this enactment violated her rights under the 
Comity Clause.96  In the mid-1780s, she had been taken to Pennsylvania and 
Virginia, and on this basis she argued that she had successively become a 
citizen of each of these states, thus giving her the privileges and immunities 
of a citizen of Kentucky.97  The court held, however, that she “can not have 
 
91  Id. 
92  Id.  In 1824, Wirt gave a very different opinion about a South Carolina statute.  Adopted follow-
ing the Missouri crisis, the statute provided for the imprisonment of any free black seaman while his 
vessel was present in any harbor or port of the state.  When Britain complained about the imprisonment 
of one of its subjects, Wirt opined that this provision of the statute was unconstitutional, first because of 
the exclusive power of Congress over commerce among the states and with foreign nations, and second 
because of an inconsistent treaty with Britain.  Validity of the S.C. Police Bill, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 659, 
661 (1824).  This opinion was given immediately after the Supreme Court’s decision in Gibbons v. Og-
den, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), which suggested that the possibility of exclusive congressional power 
over commerce among the states and with foreign nations.  Perhaps more to the point, Gibbons did not 
involve any question about the citizenship of free blacks. 
93  Draft Opinion by Roger B. Taney, in Carl B. Swisher, Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in MR. JUSTICE 
4345 (Allison Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 1964) (1832); see also WIECEK, 
supra note 81, at 139.  
94  Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 70, 75 (1820).  
95  11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326 (1822). 
96  See id. at 328, 331–32. 
97  Id. at 327, 331–32. 
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been a citizen, either of Pennsylvania or of Virginia, unless she belonged to 
a class of society, upon which . . . was conferred a right to enjoy all the pri-
vileges and immunities appertaining to the state.”98  The court concluded 
that free blacks were so much “a degraded race” that “under the constitution 
and laws of the United States, they can not become citizens of the United 
States.”99  Moreover, “as the laws of the United States do not now authorize 
any but a white person to become a citizen, it . . . creates a presumption that 
no state had made persons of colour citizens.”100  On such reasoning, the 
plaintiff was not a citizen of Pennsylvania or Virginia and therefore “can 
not be entitled to the benefit of the clause of the constitution in question.”101  
One of the judges, Benjamin Mills, dissented, and he recognized that 
the majority opinion was responding to the second Missouri Compromise.  
On behalf of the plaintiff, he protested that she had been moved from state 
to state before the adoption of the Constitution, and therefore “the late Mis-
souri question does not completely embrace it.”102  The Missouri question, 
however, had an inexorable effect on Southern opinion.  Southerners now 
insisted that only citizens of the United States were entitled to the benefit of 
the Comity Clause and that such citizens did not include free blacks.103 
Rather than dispute the underlying assumption about the Comity 
Clause, advocates for free blacks accepted it and fought back on the same 
terms: they insisted that free blacks were citizens of the United States who 
therefore enjoyed Comity Clause privileges and immunities.  These counte-
rarguments became more fully developed later, but a prominent early ex-
ample can be observed in 1834 in Connecticut, where a Quaker woman, 
Prudence Crandall, had opened a boarding school for black girls from out of 
 
98  Id. at 334. 
99  Id.  
100  Id. 
101  Id. at 335. 
102  Id. at 343.  Mills made clear in another case that he considered slavery contrary to “the general 
principles of liberty, which we all admire,” but also emphasized that judges ought to decide cases “by 
the law as it is, and not as it ought to be.”  FINKELMAN, supra note 17, at 192 (quoting Rankin v. Lydia, 
9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467 (1820)). 
103  Later Southern examples are abundant.  For example, a Kentuckian argued: 
The only inquiry is, what constitutes citizenship, or, in other words, what is the true constitutional 
meaning of the word citizen?  If the free negro be not a citizen, although he may be a subject, he is 
not embraced within this provision. . . .  In accordance with this principle, a citizen of the United 
States, going into any state of this union, carries with him the same right of protection, under the 
laws of the state, to which its own citizens are entitled.” 
REPORT OF THE DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 923 (Frankfort, A.G. Hodges 1849) (statement of Mr. Bul-
litt).  Similarly, in the debates about Nebraska, a senator from North Carolina observed: “[S]uppose 
these people were citizens of the United States, did not everybody know that if they were citizens of the 
United States, and had rights under the Constitution of the United States, which were withheld under this 
prohibition of the Missouri constitution, it was null and absolutely void?”  SPEECH OF THE HON. GEORGE 
E. BADGER, OF NORTH CAROLINA, IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, FEBRUARY 16, 1854, ON THE 
NEBRASKA BILL 7 (Wash., Sentinel Office 1854).   
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state.104  The legislature promptly adopted a statute barring the unlicensed 
instruction of colored persons not inhabitants of the state, and Crandall was 
eventually prosecuted and found guilty.105  Her lawyers moved in error, 
however, that the superior court “should have informed the jury, that said 
coloured persons were to be regarded as citizens of the states to which they 
respectively belonged and of the United States, and were entitled to the pri-
vileges and immunities secured by the 4th article of the constitution of the 
United States.”106  The closing argument for Crandall emphasized this point, 
explaining that since the Revolution, “all the citizens of the several States 
became citizens of the United States.”107 
Strikingly, both sides in the Comity Clause controversies took for 
granted that the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Comity Clause 
were rights secured to citizens of the United States.  Already before the sec-
ond Missouri Compromise, the Comity Clause claims of free blacks had 
begun to be disputed in terms of whether they were parties to the federal po-
litical compact and the community it formed.  But the debate now became a 
national dispute, and increasingly, for both Southerners and Northerners, it 
rested on the assumption that Comity Clause privileges and immunities be-
longed only to citizens of the United States.  
Although the implications have yet to be seen here, they should already 
be discernable along the horizon.  It is not simply that, at an abstract level, 
the Comity Clause seemed to establish a sort of “general citizenship.”108  
Closer to the ground, men and women were beginning to demand that free 
blacks should have the privileges and immunities to which they were enti-
tled as citizens of the United States.  It was a hint of things to come. 
D. Fundamental Rights as a Mode of Exclusion 
Although the main point—the new focus on the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the United States—has already been made, Part II must 
close by adding that the question of what the Comity Clause protected be-
came part of the debate about who was protected.  Many scholars look back 
on Justice Washington’s discussion of fundamental rights in Corfield v. 
Coryell as if it can be understood simply as a timeless statement of princi-
ple.  But, of course, it had a context.  Corfield was one of the cases that oc-
curred in the immediate aftermath of the second Missouri Compromise, and 
 
104  Advertisement, 3 LIBERATOR (Bos.) 47 (1833). 
105  PRUDENCE CRANDALL, supra note 57, at iii–iv.  At a first trial, in 1833, the jury was dismissed 
for failing to agree on a verdict.  Id. at iv; see also WIECEK, supra note 81, at 163–64.  
106  Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 348 (1834) (reversing judgment against Crandall because the 
information failed to aver that the school or the instructors were unlicensed). 
107  PRUDENCE CRANDALL, supra note 57, at 28. 
108  3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 675 (Bos., 
Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).   
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like other such cases, it suggests how ideals about fundamental rights lim-
ited claims of citizenship by free blacks. 
In the wake of the second Missouri Compromise, Southerners (and 
those aligned with them) regularly defeated the Comity Clause claims of 
free blacks by suggesting that such persons did not enjoy the full, extensive, 
or fundamental rights of citizenship—this being the basis for denying that 
they were citizens.  As has been seen, nothing gave a sharper edge to these 
arguments than to say that the rights to vote and hold office were essential 
or fundamental rights of citizenship.  This made political rights a measure 
of citizenship.  From this perspective, even many free blacks who enjoyed 
citizenship in their own states were not citizens, whether state or federal, for 
purposes of the Comity Clause.   
In response, dissentient judges and lawyers protested that if political 
rights were characteristic of citizenship, then all sorts of other persons 
would also be excluded.  For example, when Judge Mills dissented in Amy 
v. Smith, he pointed out that if full political participation were the measure 
of citizenship, not even most white men could be citizens: 
[L]et the position be assumed, that none are citizens but those entitled to the 
highest honors of the state, and it follows that no person, who is not a white 
male, and has not resided here for six years, and is not of the age of thirty-five 
years, can be a citizen; for such must be the qualifications of our chief magis-
trate.109  
In Virginia, moreover, “those entitled to office and suffrage, must not only 
possess age and residence, but a freehold.”110  If this were the measure of ci-
tizenship, only “the aristocracy of each state” would be included among cit-
izens.111  Pressing his point, Judge Mills also pointed out the implications 
for “white females and infants,” who “being not entitled to political ad-
vancement, can not be citizens.”112  The conceptual mistake, he concluded, 
arose “from not attending to a sensible distinction between political and civ-
il rights.  The latter constitutes the citizen, while the former are not neces-
sary ingredients.  A state may deny all her political rights to an individual, 
and yet he may be a citizen.”113   
But, of course, no one was really proposing to exclude white men, 
women, or children from citizenship.  In the ensuing decades, persons seek-
ing to exclude blacks would continue to tie citizenship to political rights, 
and persons seeking to include blacks would continue to suggest the danger 
of excluding nonvoting white men, women, and children.114  The underlying 
 
109  11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 338 (1822) (Mills, J., dissenting). 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. at 342. 
114  For example, the arguments on both sides can be observed in the prosecution of Prudence Cran-
dall.  See Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339 (1834).  The State argued that “men of colour” were not citi-
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problem, however, was that the Comity Clause threatened local racial dis-
crimination, and therefore, as everyone understood, the link between citi-
zenship and political rights was being proposed only to impede blacks.  If 
they could be barred from citizenship, state or federal, they could be pre-
vented from claiming the privileges and immunities of citizens.  
In this context, Justice Bushrod Washington’s opinion about funda-
mental rights must be reconsidered.  His decision in Corfield v. Coryell is 
usually examined on its own, as if one could pluck it out of context without 
depriving it of its significance.  And to be sure, the case did not involve 
blacks.  It was the occasion, however, on which Washington made a distinc-
tive contribution to the debate about who could be a citizen.  By putting the 
matter in terms of rights that were “fundamental,” Washington offered a so-
lution to the question of what was protected in terms so seemingly attractive 
that they have distracted attention from the implications for who was pro-
tected.  Yet his fundamental rights approach to what really concerned who.  
It was a judicial compromise that gave a Southern twist to the Missouri 
Compromise.   
Washington framed his point about fundamental rights in a way that 
deferred to the position of Congress in the second Missouri Compromise 
and then defeated that position by cutting off black citizenship.  On the one 
hand, he included in his enumeration of privileges and immunities the right 
to travel—the right “to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for pur-
poses of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise.”115  If this 
                                                                                                                           
zens of the state because they “cannot vote.”  See id. at 351.  Her lawyers then protested that “the right of 
voting is not the criterion of citizenship,” explaining that “the one has no natural or necessary connex-
tion with the other.”  Id.  To support this, they recited the now conventional point that there were all 
sorts of instances “where persons are citizens and do not vote”: 
Formerly, property was a necessary qualification in Connecticut.  Were none but persons of prop-
erty citizens?  Suppose a voter in Connecticut should lose his right of suffrage, by reason of crimi-
nal conduct, as by law he may do, does he cease to be a citizen?  Does he become an alien?  No 
female can vote, nor any minor; but are not females and minors citizens?  
 If voting makes a citizen, what confusion!  The same man in one state, is a full citizen; in an-
other, half a citizen; in another a non-descript; in another, an alien.  How absurd to create such dis-
tinctions in these states! 
Id.  For a slightly different but essentially similar account of these passages, see PRUDENCE CRANDALL, 
supra note 57, at 10.   
Recognizing the stereotypical character of much of these debates, a Southerner countered:  
Perhaps we shall here again be met with the miserable subterfuge, that the right of suffrage is not 
essential to citizenship, as in females and minors.  But this . . . scarcely deserves a serious consid-
eration.  The civil disabilities resting upon females and minors, are general and impartial to all in 
like circumstances, black as well as white; . . . there is no political degradation . . . .   
GEORGE S. SAWYER, SOUTHERN INSTITUTES; OR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN AND EARLY 
PREVALENCE OF SLAVERY AND THE SLAVE-TRADE 300 (Phila., J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1859). 
115  Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).  His statement of this 
right is interesting for what it omits.  The right to travel associated with the Comity Clause was neces-
sarily a right of ingress, residence, and egress—the first being of particular importance in debates about 
free blacks.  Ingress, however, was precisely what Washington omitted, except to the extent it was im-
plied by the others elements. 
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was a right of a citizen of a state, and if, as Washington added, it was a fun-
damental right, it could not be denied to the citizens of any other state.  On 
the other hand, this notable Virginian and slaveowner ended his account of 
fundamental rights by expressly including suffrage.116  Political rights were 
the standard example of what blacks did not have.  Of course, some white 
men (as in Virginia) and many white women and children did not have such 
rights, and the fundamental rights theory was therefore not really plausible.  
But Washington had free blacks on his mind, and therefore, like so many 
other Southern judges, he made political rights the measure of citizenship 
for purposes of the Comity Clause.  
Ironically, Northern opponents of slavery would one day seize upon 
Bushrod Washington’s notion of fundamental rights precisely in order to 
assert the political rights of blacks.117  Until then, however, the implications 
of Washington’s opinion went in the other direction.  His view was merely 
part of a broader trend among judges of Southern sympathies to emphasize 
political rights and thereby leave blacks without citizenship—a trend that 
would reach its apogee when Chief Justice Taney wrote his opinion in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford.  By stating what was protected in political terms, these 
judges limited who was protected.118 
More generally, the point of Part II has been to observe how the second 
Missouri Compromise refocused Comity Clause debates from what to 
who—in particular, to the question of whether blacks were citizens of the 
United States.  Aspects of the citizenship question were familiar, but after 
1821, the simple exclusion of free blacks was no longer a plausible way of 
defeating their claims under the Comity Clause.  It therefore became neces-
sary to defend such exclusion or other abridgment of Comity Clause rights 
by expressly denying that free blacks were citizens for purposes of the 
Comity Clause.  One way of doing this was to deny that they were citizens 
of their states, but some states clearly accepted free blacks as citizens.  Sou-
therners therefore insisted that free blacks were not entitled to the benefit of 
the Comity Clause because they were not citizens of the United States.  In 
response, antislavery Americans increasingly asserted that free blacks were 
citizens of the United States and that on this account they were entitled to 
Comity Clause privileges and immunities. 
 
116  Id.  He sold fifty of his slaves further south in 1821.  WIECEK, supra note 81, at 126–27.  And 
his views on the potential of blacks as fellow citizens are suggested by his membership to the American 
Colonization Society.  Id. 
117  See, e.g., infra note 246. 
118  Surveying such views, Attorney General Edward Bates later explained: “[T]here is a very com-
mon error to the effect that the right to vote for public officers is one of the constituent elements of 
American citizenship . . . .  No error can be greater than this . . . .”  Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 
384 (1862).  In fact “there is no district in the nation in which a majority of the known and recognized 
citizens are not excluded by law from the right of suffrage.”  Id. at 385.  Among those excluded were 
“paupers, idiots, lunatics, and men convicted of infamous crimes, and, in some States, soldiers, all fe-
males and all minor males.”  Id. 
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III. THE DRED SCOTT CASE 
In 1857, the Comity Clause controversy, once again, came to the fore-
front of national politics, and by now the question inescapably centered on 
whether free blacks were citizens of the United States.  Already in the af-
termath of the second Missouri Compromise, it was disputed whether free 
blacks enjoyed citizenship and thus the benefit of the Comity Clause.119  
Now, however, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, this point came to be debated in 
the Supreme Court.120  On the one hand, Chief Justice Taney, speaking for 
the Court, established the Southern interpretation of the Comity Clause, that 
free blacks could not be citizens of the United States and so could not have 
Comity Clause rights.  On the other hand, Justice Curtis dramatically enun-
ciated the contrary interpretation in the most prominent antislavery dissent 
in American history.  These dueling interpretations elevated the question to 
even greater national prominence than in 1821.  Although Taney entrenched 
the Southern interpretation so far as to make the coming conflict seem al-
most inevitable, Curtis elevated the antislavery interpretation, which would 
eventually, after the conflict, be secured in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. Taney’s Opinion 
Like so many other Southerners, Chief Justice Roger Taney feared the 
implications of the Comity Clause for a mobile population of blacks, and 
like his Southern compatriots, he had a familiar answer: that blacks could 
not be citizens of the United States or otherwise citizens for purposes of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
Dred Scott was a slave who had been sold in 1830 in Missouri to an 
army surgeon, Dr. John Emerson, who later traveled with Scott to the state 
of Illinois and the territory of Wisconsin—both of which were free jurisdic-
tions.121  Later, after returning to Missouri, Scott was transferred by Emer-
son’s widow to her brother John Sandford.  At this point, Scott sought his 
freedom in the federal circuit court for Missouri.  His argument was that be-
cause the laws applicable in Illinois barred slavery, he had acquired his 
freedom when he had traveled to this Northern state.122  After losing in the 
circuit court, he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
The question of citizenship arose even before the Justices of the Su-
preme Court could reach the substantive questions, for merely to establish 
that the federal circuit court had diversity jurisdiction, Scott had to claim 
that he was a citizen of Missouri.  Chief Justice Taney, however, denied 
 
119  See supra Part II.C–D. 
120  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
121  Id. at 397. 
122  See id. at 431–32.  For further details, see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS 
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 250–65 (1978); Paul Finkelman, Scott v. Sandford: 
The Court’s Most Dreadful Case and How It Changed History, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2007).  
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that Scott could be a citizen for purposes of the U.S. Constitution, and al-
though this conclusion concerned the initial question of diversity, it also led 
Taney to explore the substantive question of whether Scott was a citizen for 
purposes of the Comity Clause: 
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into 
this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community 
formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, 
and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, 
guarantied by that instrument to the citizen?123 
Not surprisingly, Taney took the usual Southern position in Comity Clause 
cases; he argued that blacks were a “degraded” class, who could not be citi-
zens for purposes of the Constitution.124  It has been seen that some state 
courts took this view already in the immediate aftermath of the second Mis-
souri Compromise, but Taney now gave it the authority of the U.S. Su-
preme Court.125 
Taney began by distinguishing between “the rights of citizenship 
which a State may confer within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship 
as a member of the Union.”126  From this perspective, even when a black 
person was admitted by a state as its citizen, he did not necessarily become 
a citizen of the United States, enjoying the privileges and immunities of 
such citizenship:  
It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights and privileges of 
a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States.  He may 
have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State, and yet not be en-
titled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State.127  
Moreover, the Constitution gave Congress the power of naturalizing aliens: 
The Constitution has conferred on Congress the right to establish an uniform 
rule of naturalization, and this right is evidently exclusive, and has always 
been held by this court to be so.  Consequently, no State, since the adoption of 
the Constitution, can by naturalizing an alien invest him with the rights and 
 
123  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403.  Here and in the next quotation, note that Taney discussed 
rights as well as privileges and immunities of citizenship.  The phrase about “the rights, privileges, and 
immunities of citizens of the United States” was familiar from cession treaties.  In other words, it was a 
different sort of guarantee from a different context.  See infra Part IV.A.  Nonetheless, Taney may have 
deliberately echoed the phrasing of cession treaties, for he was alluding not merely to the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship mentioned in the Comity Clause but also to other rights of citizenship under 
the U.S. Constitution, including the right to have the benefit of diversity jurisdiction.  For these distinc-
tions, see infra text accompanying notes 155–56.  Some other nineteenth-century writers also talked 
about rights, privileges, and immunities in connection with the Comity Clause, but probably less self-
consciously. 
124  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 409, 411. 
125  See supra text accompanying notes 95–101. 
126  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 405. 
127  Id. 
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privileges secured to a citizen of a State under the Federal Government, al-
though, so far as the State alone was concerned, he would undoubtedly be enti-
tled to the rights of a citizen, and clothed with all the rights and immunities 
which the Constitution and laws of the State attached to that character.128 
As a result, no state on its own could “introduce a new member into the po-
litical community created by the Constitution of the United States.”129   
Of course, Taney was not really speaking of all new members of the 
political community.  Only when a black alien was admitted by a state as a 
citizen was there a question about his citizenship for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction and the Comity Clause.  Taney therefore soon came to rest on 
the familiar Southern position that blacks, whether slave or free, could not 
be citizens for purposes of the United States and its Constitution.  In other 
words, rather than persist in saying that a state could not introduce new 
members into the national political community, he now explained that it 
merely “cannot introduce any person, or description of persons, who were 
not intended to be embraced in this new political family, which the Consti-
tution brought into existence, but were intended to be excluded from it.”130   
Like earlier Southerners, Taney defended this exclusion by pointing to 
“the degraded condition of this unhappy race.”131  Since the second Missouri 
Compromise, Southerners had emphasized the degradation of blacks in or-
der to make clear that even free blacks could not be citizens for purposes of 
the Comity Clause.132  Taney now repeated this trope, arguing that, regard-
less of any distinctions “between the free negro or mulatto and the 
slave, . . . this stigma, of the deepest degradation, was fixed upon the whole 
race.”133 
 
128  Id. at 405–06. 
129  Id. at 406. 
130  Id.  Taney’s acceptance that national citizenship determined Comity Clause rights is noted by 
Kaczorowski, supra note 8, at 886–87. 
131  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 409. 
132  For an early use of this argument, see supra text accompanying notes 99–101 regarding Amy v. 
Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326 (1822).  Chief Justice Taney had earlier made the argument when he was At-
torney General in the 1830s: “[E]ven when free,” blacks were a “degraded class.”  Roger Taney, Unpub-
lished Opinion of Attorney General Taney, quoted in CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 154 
(1935).  He concluded: “They were not looked upon as citizens by the contracting parties who formed 
the Constitution.  They were evidently not supposed to be included by the term citizens.”  Id.; see also  
Finkelman, supra note 122, at 32. 
The argument itself was so degraded that Attorney General Bates dispatched it with mordant humor: 
“[I]t is said that African negroes are a degraded race, and that all who are tainted with that degradation 
are forever disqualified for the functions of citizenship.  I can hardly comprehend the thought of the ab-
solute incompatibility of degradation and citizenship.  I thought that they often went together.”  Citizen-
ship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 398 (1862). 
Incidentally, the constitutional significance of the trope about a degraded race raises a question about 
the role of law in shaping racial stereotypes.  In particular, did the legal posture necessary to defend sla-
very in the courts contribute to a hardening in the denigration of blacks as racially inferior? 
133  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 409. 
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In support of the exclusion of blacks from citizenship, Taney also 
hinted at the political rights of citizens.  He undoubtedly was familiar with 
the opinions of Bushrod Washington and other Southern judges that the pri-
vileges and immunities secured by the Comity Clause included the right to 
vote.  In this vein, he rhetorically asked whether the Clause had “embraced 
the negro African race . . . and put it in the power of a single State to make 
him a citizen of the United States, and endue him with the full rights of citi-
zenship in every other State without their consent?”134  The significance of 
the question was obvious. 
Taney thus followed other Southern judges in holding that blacks were 
not citizens for purposes of the Constitution, and that they therefore did not 
have the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Comity Clause.  But 
in at least one respect his opinion in Dred Scott was different: it resolved 
the legal controversy so conclusively as to point toward another mode of 
dispute. 
B. Curtis’s Dissent 
Among the dissenting justices, none rejected Taney’s argument more 
vigorously than Justice Benjamin Curtis.  Of particular importance here, 
Curtis gave national prominence to the antislavery position on the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States.  When Southern 
judges and others had said that blacks could not be citizens of the United 
States, antislavery Americans had long responded in kind, insisting that 
blacks could be citizens of the United States and therefore could be entitled 
to Comity Clause privileges and immunities.  Now Curtis repudiated Taney 
in such terms, and he thereby elevated the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States as a central antislavery demand. 
Like the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment about a decade later, 
Curtis understood that he first had to define who was a citizen of the United 
States.  In his words, “under the Constitution of the United States, every 
free person born on the soil of a State, who is a citizen of that State by force 
of its Constitution or laws, is also a citizen of the United States.”135  To de-
fend this position about who was a U.S. citizen and thus within the Comity 
Clause’s privileges and immunities, Justice Curtis would soon rely on the 
third understanding of what was included among such privileges and im-
munities.136  
 
134  Id. at 406.  Taney raised this argument by question and implication rather than directly because, 
in another part of his opinion, he sought to disconnect voting and citizenship, observing that in some 
states “foreigners not naturalized are allowed to vote,” which seemed to show that even when “the State 
may give the right to free negroes and mulattoes . . . that does not make them citizens of the State, and 
still less of the United States.”  Id. at 422. 
135  Id. at 576 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
136  See infra text accompanying note 144.  
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He understood, moreover, that like other antislavery judges, he had to 
put to rest the Southern objection that citizenship entailed political rights.  
Southerners, he noted, had objected: 
[T]hat if free colored persons . . . are . . . made citizens of the United States, 
then . . . such persons would be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several States; and, if so, then colored persons could vote, and 
be eligible to not only Federal offices, but offices even in those States whose 
Constitutions and laws disqualify colored persons from voting or being elected 
to office.137 
Curtis answered that this sort of complaint rested on the “untenable” as-
sumption that no one could be considered a citizen in the United States un-
less he was “entitled to enjoy all the privileges and franchises which are 
conferred on any citizen.”138  
Curtis backed up his response by observing that many states denied en-
tire classes of individuals the right to vote or to hold office, without depriv-
ing them of citizenship.  Echoing judges such as Mills in Amy v. Smith, 
Curtis explained that different states permitted different classes of persons 
to vote: 
One may confine the right of suffrage to white male citizens; another may ex-
tend it to colored persons and females . . . .  But whether native-born women, 
or persons under age, or under guardianship because insane or spendthrifts, be 
excluded from voting or holding office, or allowed to do so, I apprehend no 
one will deny that they are citizens of the United States.139  
Of course, the right to vote was “one of the chiefest attributes of citizenship 
under the American Constitutions; and the just and constitutional posses-
sion of this right is decisive evidence of citizenship.”140  Yet Curtis did “not 
think the enjoyment of the elective franchise essential to citizenship.”141  
He thereby rejected the position taken by Justice Washington in Cor-
field v. Coryell that the Comity Clause guaranteed fundamental rights or 
any other any particular rights, including suffrage: 
The truth is, that citizenship, under the Constitution of the United States, is not 
dependent on the possession of any particular political or even of all civil 
rights; and any attempt so to define it must lead to error.  To what citizens the 
elective franchise shall be confided, is a question to be determined by each 
 
137  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 582–83.   
138  Id. at 583. 
139  Id. 
140  Id. at 581. 
141  Id.  The Supreme Court repeated this point when, after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it held that a woman had no right under the Privileges or Immunities Clause to vote in federal 
elections.  Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874).  Ironically, as fate would have it, 
the case came out of Missouri. 
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State, in accordance with its own views of the necessities or expediencies of its 
condition.142 
Rather than impose a fixed baseline, the Comity Clause merely assured 
visitors of such rights as a state accorded all of its citizens: 
[T]his clause of the Constitution does not confer on the citizens of one State, in 
all other States, specific and enumerated privileges and immunities. They are 
entitled to such as belong to citizenship, but not to such as belong to particular 
citizens attended by other qualifications.  Privileges and immunities which be-
long to certain citizens of a State, by reason of the operation of causes other 
than mere citizenship, are not conferred. . . .  It rests with the States themselves 
so to frame their Constitutions and laws as not to attach a particular privilege 
or immunity to mere naked citizenship.  If one of the States will not deny to 
any of its own citizens a particular privilege or immunity, if it confer it on all 
of them by reason of mere naked citizenship, then it may be claimed by every 
citizen of each State by force of the Constitution . . . .143 
Visitors could claim not fundamental rights, but rather the rights that be-
longed to locals on account of their “mere naked citizenship.”  
This interpretation of what was protected—earlier identified as the 
third understanding—was essential for Curtis’s position on who was pro-
tected.  In the wake of the second Missouri Compromise, Washington and 
other Southern judges had taken an exaggerated and “untenable” interpreta-
tion of the protected privileges and immunities to exclude blacks from fed-
eral citizenship.144  Curtis therefore could defend the inclusion of blacks by 
falling back upon a much more plausible interpretation.  According to Cur-
tis, the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Comity Clause were 
merely the privileges and immunities enjoyed by “all” citizens of a state—
the privileges and immunities enjoyed simply on account of citizenship.145  
With this nonfundamental definition of the privileges and immunities of ci-
tizenship, it did not matter that free blacks lacked political rights; regard-
less, like children, women, and poor white men, free blacks could still be 
citizens of a state, and of the United States, who had a constitutional right to 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the other states.  Curtis thereby 
 
142  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 583. 
143  Id. at 583–84. 
144  See supra text accompanying note 138. 
145  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 584.  In effect, Curtis was reasserting Congress’s 1821 resolu-
tion admitting Missouri to the Union.  He recalled that Congress admitted Missouri on the condition that 
its constitution “shall never be construed to authorize the passage of any law . . . by which any citizen of 
either of the States of this Union shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and im-
munities to which such citizen is entitled under the Constitution of the United States.”  Id. at 588 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  Justice Curtis acknowledged that “this legislative declaration” could not 
“confer or take away any privilege or immunity granted by the Constitution.”  Id.  At the same time, he 
observed “that it expresses the then conviction of the legislative power of the United States, that free ne-
groes, as citizens of some of the States, might be entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in 
all the States.”  Id. 
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vindicated Dred Scott as a citizen of Missouri, and of the United States, 
with the benefit of diversity jurisdiction and Comity Clause rights. 
C. Lincoln–Douglas Debates 
It was only a short step from the intellectual clash in Dred Scott to the 
physical conflict of the Civil War.  And the path seemed to be laid out by 
Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas in their famous debates. 
Speaking in Springfield in the summer of 1857, Senator Stephen Doug-
las echoed Taney’s decision that “the negro is not and cannot be a citizen of 
the United States” and denounced antislavery opposition to this Southern 
stance.146  Douglas asked: “What is the objection to that decision?  Simply 
that the negro is not a citizen.  What is the object of making him a citizen?  
Of course to give him the rights, privileges and immunities of a citizen.”147  
The next summer, at the close of the Republican Convention at Spring-
field, Abraham Lincoln responded.  Reciting that “A house divided against 
itself cannot stand,” he argued that, in the contest between slavery and free-
dom, the nation “will become all one thing, or all the other.”148  He therefore 
took aim at Douglas’s defense of Taney, for Taney’s conclusions about pri-
vileges and immunities were part of the “machinery” for advancing slav-
ery.149  As Lincoln explained, Taney took the view: 
That no negro slave, imported as such from Africa, and no descendant of such 
slave, can ever be a citizen of any State, in the sense of that term as used in the 
Constitution of the United States. This point is made in order to deprive the 
negro, in every possible event, of the benefit of that provision of the United 
States Constitution which declares that “The citizens of each State shall be en-
titled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.”150  
Three weeks later, in Chicago, Douglas declared his objection to Lincoln’s 
reasons “for resisting the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott 
case.”151  Speaking of the future president, who sat facing him in the hall, 
Douglas explained: 
He says it is wrong, because it deprives the negro of the benefits of that clause 
of the Constitution which says that citizens of one State shall enjoy all the pri-
vileges and immunities of citizens of the several States; in other words, he 
thinks it wrong because it deprives the negro of the privileges, immunities, and 
 
146  Senator Stephen A. Douglas, Kansas—The Mormons—Slavery, Delivered at Springfield, Illi-
nois (June 12, 1857), in A POLITICAL TEXT-BOOK FOR 1860, at 154, 155 (N.Y., Tribune Ass’n 1860). 
147  Id. 
148  Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield (June 17, 1858), in POLITICAL DEBATES BETWEEN 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 1, 1 (Cleveland, O.S. Hubbell & Co. 1895). 
149  Id. at 3–4. 
150  Id. at 4. 
151  Senator Stephen Douglas, Speech on the Occasion of his Public Reception at Chicago (July 9, 
1858), in POLITICAL DEBATES BETWEEN ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS, supra note 
148, at 8, 17. 
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rights of citizenship, which pertain, according to that decision, only to the 
white man.  I am free to say to you that in my opinion this government of ours 
is founded on the white basis.  It was made by the white man, for the benefit of 
the white man, to be administered by white men, in such manner as they 
should determine.152  
Today, mobility is taken for granted, and the right of a citizen of one state 
to the privileges and immunities of the citizens of other states seems a ra-
ther arcane question.  In the mid-nineteenth century, however, it was a 
fighting matter. 
In the legal battle, although Taney gave the Southern position the final-
ity of a Supreme Court precedent, Curtis drew national attention to the anti-
slavery response and thereby elevated it to a central antislavery position.  
The struggle against slavery now prominently embraced the ideal that free 
blacks were citizens of the United States and that they therefore had Comity 
Clause rights.  But before observing how this Comity Clause question was 
resolved after the military conflict, it is necessary to pause to consider how 
it came to be rephrased. 
IV. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES 
The assumption that Comity Clause rights belonged to citizens of the 
United States eventually acquired succinct expression in terms of “the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”  Both Southerners 
and Northerners used this locution, for it felicitously captured their shared 
assumption that the Comity Clause secured the rights arising from a general 
citizenship.  Indeed, because the phrase expressed the underlying assump-
tion about citizenship, it became an appealing label for Comity Clause 
rights, and each side found it a forceful way of asserting its position in 
terms of the underlying justification.  It is therefore no surprise to find Sou-
therners arguing that “[t]he citizens of each State are secured in the enjoy-
ment of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”153  
The phrase, however, was especially resonant for those who took the 
Northern position.  In defense of the Comity Clause rights of free blacks, it 
became commonplace to insist upon “the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States.” 
A. Different Contexts and Different Meanings 
Of course, Americans alluded to “the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States” in a range of different contexts, not all of which 
focused on free blacks or the Comity Clause.  That is, in different contexts, 
 
152  Id. 
153  CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 903 (1848) (statement of Sen. Hunter of Virginia) 
(arguing that the U.S. Constitution’s limits on states do not apply to territories and, more generally, that 
Congress has power to regulate the territories). 
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they used the phrase with different meanings.  In the debates that centered 
on the rights of free blacks, however, “the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States” were Comity Clause rights. 
The importance of distinguishing among contexts can initially be ob-
served in connection with cession treaties—the international treaties that 
ceded territories to the United States.  In these documents, the United States 
assured the inhabitants of the ceded territories that they would enjoy “the 
privileges, rights and immunities of Citizens of the United States.”154  On 
this basis, it has been suggested that the cession treaties point to the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.155  
The privileges and immunities clauses of the cession treaties, however, 
dealt with a distinct problem.  The difficulty was to assure the inhabitants of 
the ceded territories that they would enjoy the rights of subjects or citizens 
of the United States—in other words, to guarantee that they would enjoy 
such rights in their own jurisdiction.  This is why the treaties made “the pri-
vileges, rights and immunities” of citizens a positive duty of the United 
States.  And although the word “rights” may have been intended as mere 
surplusage, it had the effect of clarifying that the United States was guaran-
teeing more than what was secured by the Comity Clause.156 
In contrast, the arguments about the privileges and immunities owed to 
free blacks concerned a very different context and a very different prob-
lem—not which rights they enjoyed at home, but whether they were among 
the persons who could enjoy rights when they traveled.  The privileges and 
immunities problem faced by free blacks was that some states excluded 
them—increasingly on the ground that they were not citizens of the United 
States and that they therefore were not entitled to Comity Clause rights.  In 
this context, the antislavery demands for the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States concerned not what was protected by the Com-
ity Clause but who was protected.  To resolve this question, antislavery 
Americans interpreted the Comity Clause to protect citizens of the United 
States, including free blacks.  Giving support to this interpretation of the 
Comity Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment later would define who was a 
 
154  For example, in the Florida cession treaty, the federal government provided that the inhabitants 
would be “admitted to the enjoyment of all the privileges, rights and immunities of the Citizens of the 
United States.”  Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits Between the United States of America, and His 
Catholic Majesty (Adams–Onis Treaty), U.S.-Spain, art. 6, Feb. 22, 1821, 8 Stat. 252.  In a similar man-
ner, in the Louisiana cession treaty, the federal government provided that the inhabitants would be “ad-
mitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of 
all of the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States.”  Treaty Between the Unit-
ed States of America and the French Republic, U.S.-Fr., art. III, Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200.   
155  Lash, supra note 13, at 1285–87.  
156  Attorney General Edward Bates noted that sometimes “the words rights, privileges, immunities 
are abusively used, as if they were synonymous.  The word rights is generic, common, embracing what-
ever may be lawfully claimed.  Privileges are special rights belonging to the individual or class, and not 
to the mass.  Immunities are rights of exemption only, freedom from what otherwise would be a duty, 
obligation, or burden.”  Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 407 (1862). 
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citizen of the United States and would bar states from abridging the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States. 
For now, it should suffice to note that cession treaties and the exclusion 
of free blacks were different contexts, and what was said about the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States in these contexts in-
volved different problems, texts, and meanings.  Thus, when cession 
treaties guaranteed the “privileges, rights and immunities of citizens of the 
United States,” they were understood to assure a broad range of rights.  But 
when Americans, in debates about free blacks, asserted the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States, they were understood to be 
speaking about Comity Clause rights. 
The importance of context is also apparent when one examines the pri-
vileges and immunities arguments not in favor of free blacks, but against 
slavery.  At least some Americans opposed slavery roughly in terms of “the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”157  The clearest 
example comes from Joel Tiffany, who argued against slavery in 1849 on 
the ground that neither the states nor the federal government could violate 
the “rights and privileges” or the “privileges and immunities” that are guar-
anteed to “a citizen of the United States” by the Constitution.158  In thus op-
posing slavery, Tiffany did not draw a distinction between the rights of 
persons and the privileges and immunities of citizens; nor, when he focused 
on citizens, did he confine his argument to any particular level of govern-
ment.159  On the contrary, in rejecting slavery, he argued generally for privi-
leges and immunities against both the federal government and the states, 
thus apparently coming close to what today would be called “incorpora-
tion.”160  Tiffany’s argument, however, was not typical of antislavery Amer-
icans.  Indeed, although Tiffany provoked local debate in Ohio over his 
advocacy of spiritualism, he does not seem to have stimulated even this 
much local interest in his views on privileges and immunities.161   
In addition, some white abolitionists vaguely asserted privileges and 
immunities of federal citizenship as their own rights against the states.162  
These abolitionists usually were Northerners defending their speech rights 
in Southern states, and it thus is not always clear that their demands for pri-
 
157  CURTIS, DARLING PRIVILEGE, supra note 11, at 266–68; CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, 
supra note 8, at 41–51. 
158  JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 57, 87 
(Mnemosyne Publ’g Co., photo. reprint 1969) (1849).  He did not, though, use the phrase “the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States.” 
159  Id. 
160  These rights, he explained, included habeas corpus, a republican form of government, protection 
against invasion and domestic violence, the right to bear arms, and the due process of law.  Id. at 97, 
107, 115, 117. 
161  One review has been located thus far, a brief but positive notice in a Washington, D.C. paper.  
Review, 4 NAT’L ERA (D.C.) 131 (1850). 
162  See supra note 11.  
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vileges and immunities went beyond ordinary Comity Clause claims for 
cross-jurisdictional rights.163  At least occasionally, however, their state-
ments may have gone further.   
One way or another, Tiffany’s arguments for slaves, and the arguments 
of other abolitionists for themselves, are the most prominent evidence of-
fered thus far to show that there were privileges and immunities claims for 
something like incorporation.  Obviously, such arguments offer only slim 
evidentiary foundations for broad conclusions about the antislavery move-
ment or the Constitution.  Nonetheless, incorporationist scholarship sug-
gests that when the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States, it must have been echoing these 
earlier hints of incorporation.  
As already explained, however, there was a far more prominent debate 
over the privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United 
States, and this national controversy concerned not abolitionists, nor slaves, 
but free blacks.  Certainly, abolitionists and slaves needed any rights they 
could get.  At the same time, free blacks, being increasingly mobile, needed 
the benefit of the Comity Clause, and this was the problem that the states, 
Congress, and much of the nation came to debate in terms of “the privileges 
and immunities” that belonged to “citizens of the United States.”  Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, when Americans disputed the fate of free blacks, they 
tended to speak of “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States” in a different way than did someone such as Tiffany—not to claim 
federal rights for slaves against their own states, but to defend the claims of 
free blacks to Comity Clause rights in other states. 
The phrase “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” 
thus had different meanings in different contexts.  It should already be evi-
dent that, in the leading debate about privileges and immunities—the na-
tional debate about state exclusion of free blacks—Comity Clause rights 
were understood to belong to citizens of the United States.  Now it will be 
seen that in these debates, such rights increasingly were asserted as “the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”  
B. Black Interest in the Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens of the United States 
Among those who paid attention to context and meaning were free 
blacks.  The scholarship on privileges and immunities concentrates on the 
vague generalizations of white legislators in 1866.  Also revealing, how-
ever, are the more concrete statements made by Americans, both white and 
black, before the Civil War.  Although these earlier statements can be stud-
ied from white sources, they are examined here as presented by free blacks 
 
163  The incorporationist scholarship rarely, if ever, acknowledges this sort of distinction and there-
fore systematically overstates the strength of such evidence. 
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in their newspapers.  Whereas white sources mostly reported only white 
opinion, black newspapers tended to print a combination of black opinion 
and notable debates among whites.  This evidence shows that free blacks 
agreed with antislavery whites about privileges and immunities, and it is 
valuable because, of all people, free blacks surely understood what was at 
stake. 
The black newspaper evidence is especially valuable because it con-
firms the significance of context.  As already noted, at least some antislav-
ery Americans spoke about the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States in allusive ways that appear to have moved toward incorpora-
tion.164  Much more clearly and commonly, however, in the national debate 
over the status of free blacks, whites and eventually blacks asserted “the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” as a demand for 
Comity Clause rights.  Nor should this be a surprise.  In the dispute over the 
status of free blacks, what mattered were Comity Clause rights rather than 
incorporated rights. 
In 1854, for example, the National Era reported on a debate in Con-
gress over fugitive slaves.  Senator Judah P. Benjamin of Louisiana asked 
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts to answer a question about the 
return of fugitive slaves from the North, but Sumner responded with his 
own question about the privileges and immunities of free blacks in the 
South: 
 BENJAMIN: I . . . wish to inquire of the Senator from Massachusetts whether 
he acknowledges any obligation imposed by the Constitution of the United 
States, for the return of fugitive slaves from the free States to those by whom 
they are held to service or labor in the slave States  . . .   
 SUMNER: And before I answer that question, I desire to ask the Senator from 
Louisiana, whether, under the clause of the Constitution of the United States, 
which secures to the citizens of every State the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States, a colored citizen of Massachusetts can, without 
any crime, in South Carolina or Louisiana, be seized and thrown into prison, 
and then afterwards, on failure to pay certain alleged jail fees, be sold abso-
lutely into Slavery?  
 BENJAMIN: I will answer that I think that is entirely unconstitutional.165 
 
164  See supra text accompanying note 11.  
165  Perfected Proceedings, 8 NAT’L ERA (D.C.) 119 (1854).  Incidentally, Sumner could not rest 
content with Benjamin’s answer, and he therefore reminded the Senate of his desire for an enforcement 
bill, which was the sort of demand that would later underlie demands for the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause: 
 SUMNER: I am very glad that the Senator says it is entirely unconstitutional.  I will then ask the 
Senator if he is ready, in his place, to introduce an act of Congress to carry out that provision of 
the Constitution to secure to the colored citizens of the North their rights in South Carolina and 
Louisiana? 
 BENJAMIN: This is a very extraordinary method of answering a question.  I have heard of the 
Yankee method of answering one question by asking another; but this is answering one by asking 
two. [Laughter.]  
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It was a rare moment when a Southerner agreed that free blacks in the South 
enjoyed “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”  
And not insignificantly, it was of interest to a black newspaper. 
Another example from the National Era concerned John Brown’s trial 
for attacking the armory at Harper’s Ferry.  At the start of the trial in 1859, 
an ardent opponent of slavery, Lydia Maria Child, wrote from her home in 
Massachusetts to Governor Wise of Virginia to ask if she could attend 
Brown in prison.  She felt “a natural impulse of sympathy for the brave and 
suffering man” and thought that “he needs mother or sister to dress his 
wounds and speak soothingly to him.  Will you allow me to p[er]form that 
mission of humanity?  If you will, may God bless you for the generous 
deed!”166  Reprinting this letter, the National Era also published the Gover-
nor’s caustic reply.  The Governor noted that, in order to visit and tend to 
Brown in his cell, Mrs. Child would need the permission of the court and its 
officers.  But then, attributing to her a suggestion that she needed permis-
sion to enter Virginia, he responded, with a sense of affront, that of course 
Virginia would honor her constitutional right to visit the state: 
Why should you not be so allowed, madam? Virginia and Massachusetts are 
involved in no civil war, and the Constitution which unites them in one Con-
federacy guaranties to you the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the 
United States in the State of Virginia.  That Constitution I am sworn to sup-
port, and am therefore bound to protect your privileges and immunities as a 
citizen of Massachusetts coming into Virginia for any lawful and peaceful pur-
pose.167  
Blacks could not expect to enjoy “the privileges and immunities of a citizen 
of the United States in the State of Virginia.”  But the government of Vir-
ginia would ostentatiously protect a white abolitionist woman from Massa-
chusetts in such privileges and immunities. 
Blacks not only reported on the privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the United States but also complained that they lacked this freedom.  
This is not the sort of evidence that ordinarily finds its way into the histo-
ries of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Little, however, could be more 
relevant or revealing. 
In 1858, free blacks in Massachusetts, particularly Boston, presented a 
memorial to the state’s legislature.168  The memorialists, led by the Boston 
activist William Nell, complained that the Dred Scott decision had left them 
                                                                                                                           
Id. (brackets in original). 
166  Additions to the Documentary History: Lydia Maria Child and Gov. Wise, 13 NAT’L ERA (D.C.) 
184 (1859). 
167  Id. 
168  William C. Nell & Other Colored Citizens of Massachusetts, Rights of Colored Citizens, 
29 LIBERATOR (Bos.) 11 (1859).  Nell was a leader of the black community in Boston who organized, 
among other things, its campaign against segregated public schools.  2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK 
STATE CONVENTIONS, 1840–1865, at 106 n.12 (Philip S. Foner & George E. Walker eds., 1980).  
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more vulnerable than ever in Southern states: “[B]y the laws of the South-
ern States, they are still prohibited, under the severest penalties, from visit-
ing any of those States,” and “a considerable number of the colored citizens 
of Massachusetts have already been seized in Southern ports . . . thrust into 
prison, and sold into interminable slavery.”169  The memorialists acknowl-
edged that, following Dred Scott, Massachusetts had made an initial effort 
“legally to test” the rights of its black citizens.  But this had been “repulsed” 
by South Carolina and Louisiana, and since then, Massachusetts had 
“lacked the courage to vindicate the rights of her colored citizens, leaving 
them a prey to the oppressor.”170 
When laying the foundation for these complaints, Nell and the blacks 
of Massachusetts asserted that they had a right to “the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the United States.”171  They argued that because the 
Dred Scott decision “is in palpable violation” of the Comity Clause, it was 
of no authority: 
That it is, therefore, no more worthy of respect and consideration than though 
it denied to all the citizens of this Commonwealth the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States, and declared Massachusetts to be no long-
er a constituent member of the Union; but ought to be solemnly protested 
against, and resisted to the last extremity, by your honorable bodies, and by all 
the people of the State, as an intolerable act of usurpation and tyranny.172 
Massachusetts would, indeed, soon resist to the last extremity.  For now, 
however, free blacks from Massachusetts, who feared the worst from 
Southern states, had to petition their own state to take a stand in defense of 
“the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”  
Black understandings of the privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States rested on the same bitter genealogy of ideas that was fa-
miliar to whites.  Nell spelled this out when he presented resolutions on his 
memorial to the 1858 Convention of the Colored Citizens of Massachusetts:  
 Whereas, the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the Dred Scott case, by which that Court declares that we are not, and cannot 
become citizens of the United States, is in palpable violation of the 1st [sic] 
section of Article 4th of the Constitution of the United States . . . . 
 Whereas, we deem the doctrine so ably laid down by Judge Curtis, of Mas-
sachusetts, in dissenting . . . to be impregnable. . . . 
 Whereas, Stephen A. Douglas, in his campaign speeches in Illinois, is de-
claring that he does not believe it a great wrong to deprive a negro the rights of 
citizenship.  He does not believe they ever were intended to be citizens.  Our 
government, he says, was founded on a white basis—was created by white 
men. . . . 
 
169  Nell, supra note 168, at 11. 
170  Id. 
171  Id.  
172  Id. 
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 Resolved, That this Mass[achusetts] Convention adopt the memorial sent 
from Boston to the last session of the Massachusetts Legislature, protesting 
against the Dred Scott decision . . . .173 
In this manner, Nell condemned the decision that, in violation of the Com-
ity Clause, denied “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States.”174  
Free blacks had good reason to be concerned about their Comity 
Clause rights, for they took a high risk when traveling to Southern states.  
And although their views find little place in the scholarship on incorpora-
tion, it is difficult to imagine that they misunderstood the significance of the 
privileges and immunities they demanded. 
C. Bingham’s Speech on Oregon: 
Rewriting the Comity Clause 
The white congressman who most saliently advocated black Comity 
Clause rights in terms of national citizenship was Representative John 
Bingham of Ohio.  In 1866, Bingham would draft the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is therefore revealing that al-
ready in the 1859 debate over the admission of Oregon, he was speaking 
about the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.  Like 
Missouri decades earlier, Oregon asked to be admitted to the Union with a 
constitution that would have barred entry to free blacks.175  It was a familiar 
danger, and Bingham addressed it with the now conventional argument that 
free blacks enjoyed Comity Clause rights—or as he put it, that they enjoyed 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.176  Indeed, 
 
173  Anniversary of the British West India Emancipation, Convention of the Colored Citizens of Mas-
sachusetts, 28 LIBERATOR (Bos.) 132 (1858). 
174  Id.  Another black convention, in Virginia, echoed this sort of demand at the end of the Civil 
War: 
Massachusetts may with perfect propriety say to Virginia, No matter with what wrongs, for the 
purpose of sustaining a bloody and barbarous system, you outrage humanity in the persons of col-
ored men born and reared upon your own soil, I demand of you by the sacred guaranty of your 
constitutional obligations, that the humblest of my citizens, when a sojourner in your territory, 
shall be secure in all the great fundamental rights of human nature. 
Opinion of Judge Underwood on the Right of Excluding the Testimony of Colored Men from the Courts 
of Justice, N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 22, 1865, reprinted in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK NATIONAL AND 
STATE CONVENTIONS, 1865–1900, at 100 (Philip S. Foner & George E. Walker eds., 1986). 
175  OR. CONST. of 1857, art. XVIII, § 4.  This provision was to become part of the Constitution only 
if the people, when adopting the Constitution, voted against the presence of free blacks.  Id.  It was add-
ed to propitiate those who argued that if the State did not allow slavery, it would be “overrun with free 
negroes.”  Letter from George H. Williams to George H. Himes (Aug. 26, 1907), in THE OREGON 
CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1857, at 
32, 33 (Charles Henry Carey ed., State Printing Dep’t 1926). 
176  Scholars have taken note of Bingham’s speech but without recognizing that it took a familiar po-
sition against a familiar sort of threat, and they thereby assume that Bingham’s defense of the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States was his attempt to stake out a new sort of claim.  MALTZ, 
supra note 81, at 37–38.  In fact, it was an old wine in a not entirely new bottle.  Incidentally, Bingham’s 
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like many of his contemporaries, he argued for his interpretation about the 
Comity Clause by rewriting it.   
The offensive provision of the proposed Oregon Constitution barred 
free blacks from entering, residing, holding real estate, making any contract, 
or maintaining any suit therein.  Laying the foundation for his response, 
Bingham explained that “[a]ll free persons born and domiciled within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, are citizens of the United States from 
birth,” and that “all aliens become citizens of the United States only by act 
of naturalization, under the laws of the United States.”177  On this basis, 
Bingham declared: “I deny that any state may exclude a law abiding citizen 
of the United States from coming within its Territory, or abiding therein, or 
acquiring and enjoying property therein, or from the enjoyment therein of 
the ‘privileges and immunities’ of a citizen of the United States.”178  Bing-
ham then asked, “What says the Constitution”?179  He answered by quoting 
the Comity Clause.  He then elaborated: 
The citizens of each State, all the citizens of each State, being citizens of the 
United States, shall be entitled to “all privileges and immunities of citizens in 
the several States.”  Not to the rights and immunities of the several States; not 
to those constitutional rights and immunities which result exclusively from 
State authority or State legislation; but to “all privileges and immunities” of 
citizens of the United States in the several States.180   
Comity Clause rights resulted not merely from state law, but from the U.S. 
Constitution, and they belonged to all citizens of the United States.  In this 
sense, Comity Clause rights were the privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the United States. 
Bingham understood that the Comity Clause did not specify “citizens 
of the United States,” but this was how Bingham interpreted it and how he, 
in effect, rewrote it.  Like Southerners who defeated the Comity Clause 
claims of blacks by denying that such persons were citizens of the United 
States, Northerners such as Bingham assumed that the Clause referred to 
citizens of the United States: “There is an ellipsis in the language employed 
in the Constitution, but its meaning is self-evident that it is the ‘privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States’ that it 
guaranties.”181   
In fact, Bingham was not alone in rewriting the Comity Clause.  Both 
Northerners and Southerners simply altered the Clause to express what ev-
                                                                                                                           
speech was reported in at least one black newspaper.  Admission of Oregon, Speech of Hon. John A. 
Bingham, of Ohio, in the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 11, 1859), 13 NAT'L ERA (D.C.) 36 
(1859). 
177  CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981, 983 (1859) (statement of Rep. John Bingham). 
178  Id. at 984. 
179  Id. 
180  Id. 
181  Id. 
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eryone at this point assumed.  On behalf of the South, for example, George 
Sawyer wrote that “[t]he Constitution has guaranteed to the citizens of each 
State (or of the United States) the enjoyment of all the rights, privileges and 
immunities of the several States”—this being an attempt to introduce the 
assumption about citizenship in a way that made sense of the Clause.182  On 
behalf of the North, Horace Dresser also specified his assumption about “a 
federal, national, or American citizenship” by inserting it within brackets: 
“The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens [of the United States] in the several States”—this more 
typical mode of rewriting being an attempt to echo what had developed as a 
label for Comity Clause rights.183  Of course, however they rephrased the 
Clause, Southerners denied that blacks were citizens of the United States, 
and Northerners were apt to take the other view.  But either way, the rewrit-
ing clarified that states could not deny the privileges and immunities that 
the Comity Clause assured to citizens of the United States.  It was a mode 
of interpretation, and indeed interpolation, that would soon be significant 
for the Fourteenth Amendment. 
To modern scholars, attuned to modern concerns, “the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States” must have meant the incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights, but to the Americans who struggled over the fate 
of free blacks in a nation divided by slavery, it did not.  To these earlier 
Americans, whether Southern or Northern, white or black, the phrase was 
merely a concise, forceful statement of the privileges and immunities that 
Americans enjoyed in other states as citizens of the United States. 
D. Not Incorporation 
It is necessary to linger on the question of whether Bingham in 1859 
was referring to incorporation, for some scholars have suggested that, when 
he asserted the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States 
against the Oregon Constitution, he meant that the Comity Clause itself in-
corporated the Bill of Rights against the states.184  Bingham, however, was 
simply reiterating the standard antislavery position on the Comity Clause: 
 
182  SAWYER, supra note 114, at 299.  Sawyer was a New Englander who had long lived in Louisi-
ana.  He wrote this volume in 1855.  Id. at iii, v.  
In arguments in 1860, on a writ of habeas against Southerners who had brought slaves into New 
York while in transit, one of the counsel for the slaves, William Evarts, noted: “It is claimed by the 
learned counsel for the appellants, that this should be construed as if it read: ‘The citizens of each State 
shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States—in the several 
States.’”  N.Y. COURT OF APPEALS, REPORT OF THE LEMMON SLAVE CASE: CONTAINING POINTS AND 
ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL ON BOTH SIDES, AND OPINIONS OF ALL THE JUDGES 78 (N.Y., Horace Gree-
ley & Co. 1860).  To this, Evarts responded that “there is nothing in the condition of a citizen of the 
United States, which would warrant the suggestion, that there was any intention that he should carry into 
any State, social or political rights which citizens there did not enjoy.”  Id.  
183  Horace Dresser, Slavery and the Slave Trade, 43 U.S. DEMOCRATIC REV. 304, 308, 320 (1859). 
184  See, e.g., CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 8, at 61. 
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that this clause assured to visiting blacks, as citizens of the United States, 
the substantive rights that states accorded their own citizens.  As might be 
expected, the question was one of cross-jurisdictional equality, not fixed 
federal substantive limits. 
Like others who took the antislavery position—whether the litigants in 
the Crandall case or Justice Curtis in Dred Scott—Bingham was fighting 
for the privileges and immunities secured by the Comity Clause, which in 
this instance were the privileges and immunities that Oregon had given its 
own citizens and now proposed to deny to visiting blacks.  Thus, although 
he spoke about substantive rights as being among the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the United States, the context makes abundantly clear 
that he was simply making the usual Comity Clause argument that rights 
held under state law were equally assured to blacks by the Comity Clause: 
I maintain that the persons thus excluded from the State by this section of the 
Oregon constitution, are citizens by birth of the several States, and therefore 
are citizens of the United States, and as such are entitled to all the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States, amongst which are the rights 
of life and liberty and property, and their due protection in the enjoyment the-
reof by law; and therefore I hold this section for their exclusion from that State 
and its courts, to be an infraction of that wise and essential provision in the na-
tional Constitution to which I before referred . . . .185 
He then, once again, quoted the Comity Clause and explained that this was 
the provision of the Constitution under which free blacks were entitled to 
“the rights of life and liberty and property, and their due protection in the 
enjoyment thereof.”186  
Scholars who have discerned hints of incorporation in Bingham’s 
speech about Oregon have ignored the earlier antislavery context of what he 
said.  Rather than read forward from the antislavery arguments about how 
all citizens of the United States were entitled to the benefit of the Comity 
Clause, the scholars have read backwards from their twentieth-century as-
sumptions that “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States” must be federal rights incorporated against the states.   
Yet once the context of Bingham’s speech is considered, his meaning 
becomes clear.  The danger was the Southern view that blacks were not citi-
zens of the United States—a position that largely defeated the Comity 
Clause.  Against this threat, antislavery advocates and judges had come to 
argue that blacks enjoyed the benefit of the Comity Clause as citizens of the 
United States.  Bingham made this argument against the Oregon Constitu-
tion, and with compressed eloquence, he summarized that he was arguing 
for the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.  In this 
context, when Bingham said that “the rights of life and liberty and property, 
 
185  CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham on Feb. 11, 1859). 
186  Id. 
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and their due protection in the enjoyment thereof by law” were among “the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,” he meant ex-
actly what one might expect.  Like so many other antislavery advocates, he 
was defending the cross-jurisdictional claim of blacks under the Comity 
Clause—their claim under the U.S. Constitution, as citizens of the United 
States, to the substantive rights offered by states to their own citizens. 
Thus, even before the Civil War, in disputes about the Comity Clause 
claims of free blacks, opponents of slavery prominently espoused such 
claims in terms of “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States.”  This was not the only context in which Americans used this 
phrase, but it was the most prominent.  Of particular interest here, they 
sometimes clarified how they were interpreting the Comity Clause in favor 
of free blacks by rewriting the Clause to protect “the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens [of the United States].”  Not long afterward, when the 
Civil War ended, Bingham would propose to amend the Constitution in 
such terms.  
V. THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES BILL 
Although the context of Representative Bingham’s proposal might by 
now seem clear enough, there is more to be discerned, for the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause was preceded by a Privileges and Immunities Bill.  Ear-
ly in 1866, while drafting the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress briefly 
considered a bill “To declare and protect all the privileges and immunities 
of citizens of the United States in the several States.”187  This bill has never 
been examined for its role in the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment.188  
But it is very important, as it removes any room for doubt about the mean-
ing of the related clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Bill aimed to protect the privileges and immunities owed to citi-
zens of the states under the Comity Clause on the ground that these were 
“the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States.”189  Al-
though the Bill failed on account of constitutional objections, the Four-
teenth Amendment overcame this obstacle by elevating the Bill’s main 
principle to a constitutional guarantee.   
The Privileges and Immunities Bill is therefore the evidence that 
cinches the relationship between the Comity Clause disputes and the Four-
 
187  A Bill to Declare and Protect All the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States 
in the Several States, H.R. 437, 39th Cong. § 1 (as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 2, 1866, 
Printers No. 116).   
188  In one scholarly account, the Bill is mentioned in passing, but as a bill “to punish private inva-
sions of basic rights.”  MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 39 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1293–94 (1866)).  This is true of the enforcement provisions, but does not capture the main import 
of the Bill.  For more on the Bill’s provisions allowing enforcement against private action, see infra note 
198. 
189  H.R. 437. 
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teenth Amendment.  Enough has already been seen to show the connection.  
But the Bill directly ties the earlier efforts to enforce the Comity Clause 
with what would become the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause.  In particular, it completes the genealogy of context, text, and 
meaning that runs from the aftermath of the second Missouri Compromise 
up to Bingham’s drafting of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  It is, 
therefore, a sort of missing link.  
A. The Civil Rights Act 
The Privileges and Immunities Bill was designed as a companion to the 
Civil Rights Act.  The Civil Rights Act generally protected individuals 
against discrimination under state law.190  Further protection, however, 
might be needed against interstate discrimination, for this often kept indi-
viduals from even coming within the ambit of a state’s law.  The Privileges 
and Immunities Bill was therefore written to supplement the Civil Rights 
Act by enforcing the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Comity 
Clause. 
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1866 to protect individuals 
from racial discrimination under state law.  As the Civil War came to an 
end in 1865, Congress and the states, in the Thirteenth Amendment, abol-
ished slavery.191  But Southern states responded to emancipation by adopt-
ing “Black Codes,” which kept emancipated blacks in a state of de facto 
slavery.  These statutes constrained individuals on account of their race, 
barring them from a wide range of activities, such as entering into contracts 
or owning property, that were understood to be aspects of natural liberty. 
In response to this primarily intrastate discrimination, Congress passed 
the Civil Rights Act.  The statute began by declaring “all persons born in 
the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians 
not taxed . . . to be citizens of the United States.”192  It then assured all such 
citizens of equality in specified natural rights and due process:  
[S]uch citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condi-
tion of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whe-
reof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in 
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, 
to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and 
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white cit-
izens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none 
 
190  Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27–30. 
191  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
192  Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31. 
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other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary not-
withstanding.193 
Other than the proceedings for security of person and property, these rights 
were all understood as natural rights—meaning aspects of the liberty that 
individuals enjoyed in the state of nature or absence of government. 
The protection of natural rights was understood as the primary purpose 
of civil government, and in this sense, legally protected natural rights were 
also civil rights—thus giving the Civil Rights Act its name.  Although the 
phrase “civil rights” had once typically been understood to mean all rights 
enjoyed under civil laws, the phrase had come, in the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury, to mean only the natural rights protected by civil laws.  From this per-
spective, Blackstone explained that “civil liberty . . . is no other than natural 
liberty, so far restrained by human laws . . . as is necessary and expedient 
for the general advantage of the public.”194  An equality of legally protected 
natural rights may these days seem meager, but these were the rights that 
were being denied by Southern states in 1866.  They were also the sort of 
rights that seemed to distinguish free citizens from persons in servitude.195  
The Civil Rights Act, therefore, required equality of such rights and of due 
process and enforced this equality with criminal sanctions.196 
The Civil Rights Act, however, provoked constitutional objections, and 
on these and perhaps also less principled grounds, President Johnson vetoed 
it.  Congress therefore had to attend to the constitutional question, and al-
though it overrode the veto of the Civil Rights Act in April 1866, Congress 
simultaneously used the Fourteenth Amendment to establish beyond any 
doubt its constitutional authority to adopt the Civil Rights Act. 
B. The Privileges and Immunities Bill 
Less familiar than the story of the Civil Rights Act is the parallel story 
of the Privileges and Immunities Bill.  At roughly the same time that Con-
gress dealt mostly with the intrastate rights of persons in the Civil Rights 
Act, it attempted to redress interstate rights—“the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States”—in the Privileges and Immunities Bill.  
Like the Civil Rights Act, the Bill failed for constitutional reasons, and then 
became a foundation for the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 
193  Id.  
194  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1, *125.  Religious dissenters had demanded equal 
civil rights to obtain equality not only as to natural liberty under civil law but also as to the privileges 
accorded the Anglican establishment.  Blackstone, however, defended the Anglican establishment by 
flipping around the term, saying that it meant only the natural liberty enjoyed under civil laws.  Id.  For 
the shifting meaning of “civil rights,” see Philip Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-
Century Debate About Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 386–87.  
195  See Hamburger, supra note 194, at 374. 
196  Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31. 
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As suggested by its title, the Bill took the same position as Congress in 
1821 and as Justice Curtis in 1857, but now more concisely asserted it in 
terms of “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”197  
It thereby pointedly treated the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
states as the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.  
When taken out of historical context, this may seem paradoxical.  It was, 
however, merely an expression of the standard antislavery position.  When 
Southerners argued that blacks lacked Comity Clause rights because they 
were not citizens of the United States, antislavery advocates answered that 
blacks were entitled to such privileges and immunities precisely because 
they were citizens of the United States. 
The first clause of the Privileges and Immunities Bill laid out its sub-
stantive requirements.  This clause began by declaring (in response to states 
such as Missouri and Oregon) that citizens of the United States had a right 
to travel to other states.  It then specified other privileges and immunities 
(of the sort that Oregon had denied).  Finally, it declared the general princi-
ple of cross-jurisdictional equality.  The result was: 
That every person, being a citizen of the United States shall, in right of such 
citizenship, be entitled, freely and without hindrance or molestation, to go 
from the State, Territory, or district of his or her residence, and to pass into and 
through and to sojourn, remain and take permanent abode within each of the 
several States, Territories, and districts of the United States, and therein to ac-
quire, own, control, enjoy and dispose of property, real, personal and mixed; 
and to do and transact business, and to have full and speedy redress in the 
courts for all rights of person and property, as fully as such rights and privi-
leges are held and enjoyed by the other citizens of such State, Territory, or dis-
trict; and, moreover, therein to have, enjoy, and demand the same immunities 
and exemptions from high or excessive impositions, assessments, and taxation 
as are enjoyed by such other citizens under the laws or usages of such State, 
Territory, or district, and to have, demand, and enjoy all other privileges and 
immunities which the citizens of the same State, Territory, or district would be 
entitled to under the like circumstances.198 
The Bill thereby aimed to resolve the struggle over the Comity Clause that 
had begun forty-five years earlier.   
Like the Civil Rights Act, the Bill did not merely state constitutional 
principles, but asserted them as a foundation for enforcement sections.  
 
197  A Bill to Declare and Protect All the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States 
in the Several States, H.R. 437, 39th Cong. § 1 (as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 2, 1866, 
Printers No. 116).  
198  Id.  Note that the Bill’s initial clause was framed as a guarantee of the freedom of citizens rather 
than as a prohibition on the states.  On this account, the Bill’s enforcement provisions could bar private 
interference with the right, without requiring state action.  In constrast, the Fourteenth Amendment spe-
cified, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States.”  The Amendment thereby made clear it was simply a prohibition on the 
states, with obvious implications for its enforcement.  
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Much of the history of slavery seemed to be a history of Southern evasion 
of the Constitution, and the enforcement provisions therefore seemed essen-
tial.  In its first section, the Privileges and Immunities Bill attempted to cut 
off evasion by specifying the right to travel and other details of the pro-
tected privileges and immunities.  In its enforcement sections, the Bill took 
further measures against evasion by laying out criminal and civil reme-
dies.199  
Such was the legislative version of what Congress would soon propose 
as a constitutional amendment.  Revealingly, it protected Comity Clause 
rights under the rubric of “A Bill [t]o declare and protect all the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several states.”200 
C. Shellabarger’s Explanation of the Bill 
The most extensive explanation of the Privileges and Immunities Bill 
came from its sponsor, Representative Samuel Shellabarger—a radical Re-
publican lawyer from Ohio.  Although the import of the Bill is clear enough 
from its words, Shellabarger’s speech is important, for it confirms that the 
Bill was not meant to do anything more than supplement the Civil Rights 
Act by securing Comity Clause rights. 
Shellabarger had proposed the Bill on April 2, 1866.  Although this 
was shortly after President Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act, Shella-
barger recognized that Congress would override the veto—something Con-
gress did just days afterward.  The Privileges and Immunities Bill got two 
readings in the House of Representatives, and the Judiciary Committee 
agreed to report in favor of it, but the Bill came back to the floor only in the 
summer of 1866, when there was no longer time for a final House vote.201  
The underlying problems, however, were not so much procedural as consti-
tutional.  Congress had the votes to repudiate Johnson’s veto of the Civil 
 
199  Id. §§ 2–5. 
200  Id. 
201  The next month, Representative James F. Wilson proposed a substitute bill.  Amendment in the 
Nature of a Substitute to Bill H.R. 437, 39th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, May 7, 
1866).  Wilson’s bill came back to the House from the Judiciary Committee the following year.  A Bill 
to Declare and Protect All the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States in the Several 
States, H.R. 1037, 39th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan. 23, 1867). 
Incidentally, both iterations of Wilson’s bill included a final paragraph stating: “That the enumera-
tion of the privileges and immunities of citizenship in this act contained shall not be deemed a denial or 
abridgment of any other rights, privileges, or immunities which appertain to citizenship under the Con-
stitution.”  Id. § 12.  In other words, Shellabarger’s legislation about the Comity Clause “privileges and 
immunities” of free blacks was not to have adverse implications in the other context in which federal 
law protected privileges and immunities.  To be specific, Shellabarger’s bill responded to the needs of 
free blacks for privileges and immunities and it therefore concerned only Comity Clause rights.  But it 
will be recalled that cession treaties protected the “privileges, rights and immunities” of citizens of the 
United States, which in that context meant federal rights in general.  It therefore was necessary to pre-
vent the narrow meaning assumed in the one context from affecting the broader meaning assumed in the 
other context. 
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Rights Act, but in light of the constitutional objections, Congress did not 
press ahead with the Privileges and Immunities Bill.  
Shellabarger responded by giving a speech in the House about “the 
right of Congress to pass this bill into a law,” his goal being “to attract to its 
consideration the attention of my fellow-members of this House.”202  As has 
been seen, it was a familiar practice to rewrite the Comity Clause by spell-
ing out contemporary assumptions about federal citizenship within inserted 
brackets.203  Adopting this approach, Shellabarger observed that “[t]he de-
sign of this bill is to enforce that demand of the Constitution which declares 
‘the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens’ [of the United States] ‘in the several States.’”204  Shella-
barger added that “[t]his bill occupies this single ground, and aims at 
nothing beyond.”205 
He urged that the Bill was necessary in addition to the Civil Rights 
Act.  The latter guaranteed equal civil rights under state law.  The right to 
cross-jurisdictional equality, however, also needed attention, for as already 
noted, this was not necessarily a claim under state law.  As Shellabarger ob-
served about his bill, “Its scope is distinct from that of the ‘civil rights bill.’  
That insures equality in certain civil rights.  This protects all the fundamen-
tal rights of the citizen of one State who seeks to enjoy them in another 
State.  The ‘civil rights bill,’ therefore, has, in no sense, rendered this law 
unnecessary.”206 
Shellabarger’s bill was a guarantee about who enjoyed Comity Clause 
rights, not about what those rights were, and it is therefore perhaps forgiv-
able that he was a little fuzzy on the question of what was protected.  He 
understood that there had to be a distinction between the rights that were 
exclusively “local” and the others, to which visitors had a claim, and he 
adopted Bushrod Washington’s notion that some were “fundamental” and 
others were “local, and not fundamental.”207  Unfortunately, this could not 
easily be reconciled with his statement a minute earlier that his bill was de-
signed “to secure to the citizens of every State within every other State the 
‘privileges and immunities (whatever they may be) accorded in each to its 
own citizens.’”208  Nor, more seriously, could it be reconciled with the Bill’s 
statement that visitors to a state were to enjoy “all” of the privileges and 
 
202  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 293 (1866) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger on July 
25, 1866).   
203  See supra text accompanying notes 181–83. 
204  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 293 (1866).  Although “[of the United States]” ap-
pears in the Globe, it obviously is not possible to discern whether Shellabarger indicated the brackets 
when speaking or inserted them when rewriting his speech, let alone whether the reporter or an editor 
did this. 
205  Id. 
206  Id.   
207  Id.  
208  Id. 
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immunities of citizens of the state.  Shellabarger admitted that there was 
some “confusion” about what was fundamental and what was not, but he at 
least was confident “it is universally agreed” that the rights “which Kent 
enumerates as ‘fundamental,’ cannot be taken away from any citizen of the 
United States by the laws of any State, neither from its own citizens nor 
from those coming in from another State.”209   
In drafting the Bill, Shellabarger had anticipated constitutional objec-
tions, and this was why he had framed its title in terms of the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States.  When the advocates of Mis-
souri had complained in 1821 that Congress lacked the power to place its 
condition on Missouri’s statehood, Congress had stressed that it was pro-
tecting rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.  Similarly, when Democ-
rats in 1866 questioned whether Congress had the power to enforce 
constitutional rights against the states, Shellabarger entitled his Privileges 
and Immunities Bill to make clear that, in securing Comity Clause rights, it 
was protecting “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States.”210  As he explained, “these rights grow out of and belong to national 
citizenship and not out of State citizenship,” and therefore “it is within the 
power and duty of the United States to secure by appropriate legislation 
these fundamental rights.”211  
Shellabarger recognized that opponents would try to defeat the bill by 
misinterpreting it—in particular, by suggesting that its words about federal 
citizenship would protect citizens from their own states or fellow citizens.  
Lest there be any such misunderstanding, Shellabarger emphasized that 
“this bill has been carefully limited”: 
It protects no one except such as seek to or are attempting to go either tempo-
rarily or for abode from their own State into some other.  It does not attempt to 
enforce the enjoyment of the rights of a citizen within his own State, against 
the wrongs of his fellow-citizens of his own State after the injured party has 
become or when he is a citizen of the State where the injury is done.  This is 
because the bill is confined to the enforcement of this single clause of the Con-
stitution.212 
In other words, it “confine[s] its provisions to the single object of seeing 
that this clause of the Constitution was executed throughout the Repub-
lic.”213  
 
209  Id. 
210  A Bill to Declare and Protect All the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States 
in the Several States, H.R. 437, 39th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Printer’s No. 
116, Apr. 2, 1866). 
211  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 293 (1866). 
212  Id. 
213  Id.  By way of elaboration, Shellabarger quoted a Massachusetts case, Abbot v. Bayley, to the ef-
fect that “the privileges and immunities of ‘the citizens of each State,’ in every other State can, by virtue 
of this clause, only be applied in case of a removal from one State into another.”  Id. (quoting Abbot, 23 
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Although the Privileges and Immunities Bill of 1866 did not get very 
far, it remains very significant, for it shows that the antislavery position on 
the Comity Clause led directly to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges 
or Immunities Clause.  To explain why Congress had the power to enforce 
the Comity Clause, the Bill described such rights as “the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States.”  This was not entirely persua-
sive as constitutional interpretation, and in part for this reason, it would 
soon enter federal law not in a statute, but in a constitutional amendment.  
VI. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 constitutionalized a position that 
by then was widely familiar.  Today, the Amendment’s Privileges or Im-
munities Clause is usually understood on the basis of vague generalities in 
the congressional drafting debates, and it therefore seems rather puzzling.  
At the time, however, it was obvious that the clause reasserted a position al-
ready taken by antislavery lawyers in the aftermath of the second Missouri 
Compromise, by Justice Curtis in Dred Scott, and most recently, in 1866, 
by the Privileges and Immunities Bill.  The Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause thus finally gave constitutional effect to the long-
standing attempts to defend the Comity Clause as a right of federal citizen-
ship.  The Comity Clause had guaranteed to citizens of the states the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of other states.  Now, after almost half a 
century of struggle, the Fourteenth Amendment settled that the privileges 
and immunities owed to the citizens of states under the Comity Clause were 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States and, as such, 
were enforceable by Congress. 
A. Constitutionalizing the Principles of the Civil Rights Act and the 
Privileges and Immunities Bill 
The Civil Rights Act and the Privileges and Immunities Bill would to-
gether have barred both intrastate and interstate racial discrimination.  The 
Act, however, had to be adopted over constitutional objections, and the Bill 
failed when it encountered such obstacles.  Congress therefore, in July 
1866, placed all such legislation on express constitutional foundations—not 
                                                                                                                           
Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 91 (1827)).  Indeed, “[t]o conform the bill to this view of this constitutional provi-
sion, it was deemed best to limit it in accordance with that decision, and to make it secure to all the peo-
ple those great international rights which are embraced in unrestrained and secure inter-State commerce, 
intercourse, travel, sojourn, and acquisition of abode.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 293 
(1866).  The Bill’s protection of Americans who traveled across state boundaries thus would be like the 
protection of persons who traveled across international borders.  On this basis, Shellabarger again em-
phasized: “It only attempts to see to it that the citizens of the United States shall have what it is solemnly 
and expressly declared by their national Constitution they shall be ‘entitled to in the several States.’”  Id. 
at 294. 
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by creating any new principle, but rather by giving familiar principles clear 
constitutional foundations. 
It is well-known that the Fourteenth Amendment’s clauses on equal 
protection and due process gave constitutional force to positions Congress 
had earlier taken in the Civil Rights Act.  This statute had secured equality 
in various natural rights and the due process enjoyed under law.  Echoing 
the statute, the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed equal protection of the 
laws and due process, and in both ways it also established a foundation for 
enforcement legislation such as the Civil Rights Act.214  
Similarly, the final version of the Fourteenth Amendment’s clause on 
privileges or immunities guaranteed what Congress had considered protect-
ing in the Bill “[t]o declare and protect all the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States in the several states.”  This bill, as Shellabarger 
had explained, was designed “to enforce” the Comity Clause, “and aims at 
nothing beyond.”215  After his enforcement statute collapsed under the 
weight of constitutional objections, Congress, in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, asserted the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States 
and gave Congress the power to enforce these rights.  Thus, just as the Civil 
Rights Act was the precursor to the Amendment’s clauses on due process 
and equal protection, so too the Privileges and Immunities Bill was the ba-
sis of its clause on privileges or immunities. 
This genesis is evident from the drafting of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which adopted the words of the Privileges and Immunities Bill.  The 
Amendment was drafted by the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruc-
tion, and on February 3, 1866, while sitting on this Committee, Representa-
tive John Bingham of Ohio proposed the words: “The Congress shall have 
power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the 
citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states.”216  Making explicit what this would enforce, Bingham added a cita-
tion to the Comity clause: “Art. 4, Sec. 2.”217  On April 21, 1866, however, 
Bingham proposed the now familiar words “No state shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States.”218 
What happened between early February and late April?  Scholars have 
assumed that Bingham suddenly veered away from enforcement of the 
 
214  The earlier history of equal protection provisions reveals that “the equal protection of the laws” 
meant equal protection of the natural liberty secured by law.  See Hamburger, supra note 194, at 299 
(tracing the history of ideas of equal protection and how they differed from more general ideas of equal-
ity). 
215  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 293 (1866).   
216  JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION: 39TH CONGRESS, 1865–
1867, at 60–61 (photo. reprint 2005) (Benjamin B. Kendrick ed., 1914) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE 
JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION]. 
217  Id. 
218  Id. at 87. 
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Comity Clause and toward a bold new vision—a vision of incorporation—
as if he were struck by inspiration or had an “epiphany.”219  In fact, he more 
probably was struck by the title of Shellabarger’s bill.  Shellabarger intro-
duced his bill on April 2, when it was printed for members of the House.220  
Less than three weeks later, at the next drafting session of the Joint Com-
mittee, Bingham proposed that the Fourteenth Amendment contain phrasing 
very similar to the title that Shellabarger had given to his bill.221  
Of course, this is not to say that Bingham simply copied the Bill.  On 
the contrary, the Bill echoed the phrase with which Bingham and other op-
ponents of slavery had been defending the Comity Clause since before the 
Civil War.  The phrase was thus a succinct and familiar label for the Comity 
Clause rights that Bingham had already attempted to protect in the Four-
teenth Amendment.  But after Shellabarger used the phrase in his legisla-
tion, Bingham apparently realized that he should adopt the phrase in his 
Amendment.222  
Later, during debates on the floor of the Senate, the Amendment’s ini-
tial sentence was added—that “All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside.”223  This stipulation was pru-
dent, for without it, Southerners might have contested the Northern assump-
tion that free blacks were citizens of the United States.224   
The Fourteenth Amendment thus finally resolved the dispute over the 
Comity Clause by placing the antislavery interpretation of it on a secure 
 
219  See, e.g., Lash, supra note 13, at 1302 (“John Bingham had an epiphany—one that altered his 
original views of Article IV and that caused him to completely rewrite his proposed amendment.”). 
220  H.R. JOURNAL, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 481 (1866). 
221  The previous meeting of the Joint Committee had been March 5, 1866, and although there was a 
meeting on April 16, the sole object of that meeting was to hear from Senator Stewart of Nebraska.  Ac-
cordingly, the next drafting meeting was April 21, when Bingham introduced the phrasing drawn from 
Shellabarger’s bill.  See JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION, supra 
note 216, at 78, 81–82, 87. 
222  As observed supra in note 198, Bingham’s wording echoed the Bill’s main principle, but not 
Shellabarger’s attempt to justify enforcement in the absence of state action.  
After Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, some Southern governors attempted to substi-
tute an alternative, part of which would have restored the Privileges or Immunities Clause to words that 
more closely followed the Comity Clause: that “the Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the pri-
vileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.”  A Southern Proposal for a Fourteenth Amend-
ment (Feb. 4, 1867), in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 238, 240 (Walter L. Fleming 
ed., 1950).  This, however, merely repeated the phrasing that had failed to protect free blacks under the 
Comity Clause, and that had not justified congresional enforcement.  In any case, the entire Southern 
substitute was politically doomed from the start. 
223  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  For the promptings from Senator Wade and the initial proposal 
from Senator Howard, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768 (1866). 
224  Arguably, either the definition of citizenship or the Privileges or Immunities Clause might have 
sufficed to protect free blacks in their Comity Clause rights.  The goal, however, was not merely to 
make such protection possible, but to secure it in a way that would preclude any further evasion.  Con-
gress therefore had good reason to adopt both provisions. 
105:61  (2011) Privileges or Immunities 
 125 
constitutional footing.  Today, it may be thought that the renewed protec-
tion for Comity Clause rights in the Privileges or Immunities Clause was 
merely redundant.  At the time, however, it was essential.  Conceptually, 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause was needed to repudiate the positions 
taken by Missouri and by Chief Justice Taney.  On a more practical level, it 
was necessary to justify congressional enforcement.  After a half century of 
state abridgments of the privileges and immunities of free blacks, the Four-
teenth Amendment at last clarified that these rights were privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States.  On this basis, blacks could fi-
nally hope to enjoy these rights, and Congress, under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, could hope to enforce them. 
B. The Debates on the Fourteenth Amendment 
Although the congressional and ratification debates on the Fourteenth 
Amendment are usually viewed as the core of the Amendment’s history, 
this Article shows that, in a sense, they were merely the conclusion of ear-
lier developments.  To be sure, when the Privileges or Immunities Clause is 
stripped of its earlier history, the relevant evidence gets reduced to the de-
bates, and, in this narrow decontextualized form, the vague, allusive oratory 
of the representatives and senators has sometimes seemed to refer to an in-
corporation of the Bill of Rights against the states.  Yet when the debates 
are considered in the context of the half-century struggle over the rights of 
mobile blacks, it becomes clear what the congressmen meant.225   
The arguments of many congressmen could be relied upon here to 
show how the debates make sense in light of the earlier history, but it 
should suffice, by way of illustration, to examine the words of two leading 
advocates of the Fourteenth Amendment: Bingham and Howard.226  Their 
speeches are frequently relied upon as dispositive evidence that the framers 
of the Amendment intended incorporation.  As will be seen, however, their 
words are much more consistent with the account given here. 
1. Bingham.—Representative John Bingham not only drafted the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause but also prominently argued for the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Speaking on February 28, 1866, he defended the ver-
sion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause then before the House.  This 
was the early version, which simply granted congressional enforcement 
power as to the privileges and immunities of state citizens: “The Congress 
 
225  In this sense, the methodology of this Article is the opposite of that in most scholarship on the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Rather than delve deeply into debates that have seemed largely incon-
clusive, this Article concentrates on the prior context, which clarifies their meaning. 
226  For a detailed and well-known survey of the views of congressmen, see Fairman, Fourteenth 
Amendment, supra note 9.  It is acknowledged, even by some scholars sympathetic to incorporation, that 
at least some congressmen assumed that the Privilege or Immunities Clause merely echoed the Comity 
Clause.  See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 8, at 1643 (discussing Rep. Hiram Price); Curtis, The Klan, supra 
note 8, at 1411–12 (discussing Sen. Trumbull, albeit in 1871). 
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shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to 
secure to the citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of citizens 
in the several states . . . .”227  Bingham bluntly described this as “that part of 
the amendment which seeks the enforcement of the second section of the 
fourth article of the Constitution of the United States.”228  
Although he had not yet reformulated the Clause to secure “the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” he already defended it 
in such terms.  He rhetorically asked: 
Who ever before heard that any State had reserved to itself the right, under the 
Constitution of the United States, to withhold from any citizen of the United 
States within its limits, under any pretext whatever, any of the privileges of a 
citizen of the United States, or to impose on him, no matter from what State he 
may have come, any burden contrary to that provision of the Constitution 
which declares that the citizen shall be entitled in the several States to all the 
immunities of a citizen of the United States?229 
Bingham was recalling Congress’s resolution on Missouri, even echoing 
Missouri’s point about “any pretext whatsoever.”  But Bingham, unlike 
Congress in 1821, spoke of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States.  He was taking a position familiar from the past—including 
his own past—not one espoused by future advocates of incorporation.  
With this defense of the Comity Clause in mind, he exclaimed: “Why, 
I ask, should not the ‘injunctions and prohibitions,’ addressed by the people 
in the Constitution to the States and the Legislatures of States, be enforced 
by the people through the proposed amendment?”230  He explained:  
The question is, simply, whether you will give by this amendment to the peo-
ple of the United States the power, by legislative enactment, to punish officials 
of States for violation of the oaths enjoined upon them by their Constitution?  
That is the question, and the whole question.231   
On account of this narrow focus of the proposed clause, “[t]he adoption of 
the proposed amendment will take from the States no rights that belong to 
the States.”232  In other words, “[t]he proposed amendment imposed no ob-
ligation on any State, nor on any citizen in a State which was not now en-
joined upon them by the very letter of the Constitution.”233  Why not?  
Because the Amendment merely enforced existing constitutional limits that 
 
227  JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 216, at 61.  
228  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham on Feb. 28, 1866).  
229  Id.  For Bingham’s role in drafting the Privileges or Immunities Clause, see JOURNAL OF THE 
JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 216, at 60–61, 87.   
230  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866). 
231  Id. 
232  Id. 
233  The Last Reported Amendment of the Constitution, BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER, Mar. 2, 
1866, at 1.   
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already were “addressed by the people in the Constitution to the States and 
the Legislatures of States.”234  
Bingham then went into detail about the Bill of Rights.  But in doing 
so, he did not allude to incorporation, let alone incorporation through the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Instead, he made clear that he was talking 
about the Equal Protection Clause, and how it would allow Congress in ef-
fect to enforce the Bill of Rights.  Alluding to the states, and apparently 
their legislators, he said: 
[I]n the event of the adoption of this amendment, if they conspire together to 
enact laws refusing equal protection to life, liberty, or property, the Congress 
is thereby vested with power to hold them to answer before the bar of the na-
tional courts for the violation of their oaths and of the rights of their fellow-
men.  Why should it not be so?  That is the question.  Why should it not be so?  
Is the bill of rights to stand in our Constitution hereafter, as in the past five 
years within eleven States, a mere dead letter?  It is absolutely essential to the 
safety of the people that it should be enforced.235  
It was a stirring passage, and it alluded to enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 
but Bingham was speaking of Congressional enforcement of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.  Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the states could not de-
ny equal protection of the rights they guaranteed in their state bills of rights, 
and Bingham apparently assumed that this would in effect allow Congress 
to protect the rights assured by the Bill of Rights.236  Certainly, he was not 
talking about the direct requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, let 
alone its Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
Only after making this point about equal protection did he get to privi-
leges and immunities, and on this he recited what might be expected: 
Is it not essential to the unity of the people that the citizens of each State shall 
be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
States? . . .  As the whole Constitution was to be the supreme law in every 
State, it therefore results that the citizens of each State, being citizens of the 
United States, should be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States in every State . . . .237 
These were the Comity Clause rights that had come to be understood as the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.   
Bingham therefore understood them very differently from the sort of 
rights secured by bills of rights, which were mostly the rights of persons.  
Bingham repeatedly distinguished between the privileges and immunities of 
citizens and the rights of persons.  It was a distinction he had relied upon 
 
234  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866). 
235  Id. 
236  The equal protection of the law was understood to mean the equal protection of natural rights 
protected by civil laws and of due process.  See Hamburger, supra note 194, at 378. 
237  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866). 
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before the Civil War, and he now reiterated it.238  For example, when sur-
veying the Constitution’s guarantees of liberty, he spoke of “these great ca-
nons of the supreme law, securing to all the citizens in every State all the 
privileges and immunities of citizens, and to all the people all the sacred 
rights of person[s].”239  Relying on this distinction, he observed that “[t]he 
alien is not a citizen,” and this was why “[y]our Constitution says ‘no per-
son,’ not ‘no citizen,’ ‘shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,’ with-
out due process of law.”240  Bingham often lapsed into ambiguity when 
arguing for the Fourteenth Amendment, but he was more than clear enough 
that the privileges and immunities of citizens belonged to them as citizens, 
not merely as persons.  Nor should this be a surprise, for it will be recalled 
that he had described the Privileges or Immunities Clause as “that part of 
the amendment which seeks the enforcement of the second section of the 
fourth article of the Constitution of the United States.”241  
2. Howard.—Another leading exponent of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, who participated in drafting 
the Amendment and introduced the final version in the Senate.  Although he 
spoke more loosely than Bingham, he revealed that he too did not assume 
incorporation.  Indeed, like Bingham, he began noting that the first clause 
of Section One “relates to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
several States.”242  Like Bingham, moreover, he distinguished this first 
clause from the remaining clauses, which related to “the rights and privi-
leges of all persons, whether citizens or others.”243  Both in emphasizing the 
privileges and immunities of state citizens and in distinguishing these from 
the rights of persons, he started his speech in a manner incompatible with 
incorporation. 
Senator Howard then launched into detail about the first clause, saying 
this time that it “relates to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States as such, and as distinguished from all other persons not citi-
zens of the United States.”244  He explained that the Comity Clause had in 
effect “constitute[d] ipso facto the citizens of each one of the original States 
 
238  In 1859, when discussing the Oregon Constitution, Bingham had said: “I invite attention to the 
significant fact that natural or inherent rights, which belong to all men irrespective of all conventional 
regulations, are by this constitution guarantied by the broad and comprehensive word ‘person,’ as con-
tradistinguished from the limited term citizen . . . .”  CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859) 
(statement of Rep. John Bingham).  On this basis, after speaking of the rights of citizens under the U.S. 
Constitution to suffrage and office, he discussed “these wise and beneficent guarantees of political rights 
to the citizens of the United States, as such, and of natural rights to all persons, whether citizens or 
strangers.”  Id.  
239  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866). 
240  Id. at 1292.  
241  Id. at 1089. 
242  Id. at 2765 (statement of Sen. Howard on May 23, 1866).  
243  Id. 
244  Id. 
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[as] citizens of the United States.”245  The Comity Clause, moreover, enti-
tled them, “as citizens, to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several States,” and thus “[t]hey are, by constitutional right, entitled to these 
privileges and immunities, . . . and [may] ask for their enforcement when-
ever they go within the limits of the several States of the Union.”246  Not 
surprisingly, all of this alluded merely to the privileges and immunities se-
cured by the Comity Clause. 
Howard then, however, went in a different direction, which has seemed 
to many scholars to suggest incorporation.  Having completed his discus-
sion of the first clause, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, he said, “To 
these privileges and immunities . . . should be added the personal rights gu-
arantied and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution; such 
as the freedom of speech and of the press . . . .”247  After listing these per-
sonal rights, he summarized that “here is a mass of privileges, immunities, 
and rights, some of them secured by the second section of the fourth article 
of the Constitution,” and “some by the first eight amendments.”248  He 
thought that “all these immunities, privileges, [and] rights, thus guarantied 
by the Constitution or recognized by it, are secured to the citizen solely as a 
citizen of the United States . . . .  They do not operate in the slightest degree 
as a restraint or prohibition upon State legislation.”249  Was this the begin-
ning of an argument that Comity Clause rights and most of the Bill of 
Rights would now be somehow incorporated against the states by the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause?  
In fact, Howard was not saying that the rights secured by the first eight 
amendments to the Constitution were among the privileges or immunities of 
citizenship, whether as protected by the Comity Clause or the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  On the contrary, he distinguished the rights in the amend-
 
245  Id. 
246  Id.  Elaborating this point, he speculated about “what are the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of each of the States in the several States,” but he refused “to go at any length into that question at 
this time.”  Instead, he merely noted that the Supreme Court had not yet answered the question and that 
“we may gather some intimation of what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary by referring to a 
case adjudged many years ago . . . by Judge Washington,” whereupon Howard quoted Bushrod Wash-
ington’s opinion in Corfield v. Coryell.  Id.   
This leads, incidentally, to the question of whether Howard recognized the implications of Washing-
ton’s allusion to “fundamental principles,” which was part of the passage Howard quoted.  Washington 
spoke of “fundamental principles” in a case that did not directly concern slavery and, indeed, that ac-
cepted the right to travel, and his opinion thereby acquired respectability across sectional lines.  It is at 
least possible that Howard recognized he was quoting a case that had once fortified the Southern posi-
tion, for although it did this by including rights of suffrage within privileges and immunities, Howard 
was sufficiently radical that he may have welcomed the opportunity to suggest that blacks would enjoy 
voting rights when they moved to another state.  In the end, however, Howard’s view of Washington’s 
opinion remains speculative. 
247  Id. 
248  Id. 
249  Id. 
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ments and Comity Clause privileges and immunities, summarizing that all 
of these were among the “immunities, privileges, [and] rights . . . guarantied 
by the Constitution or recognized by it.”250  Like Bingham, he had earlier 
distinguished the privileges or immunities of citizens from the rights of per-
sons.251  Here, he apparently continued to draw this distinction, this being 
why, after speaking of “privileges” and “immunities,” he added the word 
“rights.”  As it happens, he was not entirely clear about this, for he said that 
all of these “are secured to the citizen solely as a citizen of the United 
States.”252  Nonetheless, when he said the privileges and immunities of the 
Comity Clause and the rights in the first eight amendments were among the 
“immunities, privileges, [and] rights” guaranteed by the Constitution, he 
evidently was distinguishing the rights of persons from the privileges and 
immunities of citizens.253  
Indeed, he was talking about what would be accomplished by all three 
clauses of Section One, not merely the first.  He was complaining about the 
absence of a “power given in the Constitution to enforce and carry out” its 
guarantees of liberty—notably those in the Comity Clause and the first 
eight amendments—and he added that “at the same time the States are not 
restrained from violating the principles embraced in them except by their 
own local constitutions, which may be altered from year to year.”254  Yet ra-
ther than say that the solution rested narrowly in the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause, or in incorporation through this clause, he more broadly 
declared, “The great object of the first section of this amendment is . . . to 
restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect 
these great fundamental guarantees.”255  For many scholars this is, at last, a 
hint of incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause.256  How-
ard, however, was not speaking merely of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.  Instead, he was generally referring to “the first section of this 
amendment,” including not only the clause on privileges or immunities but 
also the clauses on equal protection and due process.257   
Why did he suggest that all three of these clauses would compel the 
states to respect the first eight amendments?  The answer is simple: the 
overwhelming problem faced by blacks was state discrimination, which de-
 
250  Id. 
251  See supra text accompanying note 238. 
252  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard). 
253  Id. 
254  Id. at 2765–66. 
255  Id. at 2766. 
256  Even Charles Fairman exclaims: “Here at last is a clear statement that the new privileges and 
immunities clause is intended to incorporate the federal Bill of Rights.”  Fairman, Fourteenth Amend-
ment, supra note 9, at 58.  Fairman thinks that Howard, in this speech, demanded incorporation—
although Fairman notes that the Senate and House do not seem to have agreed with Howard and that 
even Howard seems later to have taken a different view.  Id.   
257  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). 
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prived them of freedoms that whites took for granted.  What blacks there-
fore needed, desperately needed, was not incorporation, but the protection 
of their rights against discrimination.  Thus, when talking about their rights, 
Howard had good reason to speak generally about Section One, not just 
about the Privileges or Immunities Clause, for all three clauses of the sec-
tion prevented states from denying blacks the benefit of state bills of rights.   
In other words, when Howard spoke about “the principles embraced 
in” the federal guarantees of rights, it is by no means clear that he was 
speaking of incorporation.258  On the contrary, he seems to have been sug-
gesting that these principles, as guaranteed in state bills of rights, would 
have to be respected by the states under all three clauses of the Amend-
ment’s first section. 
This explains why Bingham and Howard could simultaneously empha-
size Comity Clause privileges and immunities and yet also allude to the first 
eight amendments to the Constitution.  It will be recalled that, like Bing-
ham, Howard said the Privileges or Immunities Clause “relates to the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States as such, and as 
distinguished from all other persons not citizens of the United States.”259  At 
the same time, also like Bingham, Howard said that Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment arose from concern about the principles in the Bill 
of Rights.  How is this incongruity to be explained?  Bingham and Howard 
evidently were suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment—by ensuring 
due process, equal protection, and interjurisdictional equality—would re-
quire states to accord blacks the same rights that the states gave to whites.260  
As a result, Bingham and Howard could say that the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause would enforce Comity Clause rights but could also say that the 
Fourteenth Amendment would protect “the principles embraced in” the Bill 
of Rights.261  Thus, there was no contradiction between what they said about 
the Comity Clause and what they said about the Bill of Rights; their state-
ments were compatible because Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment 
dealt with problems of discrimination, not incorporation. 
3. Overview of the Debates.—The debates are much more extensive 
than can be recited here, but the main point is simply that they are ambigu-
ous, to which it can be added that there are more serious obstacles for the 
incorporation thesis than for the Comity Clause thesis.  On the one hand, 
some statements in the debates could be understood as alluding to incorpo-
ration.  On the other hand, other statements are utterly inconsistent with in-
corporation and clearly suggest that the central issue was a restoration of 
Comity Clause rights.  For example, both Bingham and Howard explained 
 
258  Id. at 2766. 
259  Id. at 2765. 
260  The difference was that whereas Bingham emphasized the role of equal protection, Howard 
spoke more generally about all of Section One. 
261  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). 
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the first clause of Section One in terms of the Comity Clause, and both 
sharply distinguished the rights of persons from the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens, thus making clear that the rights of persons were not among 
the privileges and immunities of citizens. 
On such foundations does it make sense to conclude that the debates 
support incorporation?  It is possible to read the debates in a manner consis-
tent with the Comity Clause perspective.  In contrast, the best that can be 
said for the incorporation thesis is that the debates have some passages that 
leave open this possibility and others that plainly do not. 
Indeed, it gets worse.  If the Fourteenth Amendment were understood 
to have incorporated the Bill of Rights, so profound a change would have 
been directly, candidly, and clearly discussed.262  The point is not simply 
that, in the framing and ratifying debates, there would have been blunt ad-
vocacy of such an understanding, and candid, formidable opposition.  Even 
more seriously, one would expect such a change to have arisen from an un-
derlying national controversy over incorporation.  It is therefore powerfully 
suggestive that there is no evidence of either a contemporary congressional 
debate or an underlying national controversy about incorporation.  Incorpo-
ration was a dog that did not bark.263   
All of this—both what was said and what was not said—brings the 
question back to the long-forgotten context.  Precisely because the debates, 
standing alone, are so opaque, it is all the more important to consider the 
context. 
C. The Genealogy  
The national controversy over the Comity Clause rights of free blacks 
led directly to the Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.  It thus 
offers a sort of genealogy that reveals the Clause’s meaning.   
It has been seen that there were at least several contexts in which privi-
leges and immunities were discussed prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth 
 
262  One might add that if the Amendment had been designed to incorporate the Bill of Rights, this 
would have been directly and clearly stated in the Amendment.  Nearly a century ago, a learned scholar 
observed:  
If this had been the intention of the framers of the privileges and immunities clause it is strange 
that very clear and direct language did not occur to them.  How easily it might have been said, the 
limitations imposed by the first eight amendments upon the central government are hereby ex-
tended to the States. 
D.O. McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, 4 IOWA L. BULL. 219, 233 
(1918); see also Fairman, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 9, at 82–83. 
263  Amar casts doubt on Fairman’s argument from silence on the ground that silence is not disposi-
tive.  AMAR, supra note 4, at 197–200.  Indeed, silence is not dispositive, especially when considered on 
its own.  But when one considers not only the silence in the framing and ratifying debates but also the 
absence of an underlying national controversy over incorporation, what was not said is at least very sug-
gestive.  Moreover, the larger point here about the silence is not that it shows anything by itself, but ra-
ther that, in conjunction with other evidence, it is a further indication of the need to focus on the 
context—in particular, the genealogy that led up to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
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Amendment.  One of these, however, mattered for the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in a way that the others did not.  There was a profound national con-
troversy over whether free blacks could enjoy the benefit of the Comity 
Clause, and this controversy came to rest on whether free blacks were citi-
zens of the United States.  Not surprisingly, therefore, the advocates of the 
Comity Clause rights of free blacks came to assert such rights in terms of 
“the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”  As evident 
from Curtis’s dissent in Dred Scott, from Bingham’s speech on the admis-
sion of Oregon, and most strikingly from Shellabarger’s bill, the Comity 
Clause controversy led directly to the drafting of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause.  This controversy thus reveals the genealogy of the Clause.  It 
is, in other words, not merely a context but the context. 
This context explains much that is otherwise inexplicable about the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.  It explains why the Clause used its pecu-
liar phrasing about “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States”—this having become, through the debate over free blacks, a familiar 
label for Comity Clause rights.  The context also explains why the Clause 
protected the privileges and immunities of citizens, in contrast to the ac-
companying clauses, which protected the rights of persons. 
Above all, the context reveals what the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause meant.  Although the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States were discussed in different contexts with different meanings, 
only one such context evidently became the genealogy of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.  In this context it is clear that the Clause, reinforced by 
the definition of citizenship, resolved the dispute about whether states could 
deny free blacks the benefit of the Comity Clause.   
Of course, there continued to be uncertainty about what were the pro-
tected privileges and immunities, and Southerners in particular still worried 
about the inclusion of political rights.264  Expressing such concerns, one of 
the lawyers for Sandford in the Dred Scott case, Senator Reverdy Johnson, 
said he opposed the Privileges or Immunities Clause “simply because I do 
not understand what will be the effect of that.”265  But this is not to say there 
was any doubt that the Privileges or Immunities Clause concerned the Com-
ity Clause.  On the contrary, advocates of Privileges or Immunities Clause 
evidently understood—as probably did their opponents—that the provision 
finally guaranteed the Comity Clause’s privileges and immunities as a mat-
ter of federal citizenship.  After fifty years of struggle, in which opponents 
of slavery had come to assert the Comity Clause rights of free blacks as 
 
264  See supra Part II.C–D. 
265  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3041 (1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson on June 8, 1866).  
Reverdy Johnson tends to be cited as if his observation were merely that of a particularly distinguished 
Southern lawyer.  See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1387, 1426 (1992).  But in light of Johnson’s role in Dred Scott, his comments 
need to be viewed more skeptically.  For his part in Dred Scott, see Finkelman, supra note 122, at 27. 
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“the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,” it is diffi-
cult to understand the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause to have done anything but what the opponents of slavery had long 
sought for free blacks in such terms.  To be precise, the Clause finally se-
cured the antislavery understanding of who was entitled to Comity Clause 
rights and laid the foundation for Congress’s enforcement power.  
The genealogy thus shows how the Fourteenth Amendment at last 
brought the privileges and immunities controversy full circle.  The Missouri 
dispute had done much to begin the slavery crisis, and the Dred Scott case 
had done much to precipitate its violent conclusion.  All along, a central as-
pect of the conflict had been whether free blacks would enjoy the rights of a 
mobile citizenry in other states.  Of course, on paper, the Comity Clause 
guaranteed such rights; in reality, however, Southern judges engaged in 
evasion.  They argued that only citizens of the United States were entitled 
to make claims under the Comity Clause, and then emphasized that citizen-
ship entailed political rights—the point being to deny the benefit of the 
Comity Clause to free blacks.  In response, opponents of slavery accepted 
the underlying assumption about U.S. citizenship and the Comity Clause, 
but insisted that free blacks could be citizens of the United States.  Anti-
slavery Americans thus came to defend black participation in the privileges 
and immunities of state citizens on the ground that Comity Clause rights 
were the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. Al-
though this interpretation of the Comity Clause had not, by itself, been 
enough to justify the constitutionality of the 1866 Privileges and Immuni-
ties Bill, the Fourteenth Amendment removed any doubt that it was a con-
stitutional principle, which Congress could enforce.  
VII. EPILOGUE: INCORPORATION AMENDMENTS 
In closing, it is valuable to consider some additional evidence—
evidence that is very different from what has been considered thus far.  This 
Article has focused on the pre-Amendment context of the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause, showing that the Clause had nothing to do with incorpora-
tion.  This Epilogue now shifts to the post-Amendment context, which 
confirms what has been seen from the earlier evidence.  The later evidence 
reveals that after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, there were na-
tional movements for a sort of incorporation.  It shows, moreover, that 
when these movements campaigned for amendments to apply the First 
Amendment to the states, they acted on the assumption that the Fourteenth 
Amendment had not already done this. 
It is unfortunate that these national movements for incorporation have 
gone largely unexamined in the literature on incorporation.  The scholarship 
on incorporation regularly examines the debates over the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  It even gives great weight to post-Amendment evidence—in 
order to include an 1871 speech by Bingham, in which he claimed that he 
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had really intended incorporation in 1866.266  Like the pre-Amendment evi-
dence, however, the post-Amendment evidence is much broader than is ac-
knowledged.267  Here, some of that broader later evidence will be 
examined—not the retrospective claim of a single congressman, but a pair 
of national movements that systematically sought aspects of what has come 
to be understood as incorporation.  
A. The Nativists and the Secularists 
The campaign for a sort of incorporation came from nativists and secu-
larists.  These Americans shared a theologically liberal antagonism toward 
ecclesiastical authority, and although they pursued this animosity in differ-
ent ways, it led both groups to demand incorporation of the First Amend-
ment against the states. 
The nativists enjoyed national significance from the 1840s onward as 
defenders of “native” American liberty.  They tended to be native-born 
Protestant Americans, who resented the immigration of Catholics, mostly 
from Ireland.  Although nativists often despised these immigrants, they fo-
cused their theological fears on the danger from the hierarchical authority 
claimed by the Pope and other Catholic clerics.268  In their assault on Ca-
tholicism, nativists systematically barred Catholics from voting, holding 
public office, and teaching in public schools—not, they said, out of per-
sonal antagonism to Catholics, but rather from a desire to preserve the lib-
erty of Americans from the Catholic Church.269 
They often summed up their goals under the rubric of separation of 
church and state.  By this, they tended to mean the separation of the Church 
from the state, not the separation of Protestant religion from the state, for in 
the conventional nativist view, Protestantism required individuals to follow 
their consciences rather than the authority of any church.270  Separation of 
church and state had not previously been an entirely respectable position, 
but through the anti-Catholicism of nativists, it soon acquired widespread 
popularity as a constitutional ideal.271 
 
266  CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham). 
267  For incorporationist scholarship that recognizes that the Blaine Amendment might matter, see 
AMAR, supra note 4, at 254 n.*; CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 8, at 169–70; Lash, su-
pra note 8, at 1145–50.  In focusing on the Blaine Amendment, however, these scholars’ arguments miss 
the other proposed amendments, which began before Slaughter-House.  They also miss the clear evi-
dence that the movements behind these amendments took for granted that the First Amendment had not 
yet been applied to the states.  This Part, incidentally, is largely based on PHILIP HAMBURGER, 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 287–334 (2002).  
268  HAMBURGER, supra note 267, at 201–02. 
269  Id. at 218, 234–51. 
270  Id. at 228, 234–35. 
271  Id. at 229–30, 233 (noting how Protestant clergy gave respectability to nativist demands for se-
paration of church and state); see id. at 234, 246–51, 275–78 (regarding nativist and related advocacy of 
separation of church and state). 
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The nativist movement attracted a wide range of otherwise discordant 
Americans, for it allowed Protestants who were riven by disputes over theo-
logical liberalism to unite under the banner of a theologically liberal assault 
on the Catholic Church.  With this shared antagonism, relatively orthodox 
Calvinist Protestants happily worked alongside persons of more liberal 
views.272  Even many secularists found common cause with Protestants 
against Catholics, thus allowing much overlap between the nativists and the 
secularists.273 
The secularists developed as a national political movement in America 
in the 1870s, when they briefly enjoyed enough prominence to form an ill-
fated political party.  Religious radicals had already self-consciously 
adopted the label of “secularism” to provide an acceptable rubric for their 
loose combination of heterodox groups, including atheists, spiritualists, the-
istic humanists, and a host of other unconventional theists.274  Building on 
their fragile unity, these unorthodox Americans in the 1870s sought a more 
robust form of cooperation in the National Liberal League, which united di-
vergent secularists in a campaign for separation of church and state.275   
Although secularists tended to share the nativist fears of Catholicism, 
they usually took a broader view of the danger, for they applied the theo-
logically liberal critique of ecclesiastical authority not only to the Catholic 
Church but also to Protestant denominations.  Indeed, many opposed all dis-
tinct religions.  Thus, in demanding separation of church and state, they did 
not seek the separation of the Church from the state, but rather the separa-
tion of all churches or distinct religions from the state.276 
Such were the national movements that in the 1870s agitated for what 
today would be called “incorporation” of the First Amendment.  Although 
they failed to get incorporation through an amendment, their efforts show 
that, after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the preeminent advo-
cates of incorporation assumed that the U.S. Constitution had not yet incor-
porated the Bill of Rights.   
B. The Need for Another Amendment 
Nativists and secularists assumed that they needed a further amend-
ment to the Constitution.  The main goal of nativists and secularists was to 
amend the First Amendment so that it would guarantee separation of church 
and state.  In pursuit of this endeavor, they proposed amendments that, 
 
272  Id. at 201, 213–14. 
273  This overlap was embodied in men such as Judge Hurlbut.  Id. at 247–48; see also infra notes 
278–83 and accompanying text. 
274  HAMBURGER, supra note 266, at 289, 294–95. 
275  Id. at 290, 294–95. 
276  Id. at 297. 
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among other things, would have applied the First Amendment to the states, 
it being clear to them that this had not already been done.277 
An early and prominent demand for an amendment came from Elisha 
P. Hurlbut—a former New York State judge who, in 1870, published A Se-
cular View of Religion in the State and the Bible in the Public Schools.278  
Hurlbut was a secularist, and not surprisingly, his theologically liberal anxi-
eties about ecclesiastical authority found expression both in anti-Catholic 
nativism and in distrust of a wider range of orthodoxies.  In writing his 
pamphlet, however, he focused on the danger from Catholicism, which he 
hoped to redress with an amendment to the Constitution.  The amendment, 
which was drafted by a friend, rewrote the First Amendment to apply it to 
the states and then added a clause giving Congress power to take action 
against the Catholic Church: 
Neither congress nor any state shall make any law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances.  But congress may enact 
such laws as it shall deem necessary to control or prevent the establishment or 
continuance of any foreign hierarchical power in this country, founded on 
principles or dogmas antagonistic to republican institutions.279  
 
277  Incidentally, their demands for incorporation of the First Amendment are also important because 
religious rights have been the focus of some of the most interesting modern scholarship on incorpora-
tion.  This scholarship suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment not only incorporated the Bill of Rights 
but also, at the same time, gave new meaning to some of its guarantees.  In particular, the scholarship 
alleges that the Amendment introduced a right of religious exemption into the incorporated First 
Amendment rights.  See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 4, at 256–57; Lash, supra note 8, at 1117, 1129, 1156.  
It is therefore revealing that the national movements that advocated incorporation focused on religious 
liberty.  Rather than assume that the Fourteenth Amendment had already incorporated the First Amend-
ment, nativists and secularists assumed that a further amendment was necessary for this purpose.  And 
rather than seek a right of exemption, they sought to reconstruct the First Amendment toward separation 
of church and state.  See HAMBURGER, supra note 267, at 436 n.112. 
278  E.P. HURLBUT, A SECULAR VIEW OF RELIGION IN THE STATE AND THE BIBLE IN THE PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS (Albany, Joel Munsell 1870). 
279  Id. at 5.  Hurlbut was animated by fierce religious animosities.  When explaining his amend-
ment, Hurlbut rhetorically asked: “But is not the proposed amendment calculated to abridge religious 
liberty?”  Id. at 22.  He answered in the negative, explaining: “There is a distinction to be taken between 
religious opinion and worship on the one hand, and organizations and practices in the name of religion 
on the other.”  Id.  Rather than oppose religious liberty, he merely rejected religious organizations.  The 
“theocracy” of such groups was “a fungus of religion,” which “may be eradicated without hurting relig-
ion itself.  Restraint of theocracy, is the way to religious health and freedom.”  Id. at 23.   
Toward the end of his pamphlet, Hurlbut focused on a broad range of Christianity and proposed an-
other amendment of his own making: 
To the end that the functions of civil government may be exercised without interference in matters 
of religion; neither the United States, nor any state, territory, municipality, or any civil division of 
any state or territory, shall levy any tax, or make any gift, grant or appropriation for the support, or 
in aid of, any church, religious sect or denomination, or any school, seminary, or institution of 
learning, in which the faith or doctrines of any religious order or sect shall be taught or inculcated, 
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Hurlbut worried that wherever Catholics were numerous, they were gaining 
influence over state and city governments, and he therefore sought to ensure 
that the religion clauses of First Amendment applied to the states and that 
Congress would have power to take more direct action.  
Hurlbut explained that this incorporation was necessary because the 
Constitution had not already applied the First Amendment to the states: 
“The proposed amendment prohibits a state from establishing any religion, 
or preventing its free exercise.  The writer has assumed, that there is noth-
ing in the Constitution as it stands, which prevents a state from doing ei-
ther.”280  He understood that judges could strain to reach another conclusion, 
but he doubted the propriety of such an approach:  
There are . . . clauses in the Constitution of the United States which might be 
tortured into a construction prohibitory of state establishment of religion, by a 
court which should lean against it; or might be held, as I think more properly, 
by an impartial legal tribunal, not applicable to the case: such as the clauses 
which provide that the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several 
states shall be equal, and the United States shall guaranty to every state, a re-
publican form of government.281 
Evidently, no clause of the recently adopted Fourteenth Amendment was 
even worth listing as a possible vehicle for applying the Establishment 
Clause to the states.  In any case, he rejected “tortured” interpretations, be-
lieving, “It is better that a Constitution should speak plainly than hint its 
meaning.”282  On such grounds, he reiterated his assumption “that there is 
nothing in the Constitution as it stands, which forbids a state from establish-
ing a religion.”283   
Eventually, in the mid-1870s, the demands for a constitutional amend-
ment became a national issue.  The secularists, who were now organizing 
the National Liberal League, recognized the value of Hurlbut’s proposal, 
and in 1874 and 1876 they added their own demands for amendments—
thereby making incorporation of the First Amendment a central goal of their 
movement.  Although the National Liberal League most centrally wanted to 
shift the First Amendment toward the secularist vision of separation, it also 
sought to extend the First Amendment to the states.  Its proposals therefore 
simultaneously incorporated the First Amendment and added requirements 
designed to carry out its understanding of separation of church and state.  
The 1874 amendment provided: 
                                                                                                                           
or in which religious practices shall be observed; or for the support, or in aid of any religious char-
ity or purpose, of any sect, order, or denomination whatsoever. 
Id. at 54–55 (emphasis omitted).  
280  Id. at 14. 
281  Id. 
282  Id. 
283  Id. at 5. 
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 SECTION 1.— Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or favoring any particular form of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances.  
 SECTION 2.— No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or favoring any particular form of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances.  No religious test shall ever be required as a condition of 
suffrage, or as a qualification to any office or public trust, in any State; and no 
person shall ever in any State be deprived of any of his or her rights, privi-
leges, or capacities, or disqualified for the performance of any public or private 
duty, or rendered incompetent to give evidence in any court of law or equity, 
in consequence of any opinions he or she may hold on the subject of religion. 
 SECTION 3.— Congress shall have power to enforce the provisions of the 
second section of this Article by appropriate legislation.284 
The secularists gave two reasons for wanting “this enlargement of the First 
Amendment.”285  First, after reciting the Tenth Amendment, they noted that 
“the Constitution . . . contains no provision prohibiting the several States 
from establishing a State religion, or requiring a religious test for office, or 
disqualifying witnesses in the courts on account of their religious opinions, 
or otherwise restricting their religious liberty.”  Because of “this defect in 
the United States Constitution, some of the States are, as a matter of fact, 
actually guilty of grave infringements on the religious liberty of their citi-
zens.”286  Second, the ratification of the proposed amendment “would be the 
death-warrant of all attempts to pervert the Constitution to the service of 
Roman Catholicism or any other form of Christianity”—a reminder of the 
central animosity that secularists shared with nativists.287 
The National Liberal League’s 1876 amendment took the same general 
approach as the 1874 version, but moved “in the direction of greater verbal 
precision and comprehensiveness.”288  
 
284  EQUAL RIGHTS IN RELIGION: REPORT OF THE CENTENNIAL CONGRESS OF LIBERALS, AND 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL LIBERAL LEAGUE, AT PHILADELPHIA, ON THE FOURTH OF JULY, 
1876, at 12 (Bos., Nat’l Liberal League 1876). 
285  Id. 
286  Id. 
287  Id. at 13 (quoting the 1874 proposal for the “Religious Freedom Amendment”).  Attempting to 
fend off accusations of intolerance, the Liberals explained their position: 
But the proposition of this new Amendment is not made at all in the spirit of a bellicose partisan-
ship: on the contrary it is made with the strongest conviction that consistency with democratic 
ideas is the absolute condition of a permanent republic; that this consistency must be found both in 
our national and State Constitutions; and that the only way to ensure it in our State Constitutions is 
to assimilate them to our national Constitution by virtue of some such provision as we now pro-
pose. 
Id. 
288  Id. 
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 SECTION 1.— Neither Congress nor any State shall make any law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or favoring any particular form of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or permitting in any degree a union of 
church and State, or granting any special privilege, immunity, or advantage to 
any sect or religious body or to any number of sects or religious bodies; or tax-
ing the people of any State, either directly or indirectly, for the support of any 
sect or religious body or of any number of sects or religious bodies; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably 
to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 
 SECTION 2.— No religious test shall ever be required as a condition of suf-
frage, or as a qualification to any office or public trust, in any State.  No per-
son shall ever in any State be deprived of any of his or her rights, privileges, or 
capacities, or disqualified for the performance of any public or private duty, or 
rendered incompetent to give evidence in any court of law or equity, in conse-
quence of any opinions he or she may hold on the subject of religion.  No per-
son shall ever in any State be required by law to contribute directly or 
indirectly to the support of any religious society or body of which he or she is 
not a voluntary member. 
 SECTION 3.— Neither the United States, nor any State, Territory, municipal-
ity, or any civil division of any State or Territory, shall levy any tax, or make 
any gift, grant or appropriation, for the support, or in aid of any church, reli-
gious sect, or denomination, or any school, seminary, or institution of learning, 
in which the faith or doctrines of any religious order or sect shall be taught or 
inculcated, or in which religious practices shall be observed; or for the support, 
or in aid, of any religious charity or purpose of any sect, order, or denomina-
tion whatsoever. 
 SECTION 4.— Congress shall have power to enforce the various provisions 
of this Article by appropriate legislation.289 
This improved amendment was designed to be “as comprehensive and as 
thorough as we can make it.”290 
These amendments were meant to remedy the failure of the Constitu-
tion to guarantee separation of church and state.  As the secularists ex-
plained about the 1876 proposal, this amendment would complete the 
Constitution by “effect[ing] the total separation of Church and State.”291  To 
this end, however, the amendment also had to address the failure of the U.S. 
Constitution to apply its restrictions to the states.  The amendment would 
therefore limit the power not only of Congress but also of “all branches and 
departments of the government, National, State, and municipal.”292 
By 1875, some more narrowly anti-Catholic nativists had joined the 
clamor for constitutional amendments.  Of course, states had their own 
guarantees of religious liberty, but if Catholics acquired local political pow-
er, it might be important, in addition, to have the First Amendment’s guar-
 
289  Id. at 16. 
290  Id. 
291  Id. at 114. 
292  Id. at 114–15. 
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antees apply at the state level.  Indeed, it seemed essential to improve the 
Amendment, so it would bar state funding from reaching Catholic institu-
tions.  On these assumptions, nativists followed the secularists in making 
highly publicized proposals.  For example, in 1875, the former nativist poli-
tician Daniel Ullmann suggested: 
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised, or property acquired by 
taxation in any State for the support of public schools, or derived from any 
public fund therefor, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect; nor 
shall any money so raised, or property so acquired, ever be given or loaned to 
any religious sect or denomination.293 
In late 1875 and 1876, Representative James Blaine proposed a similar 
amendment and made it the centerpiece of his campaign for the Republican 
nomination for the Presidency: 
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for 
the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor 
any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any reli-
gious sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided be-
tween religious sects or denominations.294 
In fact, Blaine’s amendment was only one of a range of congressional pro-
posals of this sort.295  And when Blaine’s amendment failed, nativists di-
 
293  AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: NON-SECTARIAN AND 
UNIVERSAL EDUCATION 12 (N.Y., Baker & Godwin 1876) (statement of Daniel Ullman).  Another 
amendment provided: “2.  ‘The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union, a republican 
form of government,’ and an adequate system of free and universal unsectarian education.”  Id. (empha-
sis omitted).  For a similar, later proposal by the Junior Order of United American Mechanics, see M.D. 
LICHLITER, HISTORY OF THE JUNIOR ORDER UNITED AMERICAN MECHANICS 241 (1908). 
294  4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875); see also 4 CONG. REC. 5189 (1876).  Upon being reported out of the 
Committee on the Judiciary on August 4, 1876, it passed in the House with modifications by a vote of 
180 to 7.  HERMAN AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY 277–78 (Burt Franklin 1970) (1896).  In the Senate, the 
Judiciary Committee reported an amended version, which failed to receive a two-thirds majority, the 
vote being 28 for and 16 against.  Id. at 278. 
295  In 1876, there were at least three other proposals in Congress.  Representative O’Brien proposed, 
inter alia, “No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; . . . nor shall any religious test be required as a qualification for any office or public 
trust in any State, or under the United States.”  Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Consti-
tution, H.R.J. Res. 36, 44th Cong. (1876) (as proposed on Jan. 17, 1876).  Representative Williams pro-
posed, inter alia, “No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.”  Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, H.R.J. Res. 44, 44th Cong. (1876) (as proposed on Jan. 18, 1876).  Representative Lawrence pro-
posed, “No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof.”  Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution, H.R.J Res. 163, 44th 
Cong. § 1 (1876) (as proposed on Aug. 8, 1876).  
In 1878, Senator Edmunds proposed, “No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no religious test shall ever be required as a qualifi-
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rectly adopted similar provisions in the states or required them as conditions 
for the admission of new states.296 
Almost all of the proposed federal amendments, secular and nativist, 
sought to alter the First Amendment’s standard of religious liberty in order 
to achieve one or another version of separation of church and state.  At the 
same time, all of the proposals clearly assumed that the Fourteenth 
Amendment had not already applied the First Amendment to the states. 
It may be thought that the Blaine Amendment reveals little about atti-
tudes concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, for Blaine made his proposal 
after 1873, when the Slaughter-House Cases may have dampened hopes for 
incorporation through that amendment.297  Yet Blaine’s amendment was on-
ly one of many, and it and the others from after the Slaughter-House Cases 
merely echoed what was proposed earlier.  In the extensive discussion of 
the proposals, moreover, there is no indication that they were drafted in re-
sponse to the Slaughter-House Cases.  On the contrary, the assumption both 
before and after these cases was that there had been no incorporation.  As 
Judge Hurlbut explained in 1870, his proposed amendment “prohibit[ed] a 
state from establishing any religion, or preventing its free exercise,” for he 
assumed that “there is nothing in the Constitution as it stands, which pre-
vents a state from doing either.”298 
Of course, much more could be said about what happened after the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  As has been explained elsewhere, 
although nativists failed to get a federal amendment incorporating the First 
Amendment, their ideals of Americanism laid the foundation for judicial in-
corporation of the Bill of Rights.299  Their vision was a cultural development 
rather than a legal theory, and it was therefore all the more pervasive—
eventually reaching many persons (including many Supreme Court Justices) 
                                                                                                                           
cation to any office or public trust under any State.”  Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, S.J. Res. 13, 45th Cong. (1878) (as proposed on Jan. 10, 1878). 
296  See HAMBURGER, supra note 267, at 338–39.  
297  See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
298  HURLBUT, supra note 278, at 14.  Lest it be thought this was merely the view of advocates of the 
amendments, it should be noted that it was also the assumption expressed in a professional account of 
the law of religious societies published in April 1873, just before the Slaughter-House Cases: 
Subject to the equal protection of the laws required by the National Constitution of every state for 
persons within it, there is no restriction upon the power of the states except such as may be found 
in their own constitutions and laws, as to the support by law of church or religious establishments.  
No state attempts now to support churches by taxation, nor is it probable that any such aid could, 
in the present state of public opinion, be received by law, even if the state constitutions did not 
prohibit it. 
William Lawrence, The Law of Religious Societies and Church Corporations in Ohio, 21 AM. L. REG. 
201, 208 (1873).  For scholarly disagreement about how treatises after adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment viewed the possibility of incorporation, see Wildenthal, supra note 18, at 170–255. 
299  HAMBURGER, supra note 267, at 434–49 (showing how nativism popularized cultural assump-
tions about “American” liberty—assumptions that flattened out the difference between state and federal 
bills of rights and left much of the nation, including the Justices of the Supreme Court, open to the idea 
that the same principles of liberty applied at both the state and the federal level). 
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who were not nativists in a narrow sense, but who came to share ideals of 
Americanism.  In pursuit of these ideals, Americans increasingly celebrated 
what they considered American liberties—a flattened out vision of freedom, 
in which there was little difference between federal and state rights.  They 
even sometimes expressed their understanding of American liberties in 
terms of a single American bill of rights.  Of course, nativists saw them-
selves as defending majority values, and it is therefore no coincidence that 
their ideals of American liberty included a discriminatory conception of re-
ligious freedom, separation of church and state, which they self-consciously 
demanded as a means of protecting the American majority from dangerous 
minorities.  In this context, the Supreme Court eventually incorporated 
much of the Bill of Rights against the states, and in so doing, it reinter-
preted the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious liberty in the majori-
tarian terms popularized by the nativists.  All of this, however, has been 
recounted elsewhere.300  Here, it should suffice merely to recognize that, in 
the decade after 1868, the national movements that sought incorporation of 
the First Amendment assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment had not al-
ready done this. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause did not 
incorporate the Bill of Rights, but rather protected the privileges and immu-
nities already guaranteed by the Comity Clause.  There are hints of this 
meaning in the Clause itself.  It concerned the privileges and immunities of 
citizens rather than the rights of persons.  Moreover, in saying that no state 
shall abridge these privileges and immunities, it apparently meant only 
those privileges and immunities of citizens that already limited the states.  
The meaning is even clearer from the historical context—in particular, the 
genealogy of the Clause.  In the controversy over whether free blacks had 
the benefit of the Comity Clause, antislavery Americans argued that free 
blacks were citizens of the United States and that they therefore were enti-
tled to Comity Clause privileges and immunities.  Antislavery Americans 
asserted this interpretation, moreover, in terms of “the privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States.”  This interpretation of the Comity 
Clause became a prominent antislavery position, and precisely because it 
did not prevail in the Supreme Court in Dred Scott, it had to be secured by 
the people in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
1. The Incorporation Thesis.—Few legal questions have been exam-
ined as learnedly as that of incorporation.  At the same time, in few ques-
tions of law has there been such a persistent effort to declare a “scholarly 
consensus”—as if incorporation could be established through confident as-
 
300  Id. 
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sertion.301  In fact, what stands out about the incorporation thesis is that it 
repeatedly conflicts with the text, the debates, and the context.  
The text is the initial problem, for the Fourteenth Amendment carefully 
distinguishes the rights of persons from the privileges and immunities of 
citizens.  This distinction is revealing, and only by ignoring it does the in-
corporation thesis conclude that the Privileges or Immunities Clause applied 
the Bill of Rights to the states.302  
The framing and ratifying debates are almost as awkward.  The most 
favorable conclusion that can be drawn from the debates is that the incorpo-
ration thesis rests on carefully selected ambiguities.  Some participants, 
such as Bingham and Howard, employed wandering arguments and loose 
generalities that could, in retrospect, be understood to refer to incorporation.  
Such passages, however, probably did not allude to incorporation, and they 
existed alongside other, less amorphous passages that associated the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause simply with Comity Clause rights.303 
Last but not least, there is the context.  The incorporation thesis makes 
sense only in the absence of the relevant underlying context.  Indeed, incor-
porationist literature usually does not engage with the earlier history.  When 
it does, it overlooks the difficulties faced by free blacks who crossed state 
lines.  It thereby also overlooks the national controversy in which antislav-
ery Americans demanded “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States” on behalf of free blacks.  In particular, it misses the second 
Missouri Compromise; the racism of Corfield v. Coryell; Curtis’s opinion in 
Dred Scott; the opinions of free blacks themselves; the Lincoln–Douglas 
debates; and the 1866 Privileges and Immunities Bill.  The literature there-
by overlooks the entire genealogy of the Privileges or Immunities Clause—
a genealogy which shows that the Clause dealt with something althogether 
different from incorporation.  
To the extent the incorporationist literature focuses on context, it typi-
cally insists on the importance of after-the-fact evidence.  This allows the 
incorporation thesis to rest on a retrospective speech by Bingham.  Yet even 
when attending to the post-Amendment evidence, the incorporationist lit-
erature largely ignores the incorporationist movements of the 1870s—
national movements that assumed a further amendment was necessary for 
incorporation of the First Amendment.  Of course, the incorporationist lit-
erature cannot ignore the Slaughter-House Cases, and the literature there-
fore complains that, when these cases rejected incorporation, they deprived 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of its meaning.304  This clause, how-
 
301  See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 26, at 292; Aynes, supra note 26, at 151 (quoting Barnett). 
302  Amar’s account of incorporation at least recognizes the verbal distinction but then strains to 
show that it was not a substantive distinction.  See supra note 4.  
303  See supra quotations from Bingham and Howard in text accompanying notes 228 and 243. 
304  In fact, Justice Miller had at least a rough understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
as evident from his observation that “[i]ts sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that whatever 
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ever, protected free blacks from interstate discrimination, and whatever in-
corporationists think, this once seemed meaningful.  
The incorporation thesis thus founders on the evidence or simply ig-
nores it.  The thesis elicits much passion, but it repeatedly conflicts with the 
text, the debates, and the context.305  
2. The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States.—In 
contrast to what the evidence reveals about incorporation, it clearly shows 
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected Comity Clause rights.  
There is no need at this point to repeat the evidence—whether from the con-
troversy about free blacks, from the debates, from the text, or from later 
events.  Suffice it to say that there is much evidence, all of which shows 
that when the Fourteenth Amendment protected the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States, it was securing a familiar antislavery 
position on the Comity Clause: the position that free blacks, being citizens 
of the United States, were entitled to the benefits of the Clause. 
                                                                                                                           
those rights, as you gra[n]t or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose 
restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citi-
zens of other States within your jurisdiction.”  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873).  
305  In McDonald v. Chicago, Justice Thomas incorporates many of the incorporationist errors.  130 
S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  He assumes that the 
text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause points to incorporation of the Bill of Rights, without explain-
ing how this is compatible with the Fourteenth Amendment’s distinction between the privileges or im-
munities of citizens and the rights of persons.  Id. at 3063.  He focuses on the meaning of the words 
“privileges” and “immunities,” without considering the narrower meaning of the phrase of which they 
were a part.  Id. at 3063–64.  He relies on the guarantees of “privileges, rights and immunities” in ces-
sion treaties to understand the Privileges or Immunities Clause, without noticing that the guarantees in 
cession treaties employed a different phrase, in a different context, to convey a different meaning.  Id. at 
3068–70.  He quotes Bushrod Washington’s opinion about fundamental rights in Corfield v. Coryell, 
without recognizing that this was a racist opinion that laid the foundation for Justice Taney’s opinion in 
Dred Scott.  Id. at 3067.  He relies on the familiar speeches by Bingham and Howard, without acknowl-
edging the statements in the speeches that are incompatible with incorporation.  Id. at 3071–74.  He re-
lies on quotations to show incorporation, without considering that many of them are also compatible 
with the Comity Clause interpretation, and he argues from the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Freedmens 
Act, without mentioning the relevant legislative proposal, Shellabarger’s, which prompted the phrasing 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Id. at 3074–75.  He argues that incorporation was a central and 
widespread demand on behalf of free blacks, without any evidence of a national campaign for incorpora-
tion in 1866 or earlier.  Id. at 3078–79.  He relies on only scattered post-Amendment evidence (includ-
ing some of dubious relevance) to reach strong conclusions about what “the ratifying public 
understood,” without mentioning the national movements that sought incorporation of the First Amend-
ment on the assumption that the Fourteenth had not accomplished this.  Id. at 3077.  Above all, Justice 
Thomas does not even mention the half-century controversy about whether free blacks had the benefit of 
the Comity Clause—the dispute that led directly to the adoption of Privileges or Immunities Clause and 
that this clause was designed to resolve. 
For some of these points and others, see Nelson Lund, Two Faces of Judicial Restraint (or Are There 
More?) in McDonald v. Chicago, 30–44 (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, 10-
39, 2010), available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/
1039TwoFacesofJudicialRestraint20100812.pdf. 
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This Article’s understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
should be considered more persuasive than the incorporation thesis on 
many levels.  Whereas the incorporation thesis assumes that incorporation 
could have happened without blunt advocacy and opposition, both in Con-
gress and in the press, the argument here locates the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause within a vigorous national debate.  Whereas the incorporation 
thesis requires one to believe that the Privileges or Immunities Clause dealt 
with a question of substantive federal rights that was not central in the cru-
sade against slavery, the argument here is that the Clause responded to a 
dispute about discrimination that was prominent in the antislavery struggle 
and that was profoundly important to free blacks.  Whereas the incorpora-
tion thesis tends to focus on Congress in 1866 and 1868, the argument here 
is based on a problem and an evolving phrase that can be traced across the 
antislavery movement in a direct line from the second Missouri Compro-
mise to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Whereas the incorpo-
ration thesis divines the intent of the Amendment’s framers from loosely 
floating tea leaves in the debates, the argument here rests on the longstand-
ing public records of Congress and the courts.  Whereas the incorporation 
thesis tends to rely on Bushrod Washington’s incantation of “fundamental” 
rights in Corfield v. Coryell, the argument here observes the racist signifi-
cance of that case, which was a precursor of Dred Scott.  Whereas the in-
corporation thesis rests on the views of a narrow range of white antislavery 
Americans to understand privileges and immunities, the argument here re-
lies on the views of the antislavery movement as whole, including the views 
of free blacks.  Whereas the incorporation thesis ignores the 1866 Privileges 
and Immunities Bill, the argument here recognizes that it was a missing link 
by which the continuing attempts to enforce the Comity Clause led to the 
phrasing of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Whereas the incorporation 
thesis ignores the difference between persons and citizens in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the argument here explains why the Amendment guaranteed 
equal protection and due process for persons, but privileges and immunities 
only for citizens—a distinction about which the advocates of the Amend-
ment were acutely self-conscious.  Finally, whereas the incorporation thesis 
cannot explain the national movements for incorporation in the 1870s, the 
argument here recognizes that such movements reveal what the Fourteenth 
Amendment had not done. 
The choice is thus not very difficult.  Should one rely on surmises, am-
biguities, private or even secret intent, sudden inspirations, and what was 
said by one or two framers after the fact?  Or should one rest on what once 
was the familiar public meaning of a familiar constitutional position with a 
familiar history in the antislavery movement—a history that ran for half a 
century right up into the public record of the framing of the Fourteenth 
Amendment?  In the end, surmises, ambiguities, secret intent, sudden inspi-
rations, and after-the-fact recollections are more the stuff of nineteenth-
century novels than the realities of nineteenth-century constitutional law. 
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Rather than incorporation, the problem addressed by the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause was one that lay deeper in the conflict between prejudice 
and modernity.  To be precise, the difficulty arose from the clash between 
local discrimination and the mobility that lay at the heart of America’s 
modernity.  The Comity Clause worked well enough to secure local free-
dom for whites who traveled across jurisdictional lines.  But when out-of-
state free blacks encountered local racism, the Comity Clause was no longer 
up to the task.  Especially in the South, local prejudice defeated this consti-
tutional provision.  It therefore should be no surprise that free blacks needed 
to be federal citizens in order to enjoy the privileges and immunities of state 
citizens or that these rights came to be asserted as the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the United States.  What the Comity Clause failed to do 
during the struggle against slavery, the Fourteenth Amendment finally ac-
complished by barring states from abridging the privileges and immunities 
of citizens of the United States. 
 
 
